Opinion
FSTFA176031325S
12-26-2018
David MOREY v. Courtney R. SUHLER
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
Diana, J.
This action seeks the dissolution of the parties’ eleven-year marriage. The complaint was filed on March 2, 2017, with a March 14, 2017 return date. On March 15, 2017, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint. The parties appeared for trial December 4-7, and 10-13, 2018 and was represented by counsel. In making its ruling, the court has considered the rules of practice, testimony, demeanor, credibility of witnesses, full exhibits, arguments of counsel, relevant case law, and the criteria set forth in General Statutes §§ 46b-56, 46b-62, 46b-81, 46b-82, 46b-84, 46b-87 and 46b-215b. The court also reviewed the parties’ financial affidavits, guideline worksheets, proposed orders and amended proposed orders, as submitted by their counsel.
The parties’ financial affidavits were ordered unsealed in this contested dissolution matter pursuant to Practice Book § 25-59A(h) given that financial matters are in dispute.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The court makes the following findings of fact by a preponderance of evidence, and all valuations of assets are made as of the date of dissolution, unless otherwise set forth herein.
The court has jurisdiction in this matter and all statutory stays have expired. The parties were married on September 14, 2007, in Edgartown, Massachusetts. The plaintiff has resided in Connecticut for twelve months prior to the entry of this final decree. The marriage of the parties has broken down irretrievably, with no possibility of reconciliation. The allegations in the complaint have been proven and are found to be true.
There are two children of the marriage, Cameron R. Morey, born December 19, 2008, and Ashton T. Morey, born June 13, 2011. Neither party, nor the children, have received financial assistance from the state of Connecticut.
The plaintiff is fifty-four (54) years of age and in relatively good health. He has a B.S. Degree from University of Vermont and an MBA from Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. The plaintiff served in the United States Navy, both in active and reserve service, for twenty-one years, before retiring in 2007. Currently, the plaintiff lives and works in the Washington D.C. area as a civilian employee of the United States Air Force, with a total income and benefits reaching $ 170, 000 per year. This is the plaintiff’s second marriage.
The defendant is forty-seven (47) years of age and in fair health after suffering a stroke in April 2016. She attended some college, but, did not obtain a degree. The defendant is currently unemployed, and has not earned income from employment for over ten years, while serving as the primary caretaker of the parties’ two minor children. Currently, the defendant and two children live with, and are financially supported by her parents in their Darien, Connecticut residence. This is the defendant’s second marriage.
Unless otherwise stated herein, the court relies on the financial affidavits filed by the plaintiff (# 268) and the defendant (# 263).
The plaintiff came into the marriage with the expectation of receiving a substantial commission of $ 899, 000, of which only $ 200, 000 was received. He also had an interest in his parent’s trusts. Although the valuation of the estate is unknown, as the plaintiff’s father recently died in July 2018, and the estate is yet to be settled, it is expected to contain considerable value. The defendant came into this marriage with a condominium in New Canaan, Connecticut. The court finds it has a value of $ 950, 000, liens of $ 333, 000 and equity of $ 617, 000 as stipulated by counsel. The defendant has not resided at the condominium since 2002, as it has no running water or heat, and is used purely for storage. The defendant was also the beneficiary of a substantial trust whose proceeds, $ 1.1 million dollars, were fully distributed by December 4, 2009.
The plaintiff earns a base salary of $ 126, 000 per year, with additional benefits of $ 44, 700 per year, for a total annual compensation of $ 170, 000. The plaintiff receives disability payments of $ 6300 per year, and approximately $ 15, 000 per year in trust distributions as beneficiary. He uses this money to pay interest on his two loans (2007 and 2011) from his father’s trust totaling approximately $ 300, 000.
The defendant does not work, and relies on distributions from her father’s business to pay her expenses. She has lived primarily with her parents in their various residences since 2009. Both of the children attend Darien public schools.
