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Morrison v. Camella Foods

Superior Court of Delaware
Jan 5, 2000
C. A. No. 99A-05-003 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2000)

Opinion

C. A. No. 99A-05-003.

January 5, 2000.

Daniel Robert Morrison, Rt. 1 Box 53, Bridgeville, DE 19933

Barry M. Willoughby, Esquire, Young, Conaway, Stargatt Taylor, P.O. Box 391, Wilmington, DE 19899

E. Scott Bradley, Esquire, Young, Conaway, Stargatt Taylor, Georgetown, DE 19947


Dear Mr. Morrison and Counsel:

Pro se claimant Daniel R. Morrison ("claimant") appeals a decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board ("Board") dated April 21, 1999. The Board denied Morrison's request for unemployment benefits on the grounds that he refused an offer of work for which he was reasonably fitted. This letter constitutes my decision in the matter. For the reasons below, the decision of the Board is affirmed.

FACTS

Daniel Morrison worked at the Thriftway grocery store in Seaford, Delaware for approximately 9 years. At the end of his tenure he held the position of Frozen Foods Manager and assisted in the Receiving Department. As a result of Camellia Foods purchasing Thriftway, Mr. Morrison was laid off on January 8, 1999. He made a claim for unemployment benefits, effective the week of January 10, 1999.

Following the purchase of the Seaford Thriftway, Camellia offered positions to most of the Thriftway employees. Former Thriftway employees, including claimant, submitted applications for positions in which they were interested. While there may have been some short delay before the contact was made with Mr. Morrison compared to the experience of other employees, claimant was offered work by Camellia "getting the store ready to open" with the potential for further employment once the store opened. Camellia insists that this further employment may have been in the frozen foods department or a combination of that department and another. However, no position of "Frozen Foods Manager" existed in the Camellia organizational scheme — the position claimant had requested on his application.

According to testimony, the preparation work was to last at least a few weeks. Claimant was told that the work was full-time and he could start immediately. Pay would be the same as his previous position with Thriftway. At claimant's request, Camellia's representative told him that the work hours could be arranged not to interfere with his responsibilities as a single father. Despite these concessions, claimant insists that since there was no guarantee of a permanent position, he could not be expected to take the job preparing the store for opening. Claimant informed Camellia that they should call him when something permanent became available.

Subsequently, Mr. Morrison applied for unemployment benefits. His application was denied by the Claims Deputy, who found that Daniel Morrison refused an offer of work for which he was reasonably fitted pursuant to 19 Del. C. § 3315 (3). Claimant appealed, insisting that, due to the vagueness of the offer, he did not refuse work. The Appeals Referee upheld the decision of the Claims Deputy. In his findings of fact, the Referee noted that Mr. Morrison's concern was for full-time work that was permanent and would not conflict with his child-care needs. The Referee concluded that Mr. Morrison's refusal of the offer of temporary work with the potential for a permanent position was sufficient to disqualify claimant for benefits under § 3315(3).

The pertinent portion of the statute reads as follows:

§ 3315 Disqualification for benefits.
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(3) If the individual has refused to accept an offer of work for which the individual is reasonably fitted and the disqualification shall begin with the week in which the refusal occurred and shall continue for each week thereafter until the individual has been employed in each of four subsequent weeks . . .

Claimant appealed the Referee's decision to the Board. The Board heard the appeal on April 21, 1999, and, in its decision, adopted the findings of fact of the Referee and affirmed his decision to deny benefits. Claimant then brought this timely appeal.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate review of the factual findings of an administrative agency. The reviewing Court is to examine the record below to determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the findings of fact and decision of the Board.Johnson v. Chrysler Corp., Del. Supr., 213 A.2d 64 (1965);General Motors v. Freeman, Del. Supr., 164 A.2d 686 (1960). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence adequate to lead a reasonable mind to support a conclusion. Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington Stevedores, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 892 (1994). It is more than a scintilla of evidence, but less than a preponderance.Johnson v. Caldwell Flexible Staffing, Inc., Del. Super., C.A. 92A-03-003, Gebelein, J. (April 29, 1993) (Mem. Op.) citing Olney v. Cooch, Del. Supr., 425 A.2d 610 (1981). The reviewing Court does not weigh the evidence, examine credibility of witnesses, or make factual findings of its own. Johnson v. Chrysler at 66. The Board's decision will be affirmed if substantial supporting evidence exists and the Board made no error of law. Longobardi v. Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board, Del. Supr., 293 A.2d 295 (1974).

I wish to make claimant especially aware, in light of his pro se representation, that this appeal is not another opportunity for a full hearing and this Court is bound to make a decision based on the record below. If the Board has acted within its legal authority and has articulated a reasonable basis for its decision, supported by the facts, this Court has no course but to affirm the Board's decision.

