Opinion
Civil Action 22-cv-735
11-28-2022
SHELDON LEE MORRIS, Plaintiff, v. PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS; GEORGE M. LITTLE; MICHAEL ZAKEN, also known as M. Zakerr, S. BUZAS; M. SWITZER, Ranking CO. on Duty, J. SCOTTI; MS. TRACY SHAWLEY, as subrogee of T. SHAWLEY; J. SPIKER; B. RUDZIENSKI; and CHIEF GRIEVANCE OFFICER, Defendants.
W. Scott Hardy District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION RE: ECF NOS. 15 AND 16
MAUREEN P. KELLY UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Presently before the Court is a Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 15, and a Motion to Proceed Under a Pseudonym, ECF No. 16. For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that both motions be denied.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Sheldon Lee Morris (“Plaintiff') brings this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 related to the conditions of his confinement at the State Correctional Institution -Greene (“SCI - Greene”). Plaintiff alleges that Department of Corrections' administrators and employees violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution after he refused a cell transfer that he believed would risk his personal safety. Plaintiff also asserts statelaw claims for intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. ECF No. 9.
Plaintiff alleges that the proposed move to a new housing block would have exposed him to potential attack from unnamed and unknown inmates, for unspecified reasons. After raising an objection with several Defendants, his request to remain on his current cell block was refused. Plaintiff asserts his only alternative was to accept a misconduct with a period of confinement in the Restricted Housing Unit. As a result of the misconduct, Plaintiff contends he was denied parole. Id. Plaintiff also alleges that he has not received mental health screening in accordance with DOC policy.
Plaintiff attaches the misconduct to his Complaint, along with the Disciplinary Hearing Report, and his Pennsylvania Parole Board Notice of Board Decision. ECF No. 9-1; ECF No. 9-2 atl, 12. These documents establish that Plaintiff's stay in the Restricted Housing Unit for refusing an order was limited to five days, and that the denial of parole was based on several factors that include his prison misconduct history, risk to the community if released, and negative recommendations by the trial judge and prosecuting attorney. Id. Plaintiff's exhibits also reflect that after his misconduct hearing, he was placed in Administrative Custody (“AC”) for his safety, and that he “has requested and been granted self-confinement.” Id. at 14-15.
Plaintiff now seeks injunctive relief in the form of an order requiring Defendants to move him to a protective custody unit at a different facility. He states that SCI - Greene officials have not made satisfactory arrangements for his safety and that he is exposed to RHU conditions that may harm his mental health. ECF No. 16. Plaintiff alleges that prison officials are aware of this litigation and that he has “experienced officials attempting to deny him privileges.” Id. He states that he remains under the direct supervision of the named Defendants, who are not adequately supervising their employees. Thus, Plaintiff requests that the Court intervene on his behalf to effectuate a transfer. Id. at 2.
Plaintiff also presents a Motion to Proceed Under a Pseudonym because he “has already received notice that he has been marked for death by a violent gang with members who are both incarcerated throughout the United States and members of the free world.” ECF No. 16. Plaintiff believes it is a matter of time before “anybody with access to Lexus Nexus” will be able to view the record of this litigation, which “may cause real life consequences for members of the Plaintiffs family such as attempts to be made on their lives.” Id.
The Department of Corrections' Defendants (“DOC Defendants”) have filed a response to both motions. ECF Nos. 47 and 48. While no objection is raised to Plaintiffs request to litigate this action anonymously, the DOC Defendants object to injunctive relief as unwarranted and inappropriate. ECF No. 47 at 4. Defendant Joseph Scotti was formerly employed at SCI - Greene as a Licensed Psychology Manager. He has responded to Plaintiffs motion for injunctive relief and states that he cannot carry out Plaintiffs request for transfer and that Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate his entitlement to the relief requested. ECF No. 49.
Both motions are ripe for consideration.
B. LEGAL STANDARD
Motions for preliminary injunctive relief are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and based on the timing and nature of the motion, are judged against exacting legal standards. Ferring Pharm., Inc, v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 765 F.3d 205, 210 (3d Cir. 2014) (preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and should issue only in limited circumstances). Four factors inform a court's decision as to the issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm if denied relief; (3) whether the requested relief will cause greater harm to the nonmovant; and (4) whether an injunction would be in the public interest. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc, v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012). The first two factors are “most critical” to the court's analysis, and the movant cannot succeed if either of these two factors is not established. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017). If these first two factors are met, the court then considers the remaining factors and determines whether all four factors, on balance, support granting the requested preliminary relief. Id.
