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holding that a pro se plaintiff in an class action is barred from pursuing claims on behalf of other class members in a representative capacity
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Case No: C 10-05143 SBA
05-04-2012
PATRICIA MORGOVSKY, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs, v. ADBRITE, INC., a California Corporation, IGNACIO, aka "IGGY" FANLO, and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS AND GRANTING MOTION TO STRIKE
Docket 47, 54.
On August 6, 2010, Plaintiff Patricia Morgovsky ("Plaintiff") brought the instant action against Defendants AdBrite, Inc. ("AdBrite") and Ignacio Fanlo ("Fanlo") (collectively "Defendants") in the Superior Court of California, County of San Francisco, alleging a federal cause of action under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. § 216, as well as claims predicated on state law. See Compl., Dkt. 1. Defendants removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. See Notice of Removal, Dkt. 1. The parties are presently before the Court on Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and motion to strike under Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Dkt. 54. Plaintiff has filed an opposition and a "Notice of Non-Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Strike Re California Unfair Practices Claim." Dkt. 57, 58.
Having read and considered the papers filed in connection with these matters and being fully informed, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss and GRANTS Defendants' motion to strike, for the reasons stated below. The Court, in its discretion, finds these matters suitable for resolution without oral argument. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); N.D. Cal. Civ. L.R. 7-1(b). I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Summary
AdBrite is a corporation with its principal place of business in San Francisco, California. First Amended Complaint ("FAC") ¶ 7, Dkt. 1, Exh. B. AdBrite sells online advertising. Id. ¶ 7. Mr. Fanlo was the president and/or chief executive officer of AdBrite at all relevant times. See id. ¶ 8.
Plaintiff was employed as a full-time administrative assistant for AdBrite between April 2007 and August 7, 2007. FAC ¶¶ 2, 13. During that period, Plaintiff alleges that she was required by AdBrite to work in excess of 8 hours per day and in excess of 40 hours per week, and was occasionally asked to, and did, work on the weekends. Id. ¶¶ 16, 26. According to Plaintiff, she never received overtime compensation for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. See id.
Plaintiff also alleges that AdBrite had no provision for rest and meal periods, and that she never had any rest periods and often had either no meal periods or was provided meal periods shorter than required by law. FAC ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiff further alleges that she was never paid any overtime compensation and was never compensated for missed rest periods, missed meal periods, and for taking meal periods totaling less than 30 minutes on workdays longer than 6 hours. Id. ¶ 20.
Plaintiff claims that while she was consistently praised for her job performance by her direct supervisor, her employment was terminated on August 7, 2007. FAC ¶ 27. According to Plaintiff, she was "terminated in violation of public policy," upon the insistence of Mr. Fanlo, because she shared her "dissatisfaction with other employees of . . . not being provided rest periods and meal periods and being provided meal periods shorter than required by law." Id. ¶ 28. By this action, Plaintiff seeks damages arising from AdBrite's failure to pay overtime wages and to provide compensation for missed meal and rest periods. Id. ¶ 2.
B. Procedural History
On August 6, 2010, Plaintiff commenced the instant action against Defendants in the San Francisco Superior Court. See Compl. On August 9, 2010, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint, alleging three causes of action: (1) "Violation of Labor Code § 201, Failure to Pay Wages at Time of Termination"; (2) "Violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq., Willful Failure to Properly Pay Overtime Wages"; and (3) "Unfair Business Practices, Violation of California Business and Professions Code § 17200, et seq." See FAC. On November 12, 2010, Defendants removed the action to this Court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction. Notice of Removal ¶¶ 1, 12-14
On November 19, 2010, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and motion to strike. Dkt. 8,10. Plaintiff filed a motion for leave to proceed pro se on March 31, 2011. Dkt. 29. On July 6, 2011, Plaintiff's request to proceed pro se was granted, and Defendants' motion to dismiss and motion to strike were denied without prejudice for failure to meet and confer. Dkt. 49. In granting Plaintiff's request to represent herself, the Court specifically advised Plaintiff that she is obligated to follow the same rules as represented parties, and that self-representation is not an excuse for noncompliance with court rules. Id. The Court further advised Plaintiff that it is her responsibility to prosecute the claims alleged in her complaint in a manner consistent with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court's Local Rules, and the Standing and other Orders of this Court. Id. Plaintiff was warned that the "[f]ailure to comply with any of these requirements may result in the imposition of sanctions, up to and including the dismissal of this action." Id.
