Opinion
No. CV02-3711
April 25, 2003
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO DISMISS ( #105.00)
On October 1, 2002, the respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss, together with a supporting Memorandum of Law, which seeks to dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that the habeas court does not have subject matter jurisdiction and that the petition fails to state a ground upon which relief may be granted. The petitioner filed an objection on October 23, 2002, also properly supported by a Memorandum of Law. This Court heard oral arguments from both parties on April 21, 2003. For the reasons set forth more fully below, the motion to dismiss shall be granted in part and denied in part.
"The standard of review of a motion to dismiss is well established. In ruling upon whether a complaint survives a motion to dismiss, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader. Accepting as true the allegations in the complaint and all facts provable thereunder, in deciding whether a declaratory judgment action in a given case is appropriate, [a] . . . trial court [has] wide discretion to render a declaratory judgment unless another form of action clearly affords a speedy remedy as effective, convenient, appropriate and complete. In sum, at least when there is a prayer for general equitable relief, it is the law in our courts, as it is in the federal courts, that a court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations." Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 308-09 (1998); Vincenzo v. Chairman, Board of Parole, 64 Conn. App. 258, 260-61 (2001).
"The interpretation of pleadings is always a question for the court. The modern trend, which is followed in Connecticut, is to construe pleadings broadly and realistically, rather than narrowly and technically. Although essential allegations may not be supplied by conjecture or remote implication, the complaint must be read in its entirety in such a way as to give effect to the pleading with reference to the general theory upon which it proceeded, and do substantial justice between the parties. As long as the pleadings provide sufficient notice of the facts claimed and the issues to be tried and do not surprise or prejudice the opposing party, we will not conclude that the complaint is insufficient to allow recovery." (Internal citations omitted.) Lyons v. Nichols, 63 Conn. App. 761, 764-65, cert. denied, 258 Conn. 906 (2001).
Broadly construing the petition for a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner raises claims in two categories: 1) that because the petitioner has filed an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court against Department of Correction staff, the petitioner allegedly is being subjected to retaliation and reprisals by officials, including tampering with his legal mail, and that the Department of Correction has failed to put in place a mechanism which would allow inmates to grieve or remedy mail-related problems; and 2) that even though the petitioner has received many threats on his life and safety and has requested placement in protective custody or safe phase program, or that the petitioner be transferred to a different facility, the petitioner has remained in Administrative Segregation at Northern Correctional Institution, a program which includes gang members and other inmates who are the very source of the threats.
As to the first broad claim, which alleges that the petitioner's rights under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution were violated, the petitioner has cited numerous federal cases in both his pro se petition and the memorandum of law in opposition to the motion to dismiss. With very little exception, all the cases relied upon by the petitioner in support of his First Amendment claim were actions pursued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Those cases that were not § 1983 actions, were either federal class action suits ( Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401 (1989)), or an action brought under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 ( Bieregu v. Reno, 59 F.3d 1445 (3d Circ. 1995), a federal statute which confers "general federal-question jurisdiction, which gives the district courts original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." (Emphasis removed.) Holmes Group v. Vornado Aircirculation S., 535 U.S. 826 (2002).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides that "[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." Relief can include, for example, an injunction or monetary damages.
"Habeas corpus provides a special and extraordinary legal remedy for illegal detention . . . The deprivation of legal rights is essential before the writ may be issued . . . Questions which do not concern the lawfulness of the detention cannot properly be reviewed on habeas corpus . . . When a habeas petition is properly before a court, the remedies it may award depend on the constitutional rights being vindicated . . . Further, any remedy must be commensurate with the scope of the constitutional violations that have been established." Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, 258 Conn. 804, 815 (2002), quoting Vincenzo v. Warden, 26 Conn. App. 132, 137-38 (1991).
`Detention' means "a keeping in custody; confinement." WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 384 (2nd coll. ed. 1980). "The writ of habeas corpus, as it is employed in the twentieth century, however, does not focus solely upon a direct attack on the underlying judgment or upon release from confinement. See, e.g., Gaines v. Manson, 194 Conn. 510 (1984) (undue appellate delay); Arey v. Warden, 187 Conn. 324 (1982) (conditions of confinement); Roque v. Warden, 181 Conn. 85 (1980) ( first amendment issues); Negron v. Warden, 180 Conn. 153 (1980) (state's extradition practice); Doe v. Doe, 163 Conn. 340 (1972) (custody and visitation disputes). [The Connecticut Supreme Court has] not resolved the precise limits of its scope for challenges that do not involve release[.]" (Internal citations omitted.) Lozada v. Warden, 223 Conn. 834, 841-42 (1992).
"Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system. The institutional consideration of internal security in the correction facilities themselves is essential to all other correction goals. General Statutes § 18-31a specifically mandates that the commissioner of correction `shall establish rules for the regulation and government of . . . community correctional centers . . . and for the discipline and employment of inmates.' Because the realities of running a correctional institution are complex and difficult, the courts give wide-ranging deference to the decisions of prison administrators in considering what is necessary and proper to preserve order and discipline." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) State v. Walker, 35 Conn. App. 431, 435, cert. denied, 231 Conn. 916 (1994).
"As the United States Supreme Court pointed out, [however,] . . . a prisoner is not wholly stripped of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime, although his rights may be diminished by the needs and exigencies of the institutional environment. Prisoners retain rights under the due process clause, but these rights are subject to reasonable restrictions imposed by the nature of the institution to which they have been lawfully committed. Lawful incarceration brings about the necessary withdrawal or limitation of many privileges and rights, a retraction justified by the considerations underlying our penal system." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Roque v. Warden, 181 Conn. 85, 93 (1980).
In Roque, the petitioner "claim[ed] that his possession and distribution of the [written] materials in question was activity protected by the first amendment to the United States constitution, which may be abridged by the state only where a compelling state interest exists for so doing." Id., at 96-97. The Connecticut Supreme Court noted that "[i]t is true that, in general, where state action impinges upon a fundamental right, that action will be sustained only upon the showing of a compelling state interest that can only thus be protected. Such analysis is not appropriate, however, in weighing the constitutionality of the conduct of state prison officials. Restrictions on personal liberties that would be considered unacceptable where the general public is concerned are often essential within the strictures of the prison community. The [U.S.] Supreme Court has indicated that in the prison environment a less demanding balancing test, instead, is to be applied. In Pell v. Procunier, [ 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974), a § 1983 action,] it stated: `A prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system.' Thus, challenges to prison restrictions that have an impact upon first amendment interests must be analyzed in terms of the legitimate policies and goals of the corrections system. Although deterrence of crime and rehabilitation are legitimate penal objectives, central to all other corrections goals is the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves. First amendment rights do not evaporate upon the claim of internal security, however, and the restrictions imposed must be no greater than necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.
"In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., [ 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977), also a § 1983 action], the Supreme Court sanctioned the curtailment of prisoners' first amendment associational rights by applying the following test: `Associational rights may be curtailed whenever the institution's officials, in the exercise of their informed discretion, reasonably conclude that such associations, whether through group meetings or otherwise, possess the likelihood of disruption to prison order or stability, or otherwise interfere with the legitimate penological objectives of the prison environment.' We believe that the same test is appropriate where the prisoner's freedom of speech is concerned." (Emphasis added.) (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Roque v. Warden, supra, 181 Conn. 97-98.
In Sanchez v. Warden, 214 Conn. 23, 31-32 (1990), the Connecticut Supreme Court held "that the trial court erred . . . in determining that the first amendment was implicated by the respondent's policy concerning radio possession" and "that the evidence presented to the trial court did not establish a constitutionally impermissible restriction on the petitioner's access to radio broadcasts." The "minor problems [arising from making inmates use radio headphones instead of regular radios], which can be alleviated by other measures, do not constitute restrictions upon access to radio broadcasts sufficiently insidious to implicate first amendment analysis." Id., at 32.
The Sanchez court also noted that " Procunier v. Martinez, supra, and Turner v. Safley, [ 482 U.S. 78 (1987), a class action suit for injunctive relief and damages], both dealt, in relevant part, with prison restrictions placed upon the sending and receipt of mail by inmates. In each case, however, the question before the court was not whether censorship by prison officials infringed upon rights protected by the first amendment, a point that was undisputed. The court in those cases was instead formulating `a standard of review for prisoners' constitutional claims that was responsive both to the policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints and to the need to protect constitutional rights.'" (Emphasis added.) (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Sanchez v. Warden, supra, 214 Conn. 30.
"In Flaherty v. Warden, 155 Conn. 36, 40 (1967), in which the petitioner by way of habeas corpus challenged a prison regulation denying the use of a conference room for the purpose of consultations between prisoners and their attorneys, this court declared that questions which do not concern the lawfulness of the detention cannot properly be reviewed on habeas corpus. The Superior Court, in Dukuly v. Warden, 34 Conn. Sup. 88 (1977), a habeas corpus action in which the petitioners claimed that the conditions of confinement in administrative segregation at the state prison in Somers constituted cruel and unusual punishment and prevented them from practicing their religious beliefs, took a broader view of the scope of the writ, concluding that it was available to remedy `any kind of governmental restraint contrary to fundamental law.' Id., 91, quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 405 (1963). If the nonjudgmental aspects of restraint lead to restraint that has unconstitutional qualities and properties, a question is raised as to the legality of the detention. Other judges of the Superior Court have followed the view expressed in Dukuly that a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is not restricted to a challenge of the validity of the judgment under which a prisoner is incarcerated. Necessarily, however, the only rights with which the court is concerned are those founded in the constitution or thought to be of a substantial character.