Because of the “complex and intractable problems of prison administration,” a request for injunctive relief in the prison context must be viewed with “great caution.” Goff v. Harper, 60 F.3d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1995); see also Rush v. Correctional Med. Servs., Inc., 287 Fed.Appx. 142, 144 (3d Cir. 2008). The exercise of caution is particularly warranted where, as here, the requested relief “is directed not merely at preserving the status quo but... at providing mandatory relief.” Punnett v. Carter, 621 F.2d 578, 582 (3d Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Price, 688 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1982) (“Mandatory injunctions should be used sparingly.”). In such cases, “the burden on the moving party is particularly heavy.” Id.
C. DISCUSSION
1. Injunctive Relief
Because Plaintiff does not seek to preserve the status quo, his burden “is particularly heavy” and his request must be viewed “with great caution.” Punnett, 621 F.2d at 582; Goff, 60 F.3d at 520. Based on the Court's review, Plaintiff does not satisfy this burden.
The Court first considers whether Plaintiff establishes a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits. Plaintiff claims that Defendants failed to protect him from harm by other prisoners and issued a misconduct when he refused an order to move to a new housing block in lieu of AC placement. ECF No. 9 at 12. As a general matter, prisoners have no inherent constitutional right to placement in any particular prison, to any particular security classification, or to any particular housing assignment. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221-22 (2005) (holding that the Constitution does not give rise to liberty interest in avoiding transfers to more adverse conditions of confinement).
That said, prison officials violate the Eighth Amendment when they act with “deliberate indifference to a substantial risk of serious harm to” a prisoner. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828-29 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). The prisoner must show both that a prison official ignored an objectively serious risk and that he was subjectively aware of that risk. Id. at 834, 839-40).
Plaintiff confirms that after meeting with the Prison Review Committee (“PRC”), he was placed in AC for his protection and that he has not identified the individual(s) who may cause him harm or the reasons for his belief, because doing so could cause him to be labeled a “snitch.” ECF No. 9 at 6. Such a label could create a substantial risk of harm, Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352 (3d Cir. 2012), abrogated on other grounds by Mack v. Yost, 968 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2020), but that risk must be viewed with skepticism when an inmate prevents prison officials from assessing the potential for harm or determining whether protective housing is necessary.
Beyond the speculative nature of his claim, Plaintiffs allegations also establish that prison officials did not ignore his perceived risk of harm. Under DOC policy, “[AC] is a status of confinement for non-disciplinary reasons that provides closer supervision, control, and protection than is provided in general population.” DC-ADM 802 § 3(A)(1). An inmate's request for self-confinement, as occurred after Plaintiffs misconduct hearing, is permitted when a “verifiable and documented justification exists for placement”; “the inmate is an obvious target for other inmates,” and “staff have made every effort (documented) to keep the inmate safely housed in general population.” Id. § 1(B)(4). Yet any decision to continue AC placement “shall be based on clear evidence or credible information as to whether a valid security reason exists to confine the inmate in AC as defined in Section 1 of this procedures manual.” Id. § 2(A)(7) (emphasis in original).
DOC's policies are available on the DOC's website, at https://www.cor.pa.gov/About%20Us/Pages/DOC-Policies.aspx (last visited November 28, 2022).
Despite his nonspecific claims of potential harm, Plaintiff was placed in AC, thereby eliminating any perceived threat to his safety. Plaintiffs refusal to provide information about any potential threat prevents prison officials from assessing the existence of valid security reasons for continued AC placement or alternative housing options. This conduct also precludes a finding that Plaintiff faces an objectively serious risk of harm requiring transfer. Thus, Plaintiff has not established a likelihood of success on the merits as to his Eighth Amendment failure to protect claim.
Plaintiff also fails to demonstrate that absent injunctive relief, he will suffer irreparable harm. “Speculative injury does not constitute a showing of irreparable harm.” Continental Group, Inc, v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351, 359 (3d Cir. 1980). “To satisfy the exacting standard of a preliminary injunction, the injury or threat of injury must be both ‘real and immediate,' not ‘conjectural” or “hypothetical.”' Martinez v. Rivello, No. 3:21-CV-01908, 2022 WL 3088092, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 3, 2022) (quoting Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103,109-110 (1969); Maryland Cas. Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941); United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89-91 (1947)). In this case, Plaintiffs fear of potential harm for unspecified reasons from unidentified individuals appears hypothetical and remote, and thus is insufficient to support a finding of irreparable harm. See e.g., Macchione v. Coordinator Adm'r In Washington, D.C., 591 Fed.Appx. 48, 50 (3d Cir. 2014) (inmate failed to show imminent irreparable harm where, “[b]eyond his broad assertion that he has been labeled as an informant by ‘gang leaders' and is therefore in danger of being assaulted by other unidentified inmates, [the prisoner] has provide no detailed factual allegations whatsoever”); see also Aciemo v. New Castle Cnty., 40 F.3d 645, 655 (3d Cir. 1994) (an injunction may not be used to eliminate the possibility of remote future injury). Thus, Plaintiff fails to demonstrate that he faces irreparable harm absent injunctive relief.