On October 11, 2011, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss and motion to strike. Dkt. 54. Plaintiff filed an opposition on October 28, 2011. Dkt. 57. On October 29, 2011, Plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition to Defendants' motion to strike "the private attorney general allegations of Plaintiff's claim for unfair business practices under California law." Dkt. 58. A reply was filed on November 1, 2011. Dkt. 59.
II. DISCUSSION
As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff, who is pro se, has improperly e-filed several documents using the e-filer account of her former attorney, John Hartford. See Dkt. 57, 58. Plaintiff has not received permission to use the Court's electronic filing system in this case. Under General Order No. 45, Electronic Case Filing, pro se litigants are excluded from the Court's electronic filing program unless otherwise ordered by the assigned Judge. Thus, if Plaintiff wishes to e-file in this case, she must submit a motion requesting permission to do so. Absent permission to e-file, all documents that Plaintiff files electronically in the future will be stricken from the docket.
Under General Order No. 45, while an "ECF User," i.e., a person who is registered to use the Court's electronic case filing system, may authorize another person to file a document using their user ID and password, only ECF Users may file documents. Thus, even if Plaintiff's former attorney gave her permission to use his e-filer account to file documents in this case, because Plaintiff has not been given permission to e-file documents, she is not an ECF User within the meaning of General Order 45. As such, it was improper for her to e-file documents using the e-filer account of her former attorney.
Until Plaintiff is granted permission to e-file, she must manually file all documents with the Clerk of the Court and serve the documents upon Defendants in accordance with the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for filing and service of non-electronic documents. The Court advises Plaintiff that all manually filed documents must comply with the requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which states that "[e]very pleading, written motion, and other paper must be signed by at least one attorney of record in the attorney's name--or by a party personally if the party is unrepresented." Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(a) (emphasis added). Thus, because Plaintiff is not represented by an attorney, she must personally sign every document she files with the Court. Any document manually filed with the Clerk of the Court that does not contain Plaintiff's original signature will be stricken from the docket. See id.
The Court also notes that Plaintiff does not challenge Defendants' accusation that she is attempting to have her non-attorney father, Naum Morgovsky, represent her in this matter, as evidenced by the fact that Plaintiff is using her father's e-mail address and has asked Defendants to only communicate with her through her father. The Court finds Defendants' accusation to be serious and Plaintiff's silence on the issue troubling, particularly since the name "Naum Morgovsky" appears on the vexatious litigant list maintained by the Judicial Council of California. See Vexatious Litigant List at http://www.courts.ca.gov/12272.htm The Court reminds Plaintiff that she is required to prosecute her claims in compliance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court's Local Rules, and any Order of this Court. As Civil Local Rule 3-9(a) states:
Under California's Vexatious Litigant Statute, California Code of Civil Procedure § 391, et seq., a defendant in state court may move the court to require a pro se plaintiff to provide security if the defendant can make a showing that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant and there is not a reasonable probability that the plaintiff will prevail in the litigation against the moving party. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 391.1. Once a plaintiff has been declared a vexatious litigant within the meaning of the statute, the court may also enter an order prohibiting the plaintiff from filing new state court litigation absent leave of the presiding judge where the litigation is proposed to be filed. Id. § 391.7(a). This order is known as a "prefiling order." See id. Parties subject to prefiling orders are placed on a statewide list - the "Vexatious Litigant List" - maintained by the Judicial Council of California and disseminated to the clerks of the state courts. Id. § 391.7(f).
Any party representing him or herself without an attorney must appear personally and may not delegate that duty to any other person who is not a member of the bar of this Court. A person representing him or herself without an attorney is bound by the Federal Rules, as well as by all applicable local rules. Sanctions (including default or dismissal) may be imposed for failure to comply with local rules.Civ. L.R. 3-9(a).
The Court warns Plaintiff, again, that the failure to comply with any of the above-mentioned rules and requirements may result in the imposition of sanctions, up to and including the dismissal of this action. As for the instant motion, because Defendants failed to demonstrate that Plaintiff has delegated her duty to represent herself with respect to the opposition she filed, the Court will not strike Plaintiff's opposition. However, Defendants shall promptly notify the Court if Plaintiff fails to comply with any Federal Rule of Civil Procedure, Local Rule, or Order of this Court.
