Opinion
Civil Action No. 1:97cv4-D-D
February 9, 1998
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Presently before the court is the motion of the defendant for the entry of summary judgment as against the plaintiff's claims at bar. Finding that the motion is well taken, the court shall grant the motion and dismiss the plaintiff's claims.
Background
The defendant Gencorp, Inc. ("Gencorp"), terminated the plaintiff's employment with Gencorp. on or about April 1, 1996. Believing that his termination was the result of illegally discriminatory activity, the plaintiff brought this action against the defendant. Mr. Morris charges the defendant with violating both the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., as well as the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2612 et seq. Gencorp. has since moved this court for the entry of summary judgment as against the plaintiff's claims in this case. The plaintiff has responded to the motion and the matter is ripe for resolution by the court.
II. Discussion
Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden rests upon the party seeking summary judgment to show to the district court that an absence of evidence exists in the non-moving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2553, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); see Jackson v. Widnall, 99 F.3d 710, 713 (5th Cir. 1996); Hirras v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 95 F.3d 396, 399 (5th Cir. 1996). Once such a showing is presented by the moving party, the burden shifts to the non-moving party to demonstrate, by specific facts, that a genuine issue of material fact exists.Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2511, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Texas Manufactured Housing Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Nederland, 101 F.3d 1095, 1099 (5th Cir. 1996);Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452, 455 (5th Cir. 1994). Substantive law will determine what is considered material.Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; see Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp., 81 F.3d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 1996). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510;see City of Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1099; Gibson v. Rich, 44 F.3d 274. 277 (5th Cir. 1995). Further, "[w]here the record, taken as a whole, could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue for trial."Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510; see City of Nederland, 101 F.3d at 1099. Finally, all ferefrom.See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254, 106 S.Ct. at 2513;Banc One Capital Partners Corp. v. Kneipper, 67 F.3d 1187, 1198 (5th Cir. 1995); Taylor v. Gregg, 36 F.3d 453. 455 (5th Cir. 1994); Matagorda County v. Russell Law, 19 F.3d 215, 217 (5th Cir. 1994). However, this is so only when there is "an actual controversy, that is, when both parties have submitted evidence of contradictory facts." Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994); Guillory v. Domtar Industries Inc., 95 F.3d 1320, 1326 (5th Cir. 1996); Richter v. Merchants Fast Motor Lines. Inc., 83 F.3d 96, 97 (5th Cir. 1996). In the absence of proof, the court does not "assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Little, 37 F.3d at 1075 (emphasis omitted); see Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3188, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990).
The Plaintiff's Claims
Age Discrimination In Employment Act
Mr. Morris contends that his termination is in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"). As a general rule in cases which do not involved direct evidence of age discrimination, this court employs the venerable McDonnell-Douglas framework of shifting burdens of production in evaluating claims of discrimination under the ADEA. See, e.g., Sherrod v. American Airlines, Inc., — F.3d —, 1998 WL 7252, * 7 (5th Cir. Tex.); Price v. Marathon Cheese Corp., 119 F.3d 330, 336 (5th Cir. 1997); Grizzle v. Travelers Health Network. Inc., 14 F.3d 261, 267 (5th Cir. 1994). In applying the McDonnell-Douglas framework:
First, the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination; second, if he is so successful, the defendant must articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the challenged employment action; and third, if the defendant is so successful, the inference of discrimination raised by the prima facie case disappears, and the plaintiff then must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, both that the defendant's articulated reason is false and that the defendant intentionally discriminated.Walton v. Bisco. Indust., Inc., 119 F.3d 368, 370 (5th Cir. 1997). Ultimately, however, the plaintiff must come forward with proof that could convince a reasonable trier of fact that the plaintiff's age was a substantial motivating factor in the employer's decision to terminate the plaintiff's employment.
In the case at bar, there is insufficient proof before the undersigned that the defendant discriminated against the plaintiff Morris because of his age. The plaintiff is correct that the demonstration of a prima facie case, coupled with the disbelief of the defendant's proffered reasons for the discharge, may be sufficient to permit a trier of fact to infer discriminatory intent. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks., 509 U.S. 502, 511, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 2749, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1993);Walton, 119 F.3d at 371; Bodenheimer v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 959 n. 8 (5th Cir. 1994). That such proof may be sufficient in some cases does not mandate that it will be so in every instance, however. When looking for evidence relative to the question of age discrimination, little can be found in support of the plaintiff's claim. The proof at bar, mostly comprised of speculative and inadmissable statements made by the plaintiff himself, is not enough to create a genuine issue of material fact on the question of age discrimination in this case so as to permit the submission of this matter to a trier of fact. The defendant is entitled to the entry of a judgment as a matter of law on this claim of the plaintiff.
Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993
Under the provisions of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), an eligible employee is entitled to a total of twelve (12) workweeks of leave during any twelve (12) month period "[b]ecause of a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) (Supp. 1994). It is unlawful for any employer to deny the exercise of any right provided for under the FMLA. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (Supp. 1994). In this case, Mr. Morris does not contend that he was terminated for taking leave protected under the FMLA. Rather, he charges that Gencorp. fired him to prevent the taking of future leave protected under that statute:
The FMLA also provides this leave in three other instances: 1) because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee and in order to care for such son or daughter; 2) because of the placement of a son or daughter with the employee for adoption or foster care; or 3) in order to care for the spouse, or a son or daughter, or parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or parent has a serious health condition. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(A)-(C) (Supp. 1994).
I do not believe that Gencorp. fired me for taking leave on that occasion. But because I took medical leave and because of my age, Robinson thought I was going to be taking a substantial amount of medical leave in the future. He fired me to avoid any future expenses that I would impose on the company because of my age and illness.
Exhibit "1" to Plaintiff's Response, Affidavit of Edgar Morris, ¶ 21. Gencorp. counters by arguing that the FMLA does not encompass claims where the plaintiff has not yet requested nor taken FMLA leave. Indeed, there is support for the defendant's position. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v. R.J. Gallagher Co., 959 F. Supp. 405, 407 (S.D. Tex. 1997) ("The law is concerned with medical leave that has actually been requested and denied."). Thankfully, this court need not decide the issue, for even if this court finds the alleged conduct actionable, the plaintiff has failed to come forward with sufficient proof in support of this claim.
As with the plaintiff's claim arising under the ADEA, there is little admissible evidence before the court to demonstrate a causal connection between a potentially protected activity, i.e., anticipated medical leave, and the plaintiff's termination. The only relevant proof at all before the court is that the plaintiff took valid medical leave, that the plaintiff's supervisor witnessed the plaintiff in a sickly condition, and that other employees had suffered illnesses for which Gencorp. paid substantial benefits. In light of the record as a whole, the undersigned cannot say there is a genuine issue of material fact regarding this claim of the plaintiff. The defendant is entitled to the entry of a judgment as a matter of law on this claim as well.
III. Conclusion
Upon consideration, the undersigned is of the opinion that the defendant's motion for the entry of summary judgment on the plaintiff's claims is well taken and should be granted. When faced with a properly supported motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff has failed to come forward with sufficient proof in support of his claims of discrimination in violation of the ADEA and the FMLA. There are no genuine issues of material fact in this regard, and the defendant is entitled to the entry of a judgment as a matter of law.
A separate order in accordance with this opinion shall issue this day.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to a memorandum opinion issued this day, it is hereby ORDERED THAT:) the defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED;
) the plaintiff's claims are hereby DISMISSED; and
) this case is CLOSED.
SO ORDERED.