The court finds the following valuation regarding the parties’ assets. The plaintiff’s townhouse in Georgetown, is valued at $ 945, 000, as stipulated by counsel, with liens totaling approximately $ 945, 000. This property has endured a renovation through the duration of the marriage. The plaintiff possesses liabilities totaling $ 500, 000, of which $ 425, 000 are loans from trusts in which he has an interest as a beneficiary. The defendant has various liabilities totaling $ 30, 000.
The court finds the parties have three vehicles, and a boat, with a total value of $ 7, 500. The plaintiff has $ 5, 500 in various bank accounts. The defendant has $ 18, 900 in her bank account, which includes a joint account with Capital One that she funds. The defendant’s private investment in VSS Mezzanine, LLC, and VSS Equities IV, LLC, are valued at $ 20, 000. Her jewelry and furnishings are valued at $ 70, 000. The plaintiff holds a note with a principal and interest valued at $ 57, 500. The plaintiff has three IRAs valued at $ 200, 000, two 401(k) accounts valued at $ 185, 000 and a pension with the Federal Employee Retirement System that will pay monthly benefits, depending upon the plaintiff’s election between $ 1, 480 and $ 2, 522. No election has been made as of the date of this decision. The plaintiff has a real estate, recovery, and garden business that has no value, he also has a trust that is not funded, and has no value. The plaintiff has furnishings, jewelry, and collections valued at $ 44, 000.
The plaintiff has a 15.35 percent ownership interest in Edgartown Lighthouse, LLC, valued at $ 925, 600. He is due to receive an additional 15.35 percent after his father’s death in July 2018, but this interest has yet to be distributed. This ownership interest consists of a 3, 200-square-foot, waterfront residence with six bedrooms in Martha’s Vineyard (North Water Street, Edgartown, Massachusetts). The plaintiff is a 1/3 beneficiary of the: TMorey Irrevocable Trust, TMorey, Jr. 1994 Irrevocable Trust, Paula Morey Trust, Morey Irrevocable Trust and the TMorey, Jr. 1999 Irrevocable Trust. He is the income beneficiary of the School Street Irrevocable Trust and the School Street Nominee Trust. These trusts control and contain: millions of dollars in antiques, two pieces of real estate in New York, a condominium in Florida, investments, and over $ 3 million of life insurance proceeds. The plaintiff does not control these trust assets, as the trustee is the plaintiff’s brother, Townsend Morey, III. The plaintiff is the 1/3 beneficiary of his father’s life insurance policy, $ 500, 000 of which is available to the plaintiff upon his request and the trustee’s discretion. No request for payment has been made.
The plaintiff has set up two Capital One accounts for each of his children, using the remaining funds from a gift given to the children by their paternal grandfather. Each account has a value of $ 15, 000 remaining from the $ 84, 000 given as a gift by their grandfather from 2015-2017. This money was paid to the plaintiff for the children. The children also each own a small percentage of the Edgartown Lighthouse, LLC.
Based on the evidence and the proposed orders of both parties, the court finds it is appropriate to retain continuing jurisdiction regarding educational support of the children pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-56c. The court finds as a matter of fact that it is more likely than not that the parties would have provided support for the children’s higher education if the family were intact, based on the parties’ testimony and their high levels of education.
Additional findings of fact are stated or incorporated as applicable in the Discussion, Conclusion, and Orders set forth in this decision.
