Opinion
No. CIV 07-0670-PHX-RCB
06-20-2012
Allan Kenneth Morgal, Plaintiff, v. Maricopa County Board of Supervisors, Defendant.
ORDER
Currently pending before the court is plaintiff pro se Allan Kenneth Morgal's "Motion to Reconsider Ruling on 6/5/2012[,]" entered on June 6, 2012. Mot. (Doc. 156) at 1. For the reasons set forth below, because plaintiff Morgal has not met the standards for reconsideration in accordance with LRCiv 7.2(g), the court denies his motion.
Discussion
"Motions for reconsideration are disfavored and should be granted only in rare circumstances." U.S. v. Vistoso Partners, LLC, 2011 WL 2550387, at *1 (D.Ariz. June 27, 2011 (citation omitted). Consistent with that view, LRCiv 7.2(g)(1) unequivocally states, in part:
The Court will ordinarily deny a motion for reconsideration of an Order absent a showing of manifest error or a showing of new facts or legal authority that could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence.LRCiv 7.2(g)(1) (emphasis added). Plaintiff Morgal has shown neither.
Plaintiff Morgal did, as LRCiv 7.2(g)(1) requires, "point out with specificity the matters that [he] believes were overlooked or misapprehended by the Court" in its order filed June 6, 2012. See id. Even with that specificity, however, plaintiff's motion does not provide a proper basis for granting reconsideration. In the first place, as to some issues, and particularly as to the central issue of his diligence in seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order, plaintiff is asking this court "'to rethink what [it] . . . already thought through, rightly or wrongly.'" O'Connor v. Scottsdale Healthcare Corp., 2012 WL 2106365, at *1 (June 11, 2012) (quoting Motorola, Inc. v. J.B. Rodgers Mech. Contractors, Inc., 215 F.R.D. 581, 586 (D.Ariz. 2003)) (other citation omitted). Asking a court to rethink its analysis is not a proper basis for seeking reconsideration, however. See id.
In a similar vein, and in direct contravention of LRCiv 7.2(g)(1), plaintiff Morgal's motion is rife with "repeat . . . argument[s]" he made in connection with Morgal v. Maricopa Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors, 2012 WL 2029719 (D.Ariz. June 6, 2012); Doc. 152 (same). See LRCiv 7.2(g)(1) ("No motion for reconsideration of an Order may repeat any . . . argument made by the movant in support of or in opposition to the motion that resulted in the Order.") For example, plaintiff reiterates his by now familiar refrain that the defendant has not fully cooperated in discovery and has misled the court with respect to the dating and relevancy of the National Commission on Correctional Health Care ("NCCHC") report. Such repetitious arguments cannot form the basis for relief under LRCiv 7.2(g)(1).
Further, to a certain extent, plaintiff's reconsideration motion reflects nothing more than his disagreement or dissatisfaction with this court's prior order. Such "dissatisfaction" or disagreement is not "a proper basis for reconsideration[]" though. See Spain v. EMC Mortg. Co., 2008 WL 2328358, at *2 (D.Ariz. June 4, 2008) (citing O'Neal v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 2008 WL 1721891, at *4 (E.D.Cal. 2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted) ("Plaintiffs['] assert[ion][ ] with great vehemence and a degree of disdain, that they disagree with the court's findings[ ] . . . is not grounds for . . . grant[ing] . . . reconsideration."); see also Dennis v. Ayers, 2008 WL 1989304, at *1 (N.D.Cal. 2008) (Petitioner's disagreement "with the Court's prior resolution of the claim . . . is, of course, [an] insufficient [basis] for . . . granting] a motion for reconsideration.")).
LRCiv 7.2(g)(1), governing the "[f]orm and content " of motions for reconsideration, expressly provides that "[f]ailure to comply with th[at] subsection may be grounds for denial of the motion." Exercising its discretion under that Rule, the court denies plaintiff's motion for reconsideration because he did not make the requisite showing thereunder for such relief. See LRCiv 7.2(g)(1).
Taking into account plaintiff's pro se status, the court is compelled to point out several ways in which he fundamentally misapprehends the June 6, 2012 order, as well as the Ninth Circuit's decision (Doc. 122-1). As to the former, plaintiff claims that "pursuant to prison mail rules[]" his reply was "timely and should [have] be[en] considered by the court." Mot. (Doc. 156) at 1 (citing Doc. 152 at 7 and 8). The court is uncertain as to what plaintiff means by "prison mail rules." As detailed in Morgal, however, plaintiff's reply, dated March 28, 2012, and which he claims was mailed that same date, was not timely, even including three additional days for service pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d). See Morgal, 2012 WL 202971 at *3; and Doc. 152 at 7:16-8:12.
As to footnote four, plaintiff seems to suggest that this court found that he improperly failed to specifically request or move for modification of the Rule 16 scheduling order. See Mot. (Doc. 156) at 2. "[F]ollow[ing] the approach endorsed by the Ninth Circuit[,]" this court did not require such a specific request or motion, however. Morgal, 2012 WL 202971, at *5 n. 4; Doc. 152 at 12 n. 4. Instead, the court explicitly "construe[d] plaintiff Morgal's motion for leave to amend as a motion to modify the scheduling order under Rule 16." Id. (citations omitted).
Turning to the Ninth Circuit's decision, plaintiff states that the defendant has "not cooperated with any discovery as . . . noted by the 9th Circuit[']s ruling." Mot. (Doc. 156) at 2. Further, plaintiff states that "discovery was not completed as noted by the 9th Circuit remand." Id. These are both misstatements as to what the Ninth Circuit found. As set forth in Morgal, in relevant part:
[T]he Ninth Circuit found that '[w]hen the district court granted summary judgment for the [Board],' plaintiff 'had under submission five requests that the district court order the [Board] to produce a specified official report purporting to identify specific systemic problems with healthcare services at the Maricopa County Jail. . . . In light of those five unresolved discovery "requests," the Ninth Circuit held that summary judgment in the Board's favor was improper. That Court thus 'vacate[d] and remand[ed] for further proceedings, including, if applicable, resolution of any discovery request by either party relating to the [February 24, 2006] NCCHC report.Morgal, 2012 WL 2029719, at *1 (quoting Memo. (Doc. 122-1) at 2-3). There is nothing in the Ninth Circuit's decision even hinting, much less finding that the defendant did not cooperate with any discovery. Nor did the Ninth Circuit find that "discovery was not completed[.]" See Mot. (Doc. 156) at 2.
With the foregoing clarifications and, as discussed above, the court hereby DENIES plaintiff Morgal's "Motion to Reconsider Ruling on 6/5/2012[.]" See Mot. (Doc. 156) at 1.
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Robert C. Broomfield
Senior United States District Judge
Copies to counsel of record and plaintiff pro se