"A significant factor underlying the decision in Dukuly was the assumption that habeas corpus was the only practical method available to a prisoner for bringing to the attention of a court serious violations of his constitutional rights arising from his confinement. The opinion did not consider the Civil Rights Act of 1871; see 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 1988; which provides such remedies as damages, both compensatory and punitive, injunctive relief and attorneys fees. Such an action may be brought in either a federal or a state court. It is not self-evident that the standard relief granted in a habeas corpus action, discharge of the prisoner unless the violation of his rights is corrected, is necessarily more efficacious than the relief available to a successful 1983 plaintiff.
"Because the respondent has not, either on appeal or in the trial court, raised the possible availability of 1983 as an alternative that the petitioners in this case could have pursued, it would be inappropriate for us at this time to resolve the issue of whether a 1983 action rather than a petition for a writ of habeas corpus should have been the procedural vehicle utilized. Neither party has briefed the question. Accordingly, we await a more suitable occasion to decide whether the scope of habeas corpus should be broadened to include challenges to conditions of confinement when 1983 may be a viable alternative for presenting the petitioner's claims." (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.) Sanchez v. Warden, supra, 214 Conn. 33-35.
In Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 476-77 (1973), "The respondents . . . were state prisoners who were deprived of good-conduct-time credits by the New York State Department of Correctional Services as a result of disciplinary proceedings. They then brought actions in a federal district court, pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Alleging that the Department had acted unconstitutionally in depriving them of the credits, they sought injunctive relief to compel restoration of the credits, which in each case would result in their immediate release from confinement in prison. The question before [the Supreme Court was] whether state prisoners seeking such redress may obtain equitable relief under the Civil Rights Act, even though the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254, clearly provides a specific federal remedy.
"The question is of considerable practical importance. For if a remedy under the Civil Rights Act is available, a plaintiff need not first seek redress in a state forum. If, on the other hand, habeas corpus is the exclusive federal remedy in these circumstances, then a plaintiff cannot seek the intervention of a federal court until he has first sought and been denied relief in the state courts, if a state remedy is available and adequate. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)." (Internal citations omitted.)
"It is difficult to imagine an activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the administration of its prisons. The relationship of state prisoners and the state officers who supervise their confinement is far more intimate than that of a State and a private citizen. For state prisoners, eating, sleeping, dressing, washing, working, and playing are all done under the watchful eye of the State, and so the possibilities for litigation under the Fourteenth Amendment are boundless. What for a private citizen would be a dispute with his landlord, with his employer, with his tailor, with his neighbor, or with his banker becomes, for the prisoner, a dispute with the State. Since these internal problems of state prisons involve issues so peculiarly within state authority and expertise, the States have an important interest in not being bypassed in the correction of those problems. Moreover, because most potential litigation involving state prisoners arises on a day-to-day basis, it is most efficiently and properly handled by the state administrative bodies and state courts, which are, for the most part, familiar with the grievances of state prisoners and in a better physical and practical position to deal with those grievances . . . The strong considerations of comity that require giving a state court system that has convicted a defendant the first opportunity to correct its own errors thus also require giving the States the first opportunity to correct the errors made in the internal administration of their prisons." Preiser v. Rodriguez, supra, 411 U.S. 491-92.
"The respondents place a great deal of reliance on our recent decisions upholding the right of state prisoners to bring federal civil rights actions to challenge the conditions of their confinement. But none of the state prisoners in those cases was challenging the fact or duration of his physical confinement itself and none was seeking immediate release or a speedier release from that confinement — the heart of habeas corpus . . . It is clear, then, that in all those cases, the prisoners' claims related solely to the States' alleged unconstitutional treatment of them while in confinement. None sought, as did the respondents here, to challenge the very fact or duration of the confinement itself. Those cases, therefore, merely establish that a § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody . . .
"This is not to say that habeas corpus may not also be available to challenge such prison conditions. When a prisoner is put under additional and unconstitutional restraints during his lawful custody, it is arguable that habeas corpus will lie to remove the restraints making the custody illegal.
"But we need not in this case explore the appropriate limits of habeas corpus as an alternative remedy to a proper action under § 1983. That question is not before us. What is involved here is the extent to which § 1983 is a permissible alternative to the traditional remedy of habeas corpus. Upon that question, we hold today that when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus." (Emphasis added.) (Internal citations omitted.) Id., at 498-500.