Discussion
The parties met in in 1999, and had a brief relationship. After their initial relationship, each party married and subsequently divorced another person. In 2004, the parties reconnected, began a relationship, and ultimately moved in together in 2005. The parties were engaged in Paris, France, on May 22, 2006. The plaintiff did not provide the defendant with an engagement ring. In December 2005, the plaintiff purchased a townhouse in the Georgetown section of Washington, D.C., for $ 1.3 million. The plaintiff paid the deposit of $ 160, 000, while the defendant paid the $ 8, 000 closing costs, and $ 123, 000 toward renovations. The townhouse has, and still is, being renovated. The parties had planned on spending up to $ 600, 000 for significant renovations to the property. However, since the property remained solely in the plaintiff’s name and the defendant’s name was not placed on the deed as promised, the defendant refused to advance any further money. This couple ignored the patently obvious warning signs that they were not compatible and the defendant was troubled that she was paying for everything without any contribution from the plaintiff. The couple attended therapy due to their constant arguing and money concerns, which started before the marriage and persisted throughout its existence. On September 14, 2007, the parties were married on Martha’s Vineyard. The defendant paid for eighty-eight people to attend their wedding at a cost of approximately $ 200, 000. They each grew up privileged, and come from families of some wealth, and both have, and will continue to, benefit from their families’ largesse. The defendant was the beneficiary of a trust set up by her father, in which from 1991 through 2009, she received $ 1.1 million dollars. Since 2009, she has received distributions of money from her father’s businesses to maintain her lifestyle. From 2013 through 2018, the defendant received cash distributions of approximately $ 400, 000, in addition to having other expenses paid for on her behalf. The plaintiff owns an interest in an LLC, and is the beneficiary of several trusts set up by his parents that include; real estate in Florida, New York and Martha’s Vineyard, investments, life insurance proceeds and antiques, with his estimated interest being worth several million dollars. The parties each collect antiques and store this property, furniture, jewelry, and art work in the plaintiff’s father’s residence in Loudonville, New York, and in the defendant’s New Canaan, Connecticut condominium. Some of the defendant’s belongings remain in the New York residence.
The parties lived in Georgetown together while the townhouse was in different stages of renovation until October 2008, when the property became uninhabitable. The defendant was pregnant and rented an apartment nearby at Dent Place. She paid the apartment expenses while the plaintiff paid the expenses for the Georgetown townhouse. In December 2008, the defendant gave birth to the parties’ son, Cameron. The parties’ parents each had residences in Martha’s Vineyard (Edgartown, Massachusetts) where they spent their summers. The defendant and newborn spent the summer of 2009 at Martha’s Vineyard, and the plaintiff visited regularly. The defendant was exhausted caring for their child without assistance from the plaintiff, as his work required him to travel overseas between 100-120 days each year. In the fall of 2009, she left the Dent Place apartment to move in with her parents in Darien, Connecticut. This is when the parties separated their residences. The parties’ relationship was strained, as the defendant felt financially duped by the plaintiff, who never paid for anything. The plaintiff was expecting a $ 899, 000 commission for selling his father a $ 28 million dollar life insurance policy, he only received $ 200, 000. This expectation was the focus of debate and argument for years between the parties. In 2007, and 2011, the plaintiff received loans of approximately $ 300, 000 from his father’s revocable trust of which he was a beneficiary. These monies were used by the plaintiff and were not shared with the defendant. In 2011, the parties’ second child, Ashton, was born in Greenwich, Connecticut. The plaintiff was not there for the birth, and the joy and happiness did not last long as the plaintiff questioned the defendant about the paternity of the child.
The children attended private school and preschool. The defendant paid over $ 200, 000 for these expenses without any contribution from the plaintiff’s own funds. In 2011, the defendant also spent approximately $ 100, 000 to pay the initiation fee for the entire family to join the Edgartown Yacht Club and Chappaquiddick Beach Club. When the plaintiff did contribute, he did so with money he withdrew from the parties’ joint account that was funded by the defendant’s father. In 2012, the plaintiff withdrew over $ 186, 000 from this account without consulting the defendant, and in 2016, he took another $ 32, 500 from the same account, again without the defendant’s consent. The parties’ relationship was distant and they lived separate lives. The plaintiff saw the children on weekends when he visited, which over the years became less frequent. The plaintiff’s relationship with the defendant, the children and her parents was strained and tense. The plaintiff was difficult, argumentative, loud, opinionated and authoritative. In 2012, the plaintiff had his belongs shipped out of the Darien residence, where she and the children were living, to Georgetown where he was living. He was asked to leave the residence several times, and the parties were not close, affectionate or communicative. The subject of divorce was brought up several times by the parties over the years. The defendant consulted an attorney in 2015, but could not afford the retainer. The parties limped along, tolerating each other during their occasional contact, and even had separate bedrooms when the plaintiff visited Connecticut. The defendant did not visit Georgetown. During the Christmas holiday in 2015, the police were called, when the defendant asked the plaintiff for a divorce, and he became upset. In March 2016, the parties and children went to Florida for vacation. Both sets of parents own condominiums there. During their stay at the plaintiff’s father’s residence, the plaintiff became upset and enraged when his son did not brush his teeth before bed. The plaintiff argued with the defendant who locked herself in the bedroom because she was afraid of the plaintiff’s rage. The plaintiff was screaming at the defendant, and assaulted her, by pushing, grabbing and choking her, punching her in the face, and leaving her bruised and battered. This was the last straw for the defendant, and she left with the children, and went to stay at her parents’ Florida condominium. She had tolerated verbal abuse, insults, and a lack of emotional or financial support, but this incident changed her. Thereafter, she went from being indifferent and tolerant toward the plaintiff to being filled with pure hatred, unwilling to have any contact with him.