As to the third and fourth factors, harm to the nonmovant and considerations of the public interest, courts have consistently held that administrative determinations, such as prison housing placement, should be left to the discretion of prison management. Doe v. United States, No. 1:19-CV-1673,2020 WL 307805, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 21,2020) (citing Milhouse v. O'Brien, No. 1:15-CV-00714, 2015 WL 6501250, at *4 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 27, 2015)). Weighing the Court's traditional deference against the speculative and remote possibility of harm, it is recommended that the Court decline to intrude into the province of day-to-day prison administration to dictate the terms of Plaintiffs housing assignment and deny the requested injunctive relief.
2. Use of a Pseudonym
Plaintiff next seeks an order permitting him to proceed under a pseudonym. ECF No. 16. Because Plaintiff fails to present a factual basis supporting his alleged fear of harm from disclosure of his name, it is recommended that the Court deny the requested relief.
In Doe v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 585 F.Supp.3d 797 (W.D. Pa. 2022), the Court identified the issue to be decided as “whether the plaintiff [has] presented a reasonable fear of severe harm meriting an exception to ‘the public's common law right of access to judicial proceedings.'” Id. (quoting Doe v. College of New Jersey, 997 F.3d 489, 495 (3d Cir. 2021), and quoting Doe v. Megless, 654 F.3d 404, 408 (3d Cir. 2011)).
To obtain the requested relief, it is not enough that Plaintiff “may suffer embarrassment or economic harm....”; instead, he “must show ‘both (1) a fear of severe harm, and (2) that the fear of severe harm is reasonable.'” Megless, 654 F.3d at 408 (quoting Doe v. Kamehameha Sch./Bemice Pauahi Bishop Estate, 596 F.3d 1036, 1043 (9th Cir. 2010)). “Examples of areas where courts have allowed pseudonyms include cases involving ‘abortion, birth control, transsexuality, mental illness, welfare rights of illegitimate children, AIDS, and homosexuality.'” Id. (quoting Doe v. Borough of Morrisville, 130 F.R.D. 612, 614 (E.D. Pa. 1990)). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has endorsed a non-exhaustive list of factors to guide district courts in deciding whether a litigant's reasonable fear of severe harm outweighs the public's interest in open judicial proceedings. The factors associated with allowing anonymity include:
(1) the extent to which the identity of the litigant has been kept confidential; (2) the bases upon which disclosure is feared or sought to be avoided, and the substantiality of these bases; (3) the magnitude of the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of the litigant's identity; (4) whether, because of the purely legal nature of the issues presented or otherwise, there is an atypically weak public interest in knowing the litigant's identities; (5) the undesirability of an outcome adverse to the pseudonymous party and attributable to his refusal to pursue the case at the price of being publicly identified; and (6) whether the party seeking to sue pseudonymously has illegitimate ulterior motives.Id. at 409 (citing Doe v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 176 F.R.D. 464,467-68 (E.D. Pa. 1997)).
The factors advising against anonymity include:
(1) the universal level of public interest in access to the identities of litigants; (2) whether, because of the subject matter of this litigation, the status of the litigant as a public figure, or otherwise, there is a particularly strong interest in knowing the litigant's identities, beyond the public's interest which is normally obtained; and (3) whether the opposition to pseudonym by counsel, the public, or the press is illegitimately motivated.Id.
In this case, the factors to be considered by the Court weigh against granting the requested relief. First, Plaintiff commenced this action in his own name and thus has not retained anonymity regarding this litigation. Second, the stated bases for Plaintiff's fear of disclosure are remote and speculative, directed at unidentified individuals living in the “free world” or incarcerated “throughout the United States.” Thus, the reasonableness of Plaintiff s fear of disclosure cannot be assessed, nor can the Court determine the degree of the public interest in maintaining the confidentiality of Plaintiff s identity. An adverse result in this case does not present any apparent danger, nor has Plaintiff suggested that he would abandon this action if his motion were denied. Finally, based on the present record, the Court cannot assess whether Plaintiff has illegitimate ulterior motives to proceed anonymously, and so this factor weighs neither in Plaintiffs favor nor against.
Upon consideration of the identified factors, Plaintiff fails to justify a departure from the common law right to public access to judicial proceedings. Therefore, it is recommended that the Court deny Plaintiffs Motion to Proceed Under a Pseudonym.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief, ECF No. 15, as well as his Motion to Proceed Under a Pseudonym, ECF No. 16, be denied.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections the parties are permitted to file written objections within fourteen days, or seventeen days for unregistered ECF Users. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may respond to the objections within fourteen (14) days in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
The Honorable W. Scott Hardy United States District Judge