In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1976), another § 1983 action, the court discussed the evolution of Eighth Amendment claims of cruel and unusual punishment: "Our more recent cases . . . have held that the Amendment proscribes more than physically barbarous punishments. The Amendment embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity and decency, against which we must evaluate penal measures. Thus, we have held repugnant to the Eighth Amendment punishments which are incompatible with the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society, or which involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain." (Emphasis added.) (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)
Thus, a § 1983 action does not lie when a challenge is made to the very fact or duration of physical imprisonment and the relief sought is a determination of entitlement to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment. Such a challenge is properly raised in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus because of the unique relief that can be granted by a habeas court: immediate or speedier release from imprisonment. Habeas courts may also grant relief when there is a showing of cruel and unusual punishment. Conversely, when the relief sought is monetary damages, a habeas court cannot award monetary damages to a petitioner who has successfully proven a constitutional violation.
"When a habeas petition is properly before a court, the remedies it may award depend on the constitutional rights being vindicated. Further, any remedy must be commensurate with the scope of the constitutional violations that have been established." Johnson v. Commissioner of Correction, supra, 258 Conn. 815. § 1983 actions are, nevertheless, permissible alternatives to habeas corpus actions when the relief sought is not a determination that there is an entitlement to immediate release or a speedier release from imprisonment.
While the Sanchez court stated that it "awaits a more suitable occasion to decide whether the scope of habeas corpus should be broadened to include challenges to conditions of confinement when a § 1983 may be a viable alternative for presenting the petitioner's claims;" Sanchez v. Warden, supra, 214 Conn. 35; both state and federal Supreme Courts do not restrict habeas corpus challenges solely to those attacking underlying convictions. In fact, both permit habeas corpus actions when the challenge made goes to the constitutionality of the confinement or detention.
"In Connecticut today, the scope of habeas corpus relief is defined by General Statutes §§ 52-466 and 52-470 which give the habeas court the authority to hear those petitions that allege illegal confinement or deprivation of liberty. However, the scope of habeas has been extended in limited circumstances to encompass challenges that do not involve the release of the petitioner. Specifically, in 1982, in Arey v. Warden, [ supra,] . . . the Connecticut Supreme Court expanded the scope of habeas corpus relief to include challenges based on the Eighth Amendment's protection against cruel and unusual punishment." (Emphasis in original.) (Internal citations omitted.) Smith v. Warden, Superior Court, judicial district of Tolland, Docket No. CV98-0002714 (Apr. 27, 1999, Zarella, J.).
The habeas court in Smith held "that habeas corpus is not the proper forum for petitioners to raise conditions of confinement claims when there are other more appropriate remedies available. The principle purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to serve as a bulwark against convictions that violate fundamental fairness.
"This is not to say that the petitioner should have no forum in which to seek redress for any injuries he may have suffered as a result of the conditions of his confinement . . . [T]he petitioner could pursue the . . . remedy of an injunction or damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 . . . If this petitioner has indeed suffered injuries he has other options, besides for habeas corpus, available to him . . . This court concludes that habeas corpus is not the proper vehicle for addressing the petitioner's claim." (Emphasis in original.) (Internal citations and quotation marks omitted.)
This Court finds the reasoning in Smith to be highly persuasive. Habeas corpus actions in this state serve the important role of challenging the legality of the detention or confinement. While the writ of habeas corpus has been expanded to allow challenges under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment, to expand the writ of habeas corpus to allow constitutional challenges that do not go to the legality of the detention would result in the dilution and trivialization of "The Great Writ." Nor would habeas corpus relief be unique and provide "a special and extraordinary legal remedy for illegal detention." Vincenzo v. Warden, supra, 26 Conn. App. 137.
As Thomas Paine once aptly noted, "What we obtain too cheap, we esteem too lightly; `tis dearness only that gives everything its value."
Based upon the foregoing, this Court concludes that the petitioner's first broad claim, which alleges a violation of the First Amendment arising from Department of Correction staff tampering with the petitioner's mail as harassment and retribution for his filing a § 1983 action in federal court against Department of Correction staff, does not raise a colorable constitutional violation which is recognized in this state as a viable habeas corpus claim.
The petitioner's second claim warrants little discussion, for it alleges that the petitioner has been placed with the very same inmates who have threatened him with harm. Such a claim is a cognizable habeas corpus claim under the Eighth Amendment. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833-34 (1994). At oral argument, counsel for the respondent conceded that the petitioner's second claim does indeed state an Eighth Amendment claim.
Accordingly, the respondent's motion to dismiss is granted as to the First Amendment claim. As to Eighth Amendment claim, the motion to dismiss is denied.
S.T. FUGER, JR., JUDGE