Opinion
Case No.: 01-74410
July 31, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Magistrate Judge Steven D. Pepe's Report and Recommendation dated June 28, 2002. The Court has had an opportunity to review this matter and finds that the Magistrate reached the correct conclusion for the proper reasons. Accordingly, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation; DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; GRANTS IN PART Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, and REMANDS this case for further proceedings concerning Plaintiffs disability status beginning in January 1999.
Specifically, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that based on the evidence in the record, substantial evidence exists to support the ALJ's finding that Plaintiff retained the ability to perform a light duty job through January 1999. The Magistrate Judge found that substantial evidence exists to support the Commissioner's decision denying Plaintiff disability for periods prior to January 1999. Because the ALJ found that Plaintiff has a major depressive disorder, which along with his chronic pain and fatigue affects his capacity for concentration, persistence, and pace, however, the Magistrate Judge further recommended that the case be remanded for further consideration and findings concerning Plaintiff's mental limitations and their impact on his vocational capacity after 1998. This Court agrees with both of these contentions.
I. COMMISSIONER'S REQUEST FOR ENLARGEMENT OF TIME
On July 18, 2002, the Commissioner filed a request for an Enlargement of Time for Filing of Objections to the Magistrate's Report and Recommendation. The Commissioner relied on Rule 6(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to support the motion. For the Court to grant the motion, a showing of "good cause" must be present to support an enlargement of time beyond the allocated ten day guideline. In the present case, the United States Attorney was served with a copy of the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation on July 3, 2002, and a copy was forwarded to the Commissioner's Office of Regional Counsel in Chicago, Illinois. The Defendant asserts that, due to the July 4th holiday, a delay occurred causing the Commissioner not to receive a copy until on or about July 8, 2002.
Based on the ten day guideline the Commissioner had from July 3, 2002 through July 17, 2002 to file any objections. Even considering the July 4th holiday delay, seven days still remained from July 8, 2002 through July 17, 2002. Upon review of the Commissioner's motion, no showing of "good cause" is present to support the enlargement of the ten day guideline period. Although a delay occurred due to July 4th, seven days still remained to file a timely objection. Since neither the Plaintiff nor the Defendant filed any objections within the allotted ten day time frame, this Court DENIES any enlargement of time beyond July 17, 2002.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff filed for social security benefits as of December 30, 1999, alleging disability since August 1, 1997. (Def. Mot. for Sum. Judgment pg. 2). The Social Security Administration (the agency) denied his claim (Tr. 26, 27-31) and Plaintiff requested a hearing (Tr. 32-33). On December 7, 2000, Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, and a vocational expert (VE) appeared and testified at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) Alfred H. Varga (Tr. 271-301). On February 21, 2001, the ALJ denied Plaintiff's claim (Tr. 11-22). Plaintiff, born on October 13, 1951, was forty-nine years old on the date of the ALJ's decision. The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request to review the decision (Tr. 5-6) therefore the ALJ's decision became the final decision of the Commissioner and the Plaintiff filed for judicial review of the ALJ's decision.
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court has jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's decisions pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Judicial review of the Commissioner's decision is limited to determining whether the findings of fact made by the Commissioner are supported by substantial evidence and whether the Commissioner employed the proper legal criteria in reaching his conclusion. Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1984). The credibility findings of an ALJ must not be discarded lightly and should be accorded great deference. Hardaway v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 823 F.2d 922, 928 (6th Cir. 1987). Because a district court's review of an ALJ's decision is not a de nova review, this Court may not resolve conflicts in the evidence nor decide questions of credibility. Garner, 745 F.2d at 397. The decision of the Commissioner must be upheld if supported by substantial evidence, even if the record might support a contrary decision. Smith v. Secretary of HHS, 893 F.2d at 397. An administrative decision must be affirmed if supported by substantial evidence, even if the Court might arrive at a different conclusion. Mullen v. Bowen, 800 F.2d 535, 545 (6th Cir. 1986) (quoting Baker v. Heckler, 730 F.2d 1147, 1150 (8th Cir. 1984)).
IV. ANALYSIS
To aid in making disability determinations under the Act, the Commissioner has established a five-step sequential analysis the ALJ employs. If it is determined that a claimant is not disabled at any point in the five-step review, further review is not necessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520; Mullis v. Bowen, 861 F.2d 991, 993 (6th Cir. 1988). From steps one through four, the claimant bears the burden of proving the existence and the severity of any functional limitations caused by his impairments; he also bears the burden of proving that his impairments preclude him from performing past relevant work. Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n. 5 (1987). At step five of the sequential evaluation process, the burden shifts to the agency to identify a significant number of jobs in the economy that accommodate the claimant's residual functional capacity (determined at step four) and vocational profile. Id. at 146 n. 5.
The claimant is only entitled to disability benefits if he is not able to perform other work. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(f) and 416.920(f). At step one it must be determined whether the claimant is working and engaged in substantial gainful activity. If the claimant is doing either of these activities he will be considered disabled. In the case at hand, the Plaintiff satisfies step one since he is not engaged in any type of work or substantial gainful activity.
At step two, the claimant must present a severe impairment or combination of impairments that significantly limit his ability to do basic work activities to support being disabled. The Magistrate Judge concurred with the ALJ's decision regarding the Plaintiff's retained ability to perform light duty work from August 1997 through December 1999. As required, when the ALJ stops at Step Two and concludes that there is no severe impairment, there must be substantial evidence in the record supporting the ALJ's finding that the claimant has only a `slight' impairment that does not affect his ability to work. Farris v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 773 F.2d 85, 90 (6th Cir. 1985).
Here, medical evidence within the record establishes the Plaintiff's residual functional capacity for light work with a sit/stand option, no climbing or repetitive bending, and no work around heights or hazardous machinery and no driving (Tr. 18). Testimony by the vocational expert (VE) established the Plaintiff's qualifications for approximately 6,000 positions in the region based on his age, gender, education level, work experience and ability to perform simple and routine light work. The Magistrate Judge concurred with the ALJ that in light of the vocational expert's testimony, and Plaintiff's ability to perform light duty activities, he does not meet step two and would not be considered disabled prior January 1999.
Although substantial evidence is present within the record to support the Plaintiff's ability to work through December 1998, the Magistrate Judge correctly noted the lack of "sufficient evidence to support the ALJ's disability determination for the period beginning in January 1999." See Report and Recommendation at 25. In examining the VE's response to the hypothetical question posed by the Commissioner, the hypothetical question does not take into account the Plaintiff's disability status after January 1999, when he experienced an exacerbation in both his physical and psychological problems. See Report and Recommendation at 28. This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's opinion that a further evaluation should be conducted regarding Plaintiff's disability following January 1999.
V. CONCLUSION
This Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge's decision that this case should be remanded for proceedings consistent with the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation. The Court accepts the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and adopts his Opinion as this Court's own.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Pepe dated June 28, 2002 is ACCEPTED and ADOPTED as this Court's findings and conclusions of law.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 9, filed March 28, 2002) is GRANTED IN PART and the case is REMANDED for further administrative proceedings regarding Plaintiff's disability status beginning in January 1999 consistent with the Report and Recommendation.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket No. 11, filed April 22, 2002) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART and that summary judgment be entered for Defendant on the issue of Plaintiff's disability status through December 1998.