That under that rule a subsequent purchaser, even though he had paid full value for the property, could not be a purchaser in good faith under such circumstances, is borne out by the uniform course of decisions in this state from the very beginning of our judicial history. ( Stafford v. Lick, 7 Cal. 479; Partridge v. McKinney et al., 10 Cal. 181; Morrison v. Wilson, 13 Cal. 494 [73 Am. Dec. 593]; Lestrade v. Barth, 19 Cal. 660; Landers v. Bolton, 26 Cal. 393; Killey v. Wilson, 33 Cal. 690; Pell v. McElroy et al., 36 Cal. 268; Jones v. Marks, 47 Cal. 242; Pacific Mutual etc. Co. v. Stroup, 63 Cal. 150; Dreyfus v. Hirt, 82 Cal. 621 [23 P. 193]; Scheerer v. Cuddy, 85 Cal. 270 [24 P. 713]; Hyde v. Mangan, 88 Cal. 319 [26 P. 180]; Security Loan etc. Co. v. Willamette etc. Co. etal., 99 Cal. 636 [34 P. 321]; Bessho v. General PetroleumCo., 186 Cal. 133 [ 199 P. 22].) This being so, the appellant herein is driven to his final contention, which is that notwithstanding the infirmities in the Bogart decree, and notwithstanding the fact that he took the title to the premises while the respondent was in the actual possession and occupancy of said premises in the exercise of said easement, he is still protected in the supremacy of his title, ownership, and right of possession to the whole of said premises by virtue of the finding of the trial court that he took the t

The drift of opinion in this court from an early date has favored a broad liberality rather than severely technical tendencies on this subject. (Connalley v. Peck , 3 Cal. 75; Tyron v. Sutton , 13 Cal. 494; 73 Am. Dec. 593; Peters v. Foss , 16 Cal. 357; Lestrade v. Barth , 19 Cal. 660; Hooper v. Wells, Fargo & Co ., 27 Cal. 35; 85 Am. Dec. 211; Pierson v. McCahill , 22 Cal. 127; Stringer v. Davis , 30 Cal. 318; Kirstein v. Madden , 38 Cal. 158; Farmers' Nat. Bank v. Stover , 60 Cal. 395; Sharon v. Sharon , 77 Cal. 105; Southern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Purcell , 77 Cal. 72; McPherson v. Weston , 85 Cal. 93; Chatfield v. Williams , 85 Cal. 518.) The case last cited, Chatfield v. Williams, is in most respects similar to this.

To a vendee in possession under such circumstances, the contract will avail him as an equitable defense to an action of ejectment brought against him by the vendor. (Hicks v. Lovell , 64 Cal. 19; 49 Am. Rep. 679; Warvelle on Vendors, p. 899, sec. 2; Morrison v. Wilson , 13 Cal. 494; 73 Am. Dec. 593; Love v. Watkins , 40 Cal. 566; 6 Am. Rep. 624; Central Pacific R. R. Co. v. Mudd , 59 Cal. 587; Arguello v. Bours , 67 Cal. 450; Nunez v. Morgan , 77 Cal. 429.) The principle upon which these cases were decided is, the vendee in possession under an executory contract of purchase is, in equity, regarded as the owner of the land, and not subject to an action of ejectment by his vendor (Whittier v. Stege , 61 Cal. 240), and is subject only to the lien of the vendor for the unpaid purchase-money.

To complete the purchase, nothing remains to be done except the execution of a conveyance of the right of way and a proper proportion of the water to Flickinger. His equity to a deed is perfect (Morrison v. Wilson , 13 Cal. 494; 73 Am. Dec. 593); and when such is the case, a court of equity, in accordance with its familiar rules considering that as done which ought to be done, will protect it as readily and as fully as a legal title. If the legal title would be protected by an injunction, a perfect equitable title should also.

When the plaintiff paid the purchase-money on the contract for an absolute purchase, his equity to have a deed from T. L. Grigsby was perfect, and this should be regarded as a legal title. (Morrison v. Wilson , 13 Cal. 494; 73 Am. Dec. 593.) When the lien of the Shwarz judgment attached in May, 1885, nothing remained in T. L. Grigsby, the judgment debtor; not even the equity to have a deed from A. F. Grigsby and Trubody.

A perfect equity united to the possession is, under our system, equivalent for all purposes of defense to a legal title. (Morrison v. Wilson , 13 Cal. 494; 73 Am. Dec. 593.) A vendee in possession under an executory contract, the conditions of which have been performed on his part, may avail himself of his equitable title as a defense to an action of ejectment brought against him by the holder of the legal title.

A perfect equity, united to the possession, is under our system equivalent for all purposes of defense to a legal title. (Morrison v. Wilson , 13 Cal. 494; 73 Am. Dec. 593.) A vendee in possession under an executory contract, the conditions of which have been performed on his part, may avail himself of his equitable title as a defense to an action of ejectment brought against him by the holder of the legal title.

Her title to land can only pass by deed, and the acknowledgment is a part of the deed. ( Morrison v. Wilson, 13 Cal. 494; Ewald v. Corbett, 32 Cal. 493; Barrett v. Tewksbury, 9 Cal. 13; Kendall v. Miller, 9 Cal. 591; Selover v. Am. Rus. Co. 7 Cal. 266; Wells on Sep. Prop. of Wife, § 267; Looney v. Adamson, 48 Tex. 619; Marsh v. Mitchell, 26 N.J. Eq. 497; Ennor v. Thompson, 46 Ill. 221; Kerr v. Russell, 69 Ill. 666; Board v. Davidson, 65 Ill. 124; Robinson v. Noel, 49 Miss. 253; Stillwell v. Adams, 29 Ark. 346; Heaton v. Fryberger, 38 Iowa 185; Leftwich v. Neal, 7 W.Va. 560; Grove v. Zumbro, 14 Gratt. 507; Lindley v. Smith, 48 Ill. 523; McIntosh v. Smith, 2 La. An. 758; Coal Co. v. Pasco, 79 Ill. 170; Behler v. Weyburn, 59 Ind. 143; Horsey's Lessee v. Horsey, 4 Har. (Del.) 517.

Even if it wereconceded, which it is not, that the amendment was necessary in any view of the case, when the party has had full benefit of any defence which he chose to make, when he was clearly not taken by surprise, an amendment after the trial, so as to conform to the facts proved, is always allowable. (Hunter v. Hudson River Iron Machine Co., 20 Barb. S.C. 502; Connolley v. Peck , 3 Cal. 82; Lyon v. Sutton , 13 Cal. 494.)          JUDGES: Shafter, J. Mr. Justice Rhodes did not express an opinion.

( Selover v. The Amer. Russ. Com. Co., 7 Cal. 266; Barrett v. Tewksbury, 9 Cal. 13; Morrison v. Wilson, 13 Cal. 494; Mott v. Smith, 16 Cal. 533; Maclay v. Love, 25 Cal. 367.) In view of the foregoing cases any discussion of the question in this place is deemed unnecessary.