Shortly thereafter, in April 2016, the defendant, in her mid-forties, suffered a stroke, and spent five days in the hospital. The defendant’s mother notified the plaintiff who then came to Connecticut. The defendant was very angry at her mother for informing the plaintiff, as she did not want him there. Upon her release from the hospital, the parties argued and the plaintiff returned to Washington, D.C.
These parties did not really know one another and did not care to. During their union, the defendant had four miscarriages, and the plaintiff only knew about two of them. The parties’ lives were not tied together financially, psychologically or socially. They did not regularly communicate and struggled when they were together. A perfect example of this relationship can be seen in how the issue of the Mercedes Benz was handled. In 2013, a Mercedes Benz was purchased for the defendant’s use. She paid the deposit and the monthly loan, but the title was in the plaintiff’s name. The car was registered in Washington, D.C., where the registration expired because it was not timely inspected. The defendant stored the vehicle at her residence in Connecticut, but the plaintiff was the owner of the vehicle. During the course of these proceedings, the plaintiff took possession of the vehicle by having the car towed to a dealership. He then initiated repairs, paid the last few loan payments, and sold the vehicle. The $ 19, 000 in proceeds were then retained by the plaintiff. This all occurred without consent of the defendant or court order. The money he earned and received was his, while he benefited and helped himself to her money. After 2012, this marriage existed in title only, as the defendant and her children survived and lived well due to the generosity of the defendant’s parents. The defendant was duped by the plaintiff, as he did not contribute to this marriage in anyway and cared little for his wife or children. In July 2017, he split the membership of the Edgartown Yacht Club and the Chappaquiddick Beach Club, without notice to the defendant, to avoid paying the monthly expenses that he had been paying since they joined. This is where the children attend summer camp, and take sailing, and tennis lessons. The defendant was unaware of this action, which resulted in the termination of the defendant and children’s membership. These clubs are the center of the family’s summertime activities and social relationships. The plaintiff is due to receive a significant sum of money, allowing him to contribute to the family expenses. Instead of helping with the expenses, however, he filed for divorce. The plaintiff claims he filed for divorce when he did because the defendant was not allowing him access to the children. However, the familial relationship was distant and harmful, and the plaintiff’s relationship with his children was fragile at best. In fact, the children started calling the plaintiff by his first name, and their oldest son observed and was affected by, the March 2016, assault in Florida. This evolution was the result of the plaintiff’s behavior over the years. The defendant is highly sensitive to the plaintiff’s actions, due to his abusive treatment and she wants nothing to do with him. The defendant did have a relationship and moved in which a neighbor in Darien, but that relationship has since ended and was not the cause of the breakdown of the marriage.
"It is well established that [i]n a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony ... The credibility and the weight of expert testimony is judged by the same standard, and the trial court is privileged to adopt whatever testimony [it] reasonably believes to be credible ... On appeal, we do not retry the facts or pass on the credibility of witnesses." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Caciopoli v. Lebowitz, 131 Conn.App. 306, 327, 26 A.3d 136 (2011), aff’d, 309 Conn. 62, 68 A.3d 1150 (2013).
"Nothing in our law is more elementary than that the trier is the final judge of the credibility of witnesses and of the weight to be accorded their testimony." Morande v. Newman Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 5 Conn.App. 423, 499 A.2d 78 (1985), citing Morgan v. Hill, 139 Conn. 159, 161, 90 A.2d 641 (1952).