A. Legal Standards
1. Motion to Strike
Rule 12(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that a district court "may strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." The function of a motion to strike is to avoid the expenditure of time and money that must arise from litigating spurious issues by dispensing with those issues prior to trial. Whittlestone, Inc. v. Handi-Craft Co., 618 F.3d 970, 973 (9th Cir. 2010). In order to determine whether to grant a motion to strike under Rule 12(f), the court must determine whether the matter the moving party seeks to have stricken is (1) an insufficient defense; (2) redundant; (3) immaterial; (4) impertinent; or (5) scandalous. Id. at 973-974.
2. Motion to Dismiss
A complaint may be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim if the plaintiff fails to state a cognizable legal theory, or has not alleged sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory. Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). In determining whether a complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted, the Court "accept[s] as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact, and construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the non-moving party." Daniels-Hall v. National Educ. Ass'n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010).
However, the Court is not required to accept as true "allegations that are merely conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences." In re Gilead Sciences Securities Litigation, 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008). The complaint is properly dismissed if it fails to plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is plausible on its face "when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009). Thus, "for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, the non-conclusory 'factual content,' and reasonable inferences from that content, must be plausibly suggestive of a claim entitling the plaintiff to relief." Moss v. U.S. Secret Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).
On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court's inquiry generally is limited to the allegations in the complaint. Lazy Y Ranch Ltd. v. Behrens, 546 F.3d 580, 588 (9th Cir. 2008). "A court may, however, consider certain materials-documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice-without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." U.S. v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003).
Where a complaint or claim is dismissed, leave to amend generally is granted, unless further amendment would be futile. See Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, 300 F.3d 1083, 1087-1088 (9th Cir. 2002); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (if a court dismisses the complaint, it should grant leave to amend, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts).
B. Class Action and Collective Action Claims
Plaintiff alleges that she has brought the instant action "in her individual capacity under . . . the California Labor Code," and "in her representative capacity under the California Unfair Trade Practices Act, California Business and Professions Code § 1700 et seq., and . . . Fair Labor Standards Act." FAC ¶ 1. Defendants move to dismiss the collective action and class action claims pled by Plaintiff on the ground that pro se litigants cannot pursue claims in a representative capacity. Defendants also move to strike all references to these claims on the ground that the references are immaterial and irrelevant.
Pro se plaintiffs cannot pursue claims on behalf of others in a representative capacity. See Simon v. Hartford Life, Inc., 546 F.3d 661, 664 (9th Cir. 2008); see also Johns v. County of San Diego, 114 F.3d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1997) ("While a non-attorney may appear pro se on his own behalf, he has no authority to appear as an attorney for others than himself."); C.E. Pope Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that a pro se litigant may not appear as an attorney for others). Here, because Plaintiff is a pro se litigant, she cannot pursue claims on behalf of other AdBrite employees in a representative capacity. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. To the extent that the FAC attempts to allege collective action and class action claims, these claims are DISMISSED without leave to amend. In light of the Court's ruling on the motion to dismiss, the Court GRANTS Defendants' request to strike all references in the FAC to the class action and collective action claims on the ground that these references are immaterial and irrelevant. Given the dismissal of these claims with prejudice, any amended complaint filed by Plaintiff shall not contain allegations or references indicating that Plaintiff is pursuing claims or seeking damages on behalf of other AdBrite employees.
C. FLSA Claim
Plaintiff's second cause of action alleges that Defendants violated 29 U.S.C. § 207, which requires employers to pay overtime compensation for time worked in excess of forty hours per week. See 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1). Defendants contend that dismissal of this claim is appropriate because it is time-barred.
Title 29, United States Codes, Section 255(a) sets the limitations period for a cause of action for unpaid wages under the FLSA. Under the FLSA, claims for unpaid compensation are typically subject to a two-year statute of limitations. 29 U.S.C. § 255(a). The limitations period may, however, be extended to three years for a cause of action "arising out of a willful violation" of the statute. Id. To obtain the benefit of the 3-year exception, the plaintiff must prove that the employer's conduct was willful. McLaughlin v. Richland Show Co., 486 U.S. 128, 135 (1988). "In common usage, the word 'willful' is synonymous with such words as 'voluntary,' 'deliberate,' and 'intentional.' " Id. at 133.
