Opinion
Case No. 2:06-cv-64.
May 23, 2006
OPINION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis without payment of an initial partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. NO. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996) (" PLRA"), the court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c); 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A. The court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S. Ct. 594, 595 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33, 112 S. Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992). Applying these standards, the court will dismiss Plaintiff's complaint, in part, for failure to state a claim. In addition, the court will dismiss the remainder of Plaintiff's complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Discussion
I. Factual allegationsPlaintiff is presently incarcerated at the Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF). In his pro se complaint, he sues Defendants State of Michigan, Chippewa Correctional Facility, Inspector Ian McDonald, Assistant Resident Unit Supervisor Terry Swift, and Warden Jeri-Ann Sherry. Plaintiff claims that Defendants stole some of his outgoing legal mail required for ongoing litigation in state court. For relief, Plaintiff requests injunctive relief.
II. Lack of exhaustion of available administrative remedies
Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently allege and show exhaustion of available administrative remedies. Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), a prisoner bringing an action with respect to prison conditions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 must exhaust available administrative remedies. See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001). The exhaustion requirement is mandatory and applies to all suits regarding prison conditions, regardless of the nature of the wrong or the type of relief sought. Porter, 534 U.S. at 516; Booth, 532 U.S. at 741. A district court must enforce the exhaustion requirement sua sponte. Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1104 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 833, 119 S. Ct. 88 (1998); accord Wyatt v. Leonard, 193 F.3d 876, 879 (6th Cir. 1999).
A prisoner must allege and show that he has exhausted all available administrative remedies and should attach to his § 1983 complaint the administrative decision disposing of his complaint, if the decision is available. Brown, 139 F.3d at 1104. In the absence of written documentation, the prisoner must describe with specificity the administrative proceeding and its outcome so that the court may determine what claims, if any, have been exhausted. Knuckles El v. Toombs, 215 F.3d 640, 642 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1040, 121 S. Ct. 634 (2000). A prisoner must specifically mention the involved parties in the grievance to make prison officials aware of the problems so that the prison has a chance to address the claims before they reach federal court. Curry v. Scott, 249 F.3d 493, 505 (6th Cir. 2001).
To assist prisoners in meeting this requirement, this Court advises prisoners to attach copies of documents evidencing exhaustion in its form complaint. The form complaint, which is required by local rule, is disseminated to all the prisons. See W.D. MICH. LCIVR 5.6(a). Plaintiff has chosen to forego use of the form complaint in this action.
Plaintiff's claims are the type of claims that may be grieved. See MICH. DEP'T OF CORR., Policy Directive 03.02.130, ¶ E (may grieve "alleged violations of policy and procedure or unsatisfactory conditions of confinement") (effective Nov. 1, 2000). The burden to allege and show exhaustion belongs to Plaintiff. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Knuckles El, 215 F.3d at 642; Brown, 139 F.3d at 1104. This requirement is "so that the district court may intelligently decide if the issues raised can be decided on the merits." Knuckles El, 215 F.3d at 642. Plaintiff fails to allege that he ever filed any grievances with regard to this claims set forth in this action. The Sixth Circuit has found that the district court is not required to hold evidentiary hearings on the issue of exhaustion or "spend a lot of time with each case just trying to find out whether it has jurisdiction to reach the merits." See Knuckles El, 215 F.3d at 642. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate exhaustion of available administrative remedies.
It is not clear whether Plaintiff may still grieve his claims. Under the policy of the prison, complaints must be resolved expeditiously, and complaints may be rejected as untimely. See Policy Directive 03.02.130, ¶¶ G-3, T, V. The Sixth Circuit held that an inmate cannot claim that "he has exhausted his remedies or that it is futile for him to do so because his grievance is now time-barred under the regulations." Hartsfield v. Vidor, 199 F.3d 305, 309 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Wright v. Morris, 111 F.3d 414, 417 n. 3 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 906 (1997).
Because the exhaustion requirement is no longer discretionary, but is mandatory, the Court does not have the discretion to provide a continuance in the absence of exhaustion. See Wright, 111 F.3d at 417. Rather, dismissal of this action without prejudice is appropriate when a prisoner has failed to show that he exhausted available administrative remedies. See Freeman, 196 F.3d at 645; Brown, 139 F.3d at 1104; White v. McGinnis, 131 F.3d 593, 595 (6th Cir. 1997); Bradford v. Moore, No. 97-1909, 1998 WL 476206, at *1 (6th Cir. Aug. 3, 1998). Dismissal for failing to exhaust available administrative remedies does not relieve a plaintiff from payment of the civil action filing fee. Omar v. Lesza, No. 97 C 5817, 1997 WL 534361, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 26, 1997). Accordingly, the Court will dismiss his action without prejudice.
However, the Court need not first require exhaustion of available administrative remedies when the claim may be dismissed because it is, "on its face, frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief." 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2); Brown v. Toombs, 139 F.3d 1102, 1103 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 833 (1998). Because Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim against Defendant State of Michigan and Chippewa Correctional Facility, the court will dismiss those Defendants with prejudice without first requiring Plaintiff to exhaust any available administrative remedies.
III. Failure to state a claim
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177, 114 S. Ct. 1218 (1994). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (1988); Street v. Corrections Corp. of America, 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271, 114 S. Ct. 807, 811 (1994).
Under Will v. Michigan Department of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 109 S. Ct. 2304 (1989), a suit against a state, a state agency, or a state official in his official capacity, is not a suit against a "person" under Section 1983. Id. Thus, such entities are not subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In addition, it is well established that the Eleventh Amendment bars suit against the State or one of its agencies in federal court unless the state has given express consent, regardless of the relief sought. Pennhurst State School Hospital v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100, 104 S. Ct. 900, 908 (1984); Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782, 98 S. Ct. 3057, 3058 (1978) (State and Board of Corrections). The State of Michigan has not consented to civil rights suits in the federal courts. See Abick v. Michigan, 803 F.2d 874, 877 (6th Cir. 1986). The Eleventh Amendment therefore bars Plaintiff's claims against the State of Michigan.
In addition, an express requirement of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is that the defendant be a "person." See Monell v. Dep't of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 98 S. Ct. ` (1978). The Chippewa Correctional Facility (URF) is an administrative unit of the Michigan Department of Corrections. Neither a prison nor a state corrections department is a "person" within the meaning of section 1983. Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (1989). Furthermore, Plaintiff's claim against this defendant is barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. at 782. URF is therefore not subject to a section 1983 action.
Conclusion
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, the Court will dismiss Plaintiff's claims against Defendants State of Michigan and URF for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). In addition, the Court will dismiss the remainder of Plaintiff's action without prejudice because he has failed to show exhaustion as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The Court must next decide whether an appeal of this action would be in good faith within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997). For the same reasons that the Court dismisses the action, the Court discerns no good-faith basis for an appeal. Should Plaintiff appeal this decision, the Court will assess the appellate filing fee pursuant to § 1915(b)(1), see McGore, 114 F.3d at 610-11, unless Plaintiff is barred from proceeding in forma pauperis, e.g., by the "three-strikes" rule of § 1915(g). If he is barred, he will be required to pay the appellate filing fee in one lump sum.
A Judgment consistent with this Opinion will be entered.