nor; (2) the evidencing of such intention by some word or act disclosing that the grantor has put the instrument beyond his legal control, though not necessarily beyond his physical control; and (3) acquiescence by the grantee in such intention. Blades v. Trust Co., 207 N.C. 771, 178 S.E. 565; Burton v. Peace, 206 N.C. 99, 173 S.E. 4; Gulley v. Smith, 203 N.C. 274, 165 S.E. 710; Gillespie v. Gillespie, 187 N.C. 40, 120 S.E. 822; Rogers v. Jones, 172 N.C. 156, 90 S.E. 117; Lynch v. Johnson, 171 N.C. 611, 89 S.E. 61; Lee v. Parker, 171 N.C. 144, 88 S.E. 217; Butler v. Butler, 169 N.C. 584, 86 S.E. 507; Huddleston v. Hardy, 164 N.C. 210, 80 S.E. 158; Gaylord v. Gaylord, 150 N.C. 222, 63 S.E. 1028; Fortune v. Hunt, 149 N.C. 358, 63 S.E. 82; Smith v. Moore, 149 N.C. 185, 62 S.E. 892, rehearing denied 150 N.C. 158, 63 S.E. 735; Tarlton v. Griggs, 131 N.C. 216, 42 S.E. 591; Bailey v. Bailey, 52 N.C. 44; Gibson v. Partee, 19 N.C. 530; Kirk v. Turner, 16 N.C. 14; Moore v. Collins, 15 N.C. 384; Morrow v. Williams, 14 N.C. 263; Ward's Executors v. Ward, 3 N.C. 226. But manual possession of the instrument by the grantee is not essential to delivery.
The cases are not analogous to the one at bar. The other cases cited — Graham v. Graham, 9 N.C. 322; Morrow v. Williams, 14 N.C. 263; Dail v. Jones, 85 N.C. 221; Outlaw v. Taylor, 168 N.C. 511, 84 S.E. 811; Speight v. Speight, 208 N.C. 132, 179 S.E. 461; Nixon v. Nixon, 215 N.C. 377, 1 S.E.2d 828 — all relate to attempts totidem verbis to reserve a life estate in personalty with remainder over. This has nothing to do with a joint tenancy in personalty with survivorship created by contract — either bilateral agreement or gift. Taylor v. Smith, supra.
While the deed in question purports to convey both real and personal property, counsel for appellants in brief filed states that the conveyance of the real property is not in question on this appeal. The ruling of the court below with respect to the provisions of the deed relating to personal property is made expressly upon authority of these decisions: Graham v. Graham, 9 N.C. 322; Morrow v. Williams, 14 N.C. 263; Dail v. Jones, 85 N.C. 221; Outlaw v. Taylor, 168 N.C. 511, 84 S.E. 811; Speight v. Speight, 208 N.C. 132, 179 S.E. 461. We think this case comes within the principle there enunciated.
STACY, C. J. It has been the consistent holding in this jurisdiction, following the decision in Graham v. Graham, 9 N.C. 322 (1822), that a reservation of a life estate in personal chattels, in a deed attempting to convey them in remainder, reserves the whole estate, and the limitation over is void. Morrow v. Williams, 14 N.C. 263; Hunt v. Davis, 20 N.C. 36; Newell v. Taylor, 56 N.C. 374; Dail v. Jones, 85 N.C. 222; Outlaw v. Taylor, 168 N.C. 511, 84 S.E. 611. It is quite clear, we think, that the deed in question falls within the principle established by these decisions.
"The law prescribed no formula for such reservation," says Justice Ashe in that case, "any expression in a deed that indicates the intention of the donor to reserve a life estate is sufficient." Graham v. Graham, 9 N.C. 322; Morrow v. Williams, 14 N.C. 263. No error.
But if the facts of the case are properly stated, it was improperly determined upon another point which the facts presented, but which seems not to have been noticed by the Court. It was a gift of a chattel either by deed or parol after the reservation of a life estate therein to the donor; and this, according to several adjudged cases, conveyed no interest to the donee in remainder. Graham v. Graham, 9 N.C. 322; Sutton v. Hollowell, 13 N.C. 185; Morrow v. Williams, 14 N.C. 263; Hunt v. Davis, 20 N.C. 36. Such limitations of slaves are now allowed by act of Assembly. 1 Rev. Stat., ch. 37, sec. 22.