"A violation of the FLSA is willful if the employer 'knew or showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether its conduct was prohibited by the [FLSA].' " Chao v. A-1 Med. Servs., Inc., 346 F.3d 908, 918 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 133). Mere negligence on the part of the employer will not suffice. McLaughlin, 486 U.S. at 133. "If an employer acts unreasonably, but not recklessly, in determining its legal obligation" under the FLSA, its action is not willful. Id. at 135 n. 13; see Saint-Jean v. District of Columbia --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2012 WL 723715, at * 3 (D. D.C. 2012) (reckless disregard involves actual knowledge of a legal requirement, and deliberate disregard of the risk that one is in violation).
Here, it is clear on the face of the FAC that Plaintiff's FLSA claim is time-barred, unless there has been a willful violation of the statute. Plaintiff's last day of employment with AdBrite was August 7, 2007, but she did not commence the instant action until August 6, 2010, nearly 3 years later. Thus, in order to withstand a motion to dismiss, the FAC must plausibly allege facts demonstrating that Defendants willfully violated the FLSA so as to extend the statute of limitations under FLSA from two to three years. In this regard, Defendants argue that the willfulness allegations in the FAC are insufficient under the pleading standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in Twombly and Iqbal.
The Supreme Court has explained that while the pleading standard under Rule 8, does not require "detailed factual allegations," the rule "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation. . . . A pleading that offers 'labels and conclusions' or 'a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.' Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders 'naked assertion[s]' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.' " Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly 550 U.S. at 555, 557). The Court further explained that "a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.' " Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly 550 U.S. at 570). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly 550 U.S. at 556). The plausibility standard is not satisfied where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a defendant's liability. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949 (citing Twombly 550 U.S. at 557).
As relevant to willfulness, Plaintiff alleges that "Defendants were fully aware of all aspects of the FLSA . . . with regard to Plaintiff . . . and thus Defendants knowingly and willfully caused and permitted Plaintiff . . . to regularly work in excess of forty hours per week without paying [her] one and one half of [her] regular rate of pay." FAC ¶ 47. Plaintiff also alleges that "Defendants intentionally and/or with reckless disregard for their responsibilities under the FLSA, and without good cause, failed to pay Plaintiff . . . proper wages." Id. ¶ 50.
The Court finds that these conclusory allegations lack sufficient factual matter to satisfy the plausibility standard set forth in Iqbal and Twombly. There are no factual allegations that allow the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. Plaintiff's bare assertions with regard to willfulness are conclusory and not entitled to the assumption of truth. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951. Because these conclusory assertions are "devoid of further factual enhancement," the complaint does not contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim for relief under the FLSA that is plausible on its face. See id. at 1949 ("[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice" to satisfy the pleading standard under Rule 8 and survive a motion to dismiss).
In her opposition, Plaintiff argues, without elaboration or analysis, that an e-mail allegedly sent by Mr. Fanlo to AdBrite employees dated April 20, 2007, which is attached to the FAC, demonstrates that Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. In the e-mail, Mr. Fanlo states that while "the vast majority" of AdBrite employees work "very long hours," "too few folks" are in the office at 9:00 and not in the office at 6:00." FAC, Exh. A. Mr. Fanlo further states that he expects employees to put in "9-10 hours" and "to give more than the typical 9-5 job," and that he "would be VERY sad if [AbBrite] ever had to keep track of working hours for [its] employees." Id. Mr. Fanlo also states that he does not want employees that are committed to AdBrite to "struggl[e] alone long into the night." Id.
"A copy of a written instrument that is an exhibit to a pleading is a part of the pleading for all purposes." Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c).
For purposes of this motion, the Court will assume that the e-mail attached to the FAC was sent by Mr. Fanlo as Plaintiff contends.
The Court finds that the e-mail attached to the FAC does not contain sufficient factual content to raise the plausible inference that Defendants' willfully violated the FLSA to extend the statute of limitations from two to three years. The factual matter in the e-mail does not substantiate the conclusory assertions in the FAC. The content of the e-mail does not provide a factual basis which plausibly suggests that Defendants' alleged FLSA violation was willful. There are no facts showing that Defendants knew their conduct with respect to Plaintiff was prohibited by the FLSA. Nor are there facts demonstrating that Defendants showed reckless disregard for the matter of whether their conduct with respect to Plaintiff was prohibited by the FLSA, i.e., facts demonstrating actual knowledge of a legal requirement under the FLSA and deliberate disregard of the risk that their conduct violated the FLSA. For instance, the e-mail does not contain any factual statements indicating that Defendants knew the FLSA applied to Plaintiff or facts indicating that Defendants were reckless in determining their legal obligation to Plaintiff under the FLSA.