Conclusion
The court finds the plaintiff to be without any credibility, as his testimony regarding his conduct throughout the marriage was incomplete and unpersuasive. The court finds the defendant to be credible in her testimony. The court further finds the plaintiff to be responsible for the breakdown of the marriage. The parties co-existed for years while living in different states. They had one reoccurring argument in that the plaintiff did not contribute to the cost of raising their family. He did, however, pay for the considerable carrying costs of the Georgetown townhouse. The plaintiff did not apportion any additional income to support the children, and yet, the plaintiff had enough money to loan $ 50, 000 at 5 percent interest in 2016, instead of sending it to the defendant to support the family. The defendant exhausted the bulk of her million dollar trust to support their lifestyle after the parties began living together, and in 2009 it was all gone. From 2005 through 2018, the plaintiff made virtually no payments to the defendant, and instead took money from her without any discussion or notice. He shamelessly withdrew money out of their joint account that she funded to pay his expenses, and then claimed that he supported the children with her money or their money. Even though the parties constantly argued about money, that was not the cause of the breakdown of the marriage. The breakdown was caused by plaintiff’s abusive behavior toward the defendant, both verbal and physical. The court finds the plaintiff to be at fault for the breakdown of this marriage.
Orders
Dissolution of Marriage
The marriage of the parties is hereby dissolved on the grounds of irretrievable breakdown, and the parties are declared to be single and unmarried.
Custody/Access
The Stipulation dated December 11, 2018 (# 271), is approved and made an order of the court, and is incorporated into the judgment file by reference.
Child Support
The plaintiff shall pay to the defendant the sum of $ 428 per week ($ 1, 855 per month) for child support pursuant to the Connecticut Child Support Guidelines (# 264) until such time as the oldest child shall reach the age of eighteen years of age, or shall be otherwise emancipated, at which time child support shall be adjusted with the then existing child support guidelines, or as a court may otherwise direct. The foregoing notwithstanding, if any child shall turn eighteen years old and is still in high school, the child support shall continue until the first day of next month following graduation from high school, or their nineteenth birthday, whichever shall sooner occur, pursuant to General Statutes § 46b-84(b). An immediate wage withholding order pursuant to General Statutes § 52-362(b) shall enter to secure payment of child support orders.
The plaintiff shall be responsible for seventy (70) percent and the defendant shall be responsible for thirty (30) percent of: (a) the costs of the children’s uninsured and/or unreimbursed medical expenses (unless otherwise stated herein); (b) and the defendant’s work-related child care expenses.
Educational Support
The court shall reserve jurisdiction to enter future orders with respect to the children’s college education costs under General Statutes § 46b-56c.
Alimony
Neither party shall pay periodic alimony to the other.
Health Insurance
The plaintiff shall maintain his current health insurance coverage (or reasonable equivalent) for the children’s benefit as available through his employer, at a reasonable cost, for as long as they are eligible. The defendant is presently a named insured under said Aetna plan. The plaintiff shall facilitate the defendant’s COBRA enrollment, in the event she is eligible. The defendant shall be responsible for the cost of her medical coverage.
Assets
Real Property
(a) The plaintiff shall retain sole ownership of the real property located at 1513 33rd Street, Washington, D.C., free and clear of any claim by the defendant.
(b) The defendant shall retain sole ownership of the real property located at 29 Lakeview Avenue, Unit 3A, New Canaan, Connecticut, free and clear of any claim by the plaintiff.
Lump Sum Payment
The plaintiff shall pay the defendant $ 350, 000 as a lump-sum non-taxable property distribution to the defendant from his share of the assets, as follows: $ 250, 000 within 60 days of judgment, and two (2) installments of $ 50, 000 per year, payable in each year on the anniversary day of the $ 250, 000 payment.
Personal Property
Any and all personal property of the defendant shall be removed from the 407 Louden Road, Loudonville, New York, property within sixty days of judgment. Thereafter the parties shall retain the personal property in their possession.
