Opinion
13-21-00409-CR
08-03-2023
Do not publish. Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b).
On appeal from the 92nd District Court of Hidalgo County, Texas.
Before Justices Tijerina, Silva, and Peña
MEMORANDUM OPINION
JAIME TIJERINA JUSTICE
Appellant Jason Omar Moreno appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for post-conviction DNA testing. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 64.01, 64.03 ("Chapter 64"). Appellant's court-appointed counsel has filed an Anders brief stating that there are no arguable grounds for appeal. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm the trial court's judgment.
I. Anders Brief
Pursuant to Anders v. California, appellant's court-appointed appellate counsel filed a brief and a motion to withdraw with this Court, stating that her review of the record yielded no grounds of reversible error upon which an appeal could be predicated. See id. Counsel's brief meets the requirements of Anders as it presents a professional evaluation demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to advance on appeal. See In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d 403, 406 n.9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (orig. proceeding) ("In Texas, an Anders brief need not specifically advance 'arguable' points of error if counsel finds none, but it must provide record references to the facts and procedural history and set out pertinent legal authorities." (citing Hawkins v. State, 112 S.W.3d 340, 343-44 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2003, no pet.))); Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 510 n.3 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
In compliance with High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807, 813 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1978) and Kelly v. State, 436 S.W.3d 313, 319-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014), appellant's counsel carefully discussed why, under controlling authority, there is no reversible error in the trial court's judgment. Appellant's counsel also informed this Court in writing that she: (1) notified appellant that counsel has filed an Anders brief and a motion to withdraw; (2) provided appellant with copies of both pleadings; (3) informed appellant of his rights to file a pro se response, to review the record prior to filing that response, and to seek discretionary review if we conclude that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) provided appellant with a form motion for pro se access to the appellate record that only requires appellant's signature and date with instructions to file the motion within ten days. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; Kelly, 436 S.W.3d at 319-20; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408-09. Appellant has filed a pro se response.
When appellate counsel files an Anders brief and the appellant independently files a pro se response, the court of appeals has two choices:
[i]t may determine that the appeal is wholly frivolous and issue an opinion explaining that it has reviewed the record and finds no reversible error. Or, it may determine that arguable grounds for appeal exist and remand the cause to the trial court so that new counsel may be appointed to brief the issues.Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (internal citations omitted). We are "not required to review the merits of each claim raised in an Anders brief or a pro se response." Id. at 827. Rather, we must merely determine if there are any arguable grounds for appeal. Id. If we determine that there are such arguable grounds, we must remand for appointment of new counsel. Id. Reviewing the merits raised in a pro se response would deprive an appellant of meaningful assistance of counsel. Id.
II. Independent Review
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of all the proceedings to determine whether the case is wholly frivolous. Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80 (1988). We have reviewed the record counsel's brief, and appellant's pro se response, and we have found nothing that would arguably support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ("Due to the nature of Anders briefs, by indicating in the opinion that it considered the issues raised in the briefs and reviewed the record for reversible error but found none, the court of appeals met the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 47.1."); Stafford, 813 S.W.2d at 511.
III. Motion to Withdraw
In accordance with Anders, appellant's counsel has asked this Court for permission to withdraw as counsel. See Anders, 386 U.S. at 744; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 408 n.17. We grant counsel's motion to withdraw. Within five days from the date of this Court's opinion, counsel is ordered to send a copy of this opinion and this Court's judgment to appellant and to advise him of his right to file a petition for discretionary review. See Tex. R. App. P. 48.4; see also In re Schulman, 252 S.W.3d at 412 n.35; Ex parte Owens, 206 S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
No substitute counsel will be appointed. Should appellant wish to seek further review of this case by the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, he must either retain an attorney to file a petition for discretionary review or file a pro se petition for discretionary review. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed within thirty days from the date of either this opinion or the last timely motion for rehearing or timely motion for en banc reconsideration that was overruled by this Court. See Tex. R. App. P. 68.2. Any petition for discretionary review must be filed with the Clerk of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. See id. R. 68.3. Any petition for discretionary review should comply with the requirements of Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 68.4. See id. R. 68.4.
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
Because we have concluded that there are no non-frivolous issues, we deny appellant's motion requesting appointment of new counsel. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 826-27 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (providing that only if we determine there are arguable grounds, we will remand the case to the trial court for appointment of new counsel). For the same reason, we deny appellant's motion requesting that we deny appellate counsel's motion to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (allowing appellate counsel to withdraw when the appeal is frivolous).