In short, because the allegations in the FAC and the statements in Mr. Fanlo's e-mail do not permit the Court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, Plaintiff has not shown that she is entitled to relief under the FLSA. See Iqbal, 129 S.Ct at 1950 ("where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'show[n]'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.' "). Plaintiff's FLSA claim does not survive Defendants' motion to dismiss because she has not pled factual content that allows the Court to draw the reasonable inference that Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. See id. at 1949.
Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's FLSA claim is GRANTED.The Court, however, will afford Plaintiff the opportunity to amend her complaint to allege facts that support her contention that Defendants willfully violated the FLSA. Plaintiff is also granted leave to amend to allege facts demonstrating that her FLSA claim is timely under the FLSA's two-year statute of limitations; specifically, facts establishing the applicability of the doctrine of equitable tolling and/or the doctrine of equitable estoppel.Plaintiff may amend her FAC if, in compliance with Rule 11, she can truthfully allege facts that would support her contention that Defendants willfully violated the FLSA, application of the doctrine of equitable tolling, and/or application of the doctrine of equitable estoppel.
In light of the Court's dismissal of Plaintiff's FLSA claim with leave to amend, the Court GRANTS Defendants' request to strike all references in the FAC to FLSA remedies with leave to amend.
There are two separate but related doctrines which may apply to extend the limitations period or preclude a defendant from asserting a statute of limitations defense -equitable tolling and equitable estoppel. Lukovsky v. City and County of San Francisco, 535 F.3d 1044, 1051 (9th Cir. 2008). " 'Equitable tolling focuses on 'whether there was excusable delay by the plaintiff: if a reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of a possible claim within the limitations period, then equitable tolling will serve to extend the statute of limitations for filing suit until the plaintiff can gather what information he needs.' " Id. " 'Equitable estoppel, on the other hand, focuses primarily on actions taken by the defendant to prevent a plaintiff from filing suit, sometimes referred to as 'fraudulent concealment.' " Id.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED. To the extent that the FAC attempts to allege collective action and class action claims, those claims are DISMISSED without leave to amend. In light of this ruling, any amended complaint filed by Plaintiff shall not contain allegations or references indicating that she is pursuing claims or seeking damages on behalf of other AdBrite employees. Plaintiff's FLSA claim is DISMISSED with leave to amend.
2. Plaintiff shall have twenty-one (21) days from the date this Order is filed to file a second amended ccomplaint consistent with this Order. Plaintiff is advised that any additional factual allegations set forth in her second amended complaint must be made in good faith and consistent with Rule 11. Plaintiff is further advised that her second amended complaint will supersede or replace the FAC and the first amended complaint will thereafter be treated as nonexistent. Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 878 n. 40 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. Cal., 543 U.S. 499 (2005). The second amended complaint must therefore be complete in itself without reference to the prior or superseded pleading. King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987). Plaintiff's second amended complaint shall not include any additional claims without prior Court approval. The Court warns Plaintiff that the failure to timely file a second amended complaint will result in the dismissal of her FLSA claim with prejudice.
3. Defendants' motion to strike is GRANTED.
4. Until Plaintiff is granted permission to e-file, she is required to manually file all documents with the Clerk of the Court and serve the documents upon Defendants in accordance with the applicable Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Local Rules for filing and service of non-electronic documents. The Court warns Plaintiff that the failure to comply with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court's Local Rules, and any Order of this Court may result in the imposition of sanctions, up to and including the dismissal of this action.
5. This Order terminates Docket 47 and 54.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
____________________________
SAUNDRA BROWN ARMSTRONG
United States District Judge
PATRICIA MORGOVSKY, Plaintiff,
v.
ADBRITE INC. et al,Defendant.
Case Number: CV10-05143 SBA
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, the undersigned, hereby certify that I am an employee in the Office of the Clerk, U.S. District Court, Northern District of California.
That on May 4, 2012, I SERVED a true and correct copy(ies) of the attached, by placing said copy(ies) in a postage paid envelope addressed to the person(s) hereinafter listed, by depositing said envelope in the U.S. Mail, or by placing said copy(ies) into an inter-office delivery receptacle located in the Clerk's office.
Patricia Morgovsky
1423 Avondale Road
Hillsborough, CA 94010
Richard W. Wieking, Clerk
By: Lisa Clark, Deputy Clerk