Opinion
1164 CAF 16-00341.
11-09-2017
In the Matter of Cory MORENO, Petitioner–Respondent, v. Jan ELLIOTT, Respondent–Appellant.
Davison Law Office PLLC, Canandaigua (Mary P. Davison of Counsel), for Respondent–Appellant. Cara A. Waldman, Fairport, for Petitioner–Respondent. Vivian Clara Strache, Attorney for the Children, Bath.
Davison Law Office PLLC, Canandaigua (Mary P. Davison of Counsel), for Respondent–Appellant.
Cara A. Waldman, Fairport, for Petitioner–Respondent.
Vivian Clara Strache, Attorney for the Children, Bath.
PRESENT: WHALEN, P.J., CENTRA, LINDLEY, TROUTMAN, AND WINSLOW, JJ.
MEMORANDUM:
In this proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, respondent mother appeals from an order that, inter alia, held her in civil contempt for willfully violating prior orders and directed her to stay away from petitioner father until their youngest child's 18th birthday. "A motion to punish a party for civil contempt is addressed to the sound discretion of the [hearing] court" (Matter of Philie v. Singer, 79 A.D.3d 1041, 1042, 913 N.Y.S.2d 745 [4th Dept.2010] [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Fernandez v. Fernandez, 278 A.D.2d 882, 882, 718 N.Y.S.2d 509 [4th Dept.2000] ), and we conclude that Family Court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the father met his burden of establishing, by clear and convincing evidence (see El–Dehdan v. El–Dehdan, 26 N.Y.3d 19, 29, 19 N.Y.S.3d 475, 41 N.E.3d 340 [2015] ; Belkhir v. Amrane–Belkhir, 128 A.D.3d 1382, 1382, 8 N.Y.S.3d 752 [4th Dept.2015] ), that the mother willfully violated orders that required her, inter alia, to permit the father to have visitation and telephone contact with the children; to share medical information; to be absent during visitation exchanges; to complete the intake process at the Parent Resource Center Visitation Program as soon as possible after a May court appearance so that the father could have visitation with the children at the Center in June; and to re-enroll the children in counseling services (cf. Matter of Amrane v. Belkhir, 141 A.D.3d 1074, 1076–1077, 34 N.Y.S.3d 823 [4th Dept.2016] ). The record supports the court's finding that the mother's violations of the orders unjustifiably impaired the father's rights to communicate with the children, to visit with the children, and to participate in decision-making with respect to the children's healthcare. Thus, we conclude that the court properly determined that the mother violated a lawful and unequivocal mandate of the court that was in effect at the time of the filing of a petition, that her actions caused prejudice to a right of the father, who was a party (see Judiciary Law § 753[A] ; McCain v. Dinkins, 84 N.Y.2d 216, 226, 616 N.Y.S.2d 335, 639 N.E.2d 1132 [1994] ), and that the mother's violations were willful (see Matter of Chapman v. Tucker, 74 A.D.3d 1905, 1906, 903 N.Y.S.2d 640 [4th Dept.2010] ; see also Matter of Constantine v. Hopkins, 101 A.D.3d 1190, 1191, 955 N.Y.S.2d 276 [3d Dept.2012] ).
Contrary to the mother's further contention, the court was authorized, under article 6 of the Family Court Act, to make an order of protection a condition of the order on appeal. Inasmuch as the father had served and filed a petition, and the order of protection "set forth reasonable conditions of behavior to be observed for a specific time by [the mother]" (§ 656), we see no reason to vacate the condition that the mother stay away from the father (see § 656[a] ).
It is hereby ORDERED that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.