Bank Accounts/Other Investments
The plaintiff shall retain his Capital One checking account, Navy Federal Credit Union savings account 1003, and his Navy Federal Credit Union CD account free from any claim by the defendant.
The defendant shall retain her Darien Rowayton Bank accounts (# 8026 and # 0834), and the joint Capital One account (# 2641), free from any claim by the plaintiff.
The defendant shall retain her private investments, free from any claim by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff shall retain his MV Equity Convertible Note, free from any claim by the defendant.
Trust Interests, LLC and Inherited Asset
The plaintiff shall retain his beneficiary interests and inherited assets, including Edgartown Lighthouse, LLC, free from any claim by the defendant, unless otherwise stated herein.
Retirement Assets
The plaintiff shall immediately transfer to the defendant the following investments; his two (2) Roth IRAs (# 1047 and inherited) and one (1) IRA (inherited IRA # 6411) valued at the date of dissolution including any increase or decrease in value through the date of transfer. The transfer shall be a nontaxable event from IRA to IRA. All fees and costs incurred shall be paid by the plaintiff. The court shall retain jurisdiction over these transfers.
The plaintiff shall retain his retirement accounts including his FERS pension and two 401(K) accounts, free from any claim by the defendant.
Miscellaneous Assets
Except as otherwise provided herein, the plaintiff shall retain all other assets listed on his financial affidavit, including business and self-employment interests, free from any claim by the defendant.
The defendant shall retain all other assets listed on her financial affidavit, including business and self-employment interests, free from any claim by the plaintiff.
Motor Vehicles/Boat
The plaintiff shall retain his 1996 Toyota, 2000 Porsche, and 1975 Boston Whaler, free from any claim by the defendant.
The defendant shall retain her 1998 Isuzu, free from any claim by the plaintiff.
Liabilities
The plaintiff shall be solely responsible for all liabilities listed on his financial affidavit. The defendant shall be solely responsible for all liabilities listed on her financial affidavit. Each party shall indemnify and hold the other harmless with respect to any debt, or portion thereof, ordered to be paid by such party.
Social Clubs
The plaintiff shall retain his membership in the Edgartown Yacht Club. The plaintiff shall forthwith reinstate the memberships at the Edgartown Yacht Club and the Chappaquiddick Beach Club on behalf of the defendant and the minor children, and shall pay any and all application and membership fees.
Life Insurance
The plaintiff shall maintain the two life insurance policies as stated on his financial affidavit in the amount of $ 500, 000, naming the defendant as the trustee and the minor children as irrevocable beneficiaries until the youngest child attains the age of twenty-three.
Dependency Exemption/Child Tax Credit
Each party shall claim one child as a dependency exemption/credit each year for so long as two children are eligible. When only one is eligible, the parties shall annually alternate, with the plaintiff claiming in even numbered years and the defendant claiming in odd numbered years. The parties shall execute and exchange an original IRS Form 8332 to effectuate these orders within thirty (30) days of judgment.
Attorneys/Professional Fees
Each party shall be solely responsible for his or her costs, counsel and expert fees. Each party is ordered to sign whatever documents are necessary and as presented to them to effectuate these orders within ten (10) days of presentment. These orders are effective immediately unless otherwise ordered herein.
Pendente Lite Motions
# 177 Motion for Order-GRANTED
# 196 Motion for Contempt-GRANTED
# 241 Motion for Order-DENIED
# 256 Motion for Allocation of Fees-DENIED
# 261 Motion for Indemnification-DENIED
# 262 Motion for Indemnification-DENIED
Motion for Contempt (# 196)
The court finds by clear and convincing evidence that;
1. The automatic orders to be clear and unambiguous regarding the selling, transferring, exchange, assign, remove, or in any way dispose of an asset during the pendency of an action.
2. The plaintiff failed to comply with said orders by unilaterally splitting the club memberships at Edgartown Yacht Club and the Chappaquiddick Beach Club without the consent of the defendant or court order.
3. The plaintiff’s actions are found to be willful.
4. The plaintiff is in Contempt of Court.
So Ordered.