is also inapplicable (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 122, par. 34-85) if the causes for dismissal have been the subject of a remediation plan developed under article 24A of the Code (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1985, ch. 122, par. 24A-1 et seq.); however, no plan had been developed for Harris. • 4 The statutory written warning, when required, must be sent by or at the direction of the local board and must state causes that may result in charges leading to dismissal; a written warning from a principal without prior local board approval is insufficient. ( Litin v. Board of Education (1979), 72 Ill. App.3d 889, 893, 391 N.E.2d 62, 64-65; cf. Stratton v. Wenona Community Unit District No. 1 (1990), 133 Ill.2d 413, 551 N.E.2d 640.) If insufficient written warning is given to a tenured teacher prior to dismissal proceedings, the local board has the burden of proving not only that causes for dismissal existed but also that those causes were irremediable. ( Parkman, 160 Ill. App.3d at 773, 513 N.E.2d at 847; Morris v. Board of Education (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 405, 411-12, 421 N.E.2d 387, 392.) If the local board fails to prove irremediability in such a case, it is deprived of jurisdiction to seek dismissal of the teacher. Parkman, 160 Ill. App.3d at 773, 513 N.E.2d at 847; Chicago Board of Education v. Payne (1981), 102 Ill. App.3d 741, 749, 430 N.E.2d 310, 316.
• 5 Whether causes for dismissal are remediable is a question of fact with the initial determination resting with the board. ( McBroom v. Board of Education (1986), 144 Ill. App.3d 463, 473, 494 N.E.2d 1191, 1198; Morris v. Board of Education (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 405, 411, 421 N.E.2d 387, 392.) The board's decision will not be overturned unless the reasons given for dismissal are against the manifest weight of the evidence or the board has acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
The Board is the only remaining defendant as to Count III. Plaintiff complains that the Board, primarily through Vallas, removed Nagle from her position as Principal without any notice and without affording Nagle an opportunity to respond. Nagle argues that the Board attempted to have Nagle resign from her position and when she did not the Board drafted false charges against her. Nagle argues that her conduct was remediable and did not constitute grounds for discharge until after a warning and an opportunity to remediate had been offered pursuant to McCutcheon v. Board of Eudcation, 94 Ill. App.3d 993 (1st Dist. 1981) cert. denied 455 U.S. 1018 (1982);Morris v. Board of Education, 96 Ill. App.3d 405 (1st Dist. 1981) and other similar cases. Plaintiff offers no facts in support of her remediation argument.
The board's decision will not be overturned unless the reasons given for dismissal are against the manifest weight of the evidence or the board has acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Morris v. Board of Education (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 405, 411, 421 N.E.2d 387. The remediability tests established in Gilliland and Argo-Summit are essentially the same.
Moreover, the inoculation team arrived two days early without notice, and the Board of Health failed to deliver the consent forms before May 18. • 11 We hold that there was overwhelming evidence to support the hearing officer's finding that the causes charged and proved against Parkman were remediable in nature since plaintiff failed to establish that Parkman's conduct severely damaged the students, faculty or school, or was such that it could not have been corrected if a warning had been given. As a result, the failure of plaintiff to provide a statutory warning to Parkman deprived it of jurisdiction to discharge her. ( Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill.2d 314, 388 N.E.2d 398; Aulwurm v. Board of Education (1977), 67 Ill.2d 434, 367 N.E.2d 1337; Morris v. Board of Education (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 405, 421 N.E.2d 387.) The order previously entered by this court staying the trial court order awarding back pay is hereby vacated.
"The test in determining whether a cause for dismissal is irremediable is whether damage has been done to the students, faculty or school, and whether the conduct resulting in that damage could have been corrected had the teacher's superiors warned [him]." The test has been applied to a variety of fact situations in which the complained-of conduct has concerned either deficiencies in teaching performance (see, e.g., Grissom v. Board of Education (1979), 75 Ill.2d 314, 388 N.E.2d 398; Aulwurm v. Board of Education (1977), 67 Ill.2d 434, 367 N.E.2d 1337; Morris v. Board of Education (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 405, 421 N.E.2d 387; Board of Education v. State Board of Education (1980), 82 Ill. App.3d 820, 403 N.E.2d 277) or corporal punishment. (See, e.g., Board of Education v. State Board of Education (1983), 99 Ill.2d 111, 457 N.E.2d 435; Gilliland v. Board of Education (1977), 67 Ill.2d 143, 365 N.E.2d 322.) However, we have found no Illinois cases which have applied the remediability test to a fact situation in which the complained-of conduct concerns alleged immoral acts between a teacher and student.
(Ill. Rev. Stat. 1981, ch. 122, par. 24-12; Morris v. Board of Education (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 405, 410-11, 421 N.E.2d 387.) In furtherance of the goal of protecting tenured teachers, the School Code provides that:
"Causes, remediable when considered alone, will be deemed irremediable where combined with other remediable causes if continued over a long period of time during which the teacher refuses or fails to remedy them. [Citations.] Accordingly, where no statutory warning has been given the evidence presented at the hearing on the charges must not only prove that the causes for discharge existed, but it must also be shown by competent substantial evidence that the causes were not remediable." ( Morris v. Board of Education (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 405, 411, 421 N.E.2d 387, 392.) Morris therefore requires that the board prove by competent and substantial evidence that the cause for discharge is not remediable.
Where no warning is given, the Board's evidence must prove that the teacher's conduct is irremediable. If the Board fails to meet this evidentiary burden, it is deprived of jurisdiction to terminate a teacher's employment. ( Morris v. Board of Education (1981), 96 Ill. App.3d 405, 411-13, 421 N.E.2d 387.) The question of remediability is for the Board in the first instance, and its decision will not be disturbed absent a showing that it is arbitrary and capricious. ( Morris.