Summary
dismissing a § 1983 complaint without prejudice, identifying the need for the plaintiff to seek relief from his conviction in state court
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Civil Action No. 3:94cv58-D-A
May 3, 2000
OPINION
Before the court are the motions of Defendant Jimmy Taylor for summary judgment and Defendant Larry Brinkley for dismissal or, alternatively, for summary judgment. Upon due consideration the court finds that the motions should be granted.
Factual and Procedural History
The facts of this case have been previously outlined by the court. See Morrison v. Brinkley, No. 3:94cv58-D-O, (N.D.Miss. May 2, 1994). In the interest of convenience, the court will summarize the following facts: During 1994, William Morrison (Morrison) owned/operated a restaurant known as Wild Bill's. Morrison held a permit for the on-premises sale of beer and light wine. In March 1994, he began offering live entertainment at Wild Bill's, consisting of females dancing in swimsuits or other similar attire.
On April 7 and again on April 9, 1994, the Defendants and officers under their command, raided Wild Bill's based on the suspicion that unlawful activity, including nude dancing, was taking place on the premises in violation of city ordinances. As a result of the raids, Morrison was arrested and charged with violating section 4-35(a) of the Code of Ordinances of the City of Corinth which prohibited the procurement of lewd, immoral, or improper entertainment by any business or entity licensed under the ordinance. Morrison was also arrested and charged under sections 4-36 of the Code of Ordinances for employing persons under the age of twenty-one, and 4-38 for furnishing alcohol to minors.
The City of Corinth repealed section 4-35 effective May 4, 1994. Although Morrison's arrests, which are the subject of this litigation, occurred prior to the repeal date, the prosecuting attorney for the City of Corinth amended the charges against Morrison and charged him under Mississippi Code Annotated §§ 67-3-53(c) and 97-29-31, which prohibit lewd, immoral, or improper conduct on the premises of a permit holder and indecent exposure or the procurement thereof, respectively.
Morrison was convicted in the City of Corinth Municipal Court under § 67-3-53(c) as well as sections 4-36 and 4-38 of the Corinth City Ordinances. He filed an appeal of his criminal conviction with the Circuit Court of Alcorn County, Mississippi, which was subsequently dismissed on procedural grounds. Morrison then sought review of the dismissal with the Mississippi Court of Appeals. The appellate court affirmed the Circuit Court's decision. At present, Morrison has petitioned the Circuit Court of Alcorn County, Mississippi, for writ of certiorari to review the dismissal of his appeal. No ruling has been issued, and Morrison's criminal convictions have not been reversed or otherwise terminated in his favor.
Morrison filed the instant case on April 13, 1994, alleging, inter alia, that the city ordinance and state statutes under which he was convicted are unconstitutionally vague and over broad under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. In addition, Morrison seeks compensatory and punitive damages for false arrest, false imprisonment, lost revenues, defamation of character, and mental anguish.
By order of the Magistrate Judge dated February 25, 2000, Richard T. Doughtie, III, Trustee of the bankruptcy estate of William P. Morrison, was substituted for the named Plaintiff in this cause.
Discussion
During the pendency of this cause of action, the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 114 S.Ct. 2364, 129 L.Ed.2d 383 (1994). Based on the submissions by the parties, there appears to be substantial agreement that the holding in Heck requires dismissal of the underlying cause of action.In Heck, the Supreme Court considered the interrelationship between habeas corpus proceedings and actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court stated:
[T]o recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.
Id. at 2372 (footnotes omitted).
Based on the principals provided in Heck, the Fifth Circuit has similarly held that a § 1983 claim attacking the constitutionality of a conviction or imprisonment does not accrue until that conviction or sentence has been reversed or otherwise terminated in the plaintiff's favor. Hudson v. Hughes, 98 F.3d 868, 872 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Boyd v. Biggers, 31 F.3d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1994). Only if the court finds that a plaintiff's § 1983 claim, even if successful, "will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff," should the § 1983 claim be allowed to proceed. See Mackey v. Dickson, 47 F.3d 744, 746 (5th Cir. 1995).
In the case sub judice, Morrison's success in his claims against the Defendants would necessarily draw into question the validity of his conviction or sentence. Therefore, the Plaintiff must demonstrate that the conviction has been invalidated in order for his cause of action to accrue. See Heck, 114 S.Ct. at 2372. Plaintiff has made no such showing. He has instead made clear that Morrison has petitioned the Circuit Court of Alcorn County, Mississippi, for writ of certiorari to review the dismissal of the prior appeal. Plaintiff suggests, and this court agrees, that this action is not ripe for decision and should be dismissed without prejudice to Morrison's right to re-petition the court for relief if his convictions are resolved in his favor. Accordingly, the Defendants' motions shall be granted and Plaintiff's claims shall be dismissed without prejudice.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER
Pursuant to an opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED that:
the Defendant Jimmy Taylor's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED;
the Defendant Larry Brinkley's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED;
the Plaintiff's claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE;
all other pending motions are DENIED as moot;
this case is closed.