DISCUSSION

A. Error of Law

Title 19 Del. C. § 3315(3) of the Delaware Code states, in pertinent part, that, "an individual shall be disqualified for benefits if he has refused to accept an offer of work for which he is reasonably fitted." Whether claimant in this case is "reasonably fitted" for the preparation work that Camellia offered does not appear to be in issue. Claimant, himself, states that due to his lengthy experience in the retail grocery business he could perform nearly any work in the store. Referee at 10. Where hours, salary, and employment circumstances are the same as a claimant's prior work, "reasonable fitness" fairly may be presumed absent other conflicting factors. See Yunovich v. Corrosion Testing, Del. Super., C.A. 94A-01-11, Silverman, J. (Dec. 12, 1994). See also Hopkins Construction, Inc. v. Delaware Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, Del. Super., C.A. 98A-05-002, Graves, J. (Dec. 17, 1993). Claimant instead seems to be relying on the proposition that, since there was no definite duration of the assignment, nor any offer of permanent work, Camellia's communication with him does not qualify as an "offer of work" under the statute.

References to the transcript of the Referee's hearing are cited as "Referee at #." References to the transcript of the Board hearing are cited as "Board at #."

Whether an offer of employment has been made is substantially a question of fact, left to the Board's discretion. However, ambiguity on the record may raise questions as to whether an offer of work has been made; enough ambiguity could support reversal of the Board's decision. See Johnson v. Caldwell Flexible Staffing, Inc. at 2, supra. See also Re Delstar Industries, Inc. v. Delaware Department of Labor and Stewart, Del. Super., C.A. 96A-04-001, Quillen, J. (Jan. 8, 1997) (Let. Op.). ("Bona fide offers of work should have some degree of the concrete.") For example, a mere mention of a possible interview for a job opportunity without specifics as to date, time, or place of interview, or starting date of potential job will not constitute a job offer within the meaning of the statute. Johnson v. Caldwell Flexible Staffing, Inc. at 2.

While an ambiguous offer may not meet the requirements of the statute, this Court is not presented with such a situation. Claimant repeatedly admits in the record and his filings with this Court that Camellia offered a job opening the store. Further, there is no dispute that that job would have been at the same pay rate as claimant's prior position, that he could have started immediately, and that it would have been for as many hours as he could work. Mr. Morrison's real complaint is that the prospect of employment by Camellia after the initial preparation work was vague and ambiguous. As he says, "my daughter and I can't live on probably. And we can't pay our bills on maybe."Referee at 15. That is quite true. However, as the Referee and Board concluded, Mr. Morrison was not dealing with a hypothetical employment prospect.

An offer was on the table. It was guaranteed for a limited duration, but it was a firm offer of work. The duration of the employment behind an offer is irrelevant in the eyes of the statute. While one who is permanently laid off, such as Mr. Morrison, has more discretion in accepting or rejecting interim employment than a person who is temporarily laid off, that discretion is not unlimited. See Morgan v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., Del. Super., 506 A.2d 185 (1986) (where claimant is temporarily laid off, suitability of offered employment is measured by broader standard than where claimant has no prospect of returning to previous employment). See also Harman v. Harmon's Lawn General Services, Del. Super., C.A. 93A-10-006, Lee, R.J. (April 28, 1994). The statutory scheme allows a claimant reasonable excuses for refusing an offer, such as the job being too great a distance from the claimant's residence or the pay or other conditions being too far out of line with that of similar work. See 19 Del. C. § 3315 (3)(a-d).

None of the statutory exceptions are applicable here. The job that was offered may not have been what claimant wished it to be, but it was an offer of employment adequate to satisfy the statute. The Board committed no error of law in concluding that Mr. Morrison refused an offer of work for which he was reasonably fitted.

B. Substantial Evidence

A review of the entire record below confirms that there is substantial evidence to support the Board's decision. The Referee and the Board had first-hand opportunity to assess the credibility of the witnesses and make judgments of the facts from the testimony. This Court is bound to accept those findings, as they are supported on the record. Claimant admitted that he was offered a position with Camellia Foods. Board at 5. He acknowledged that he could do the required work. Referee at 10. It is undisputed that the pay would be the same, plenty of hours would be available, and that other conditions of the employment would be commensurate with his prior position. Camellia Foods was even willing to work around his child-care schedule. These portions of the record alone are adequate to support the findings and conclusion of the Board that Mr. Morrison refused a temporary position with Camellia Foods for which he was reasonably fitted.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the decision of the Board is affirmed.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

T. Henley Graves


Summaries of

Morrison v. Camella Foods

Superior Court of Delaware
Jan 5, 2000
C. A. No. 99A-05-003 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2000)
Case details for

Morrison v. Camella Foods

Case Details

Full title:Daniel Robert MORRISON v. CAMELLA FOODS and UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE APPEAL…

Court:Superior Court of Delaware

Date published: Jan 5, 2000

Citations

C. A. No. 99A-05-003 (Del. Super. Ct. Jan. 5, 2000)