Opinion
Case No. 1:04-cv-00650-DFH-TAB.
February 24, 2005
ENTRY ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
Plaintiff John Moranski alleges that his employer, General Motors Corporation, discriminated against him on the basis of his religion in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. GM has moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Because the plaintiff has alleged facts that show he cannot be entitled to relief, the defendant's motion is granted.
I. Standard for Rule 12(b)(6) Motion
In ruling on a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the court must assume as true all well-pleaded facts set forth in the complaint, construing the allegations liberally and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Forseth v. Village of Sussex, 199 F.3d 363, 368 (7th Cir. 2000). For purposes of GM's motion, the issue is whether the plaintiff might prove any set of facts consistent with the allegations that would give him a right to relief. Wudtke v. Davel, 128 F.3d 1057, 1061 (7th Cir. 1997), citing Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993). A defendant is entitled to dismissal only where "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Chaney v. Suburban Bus Division, 52 F.3d 623, 626-27 (7th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, a plaintiff may still plead himself out of court if the complaint includes particulars that show he cannot possibly be entitled to the relief he seeks. Warzon v. Drew, 60 F.3d 1234, 1239 (7th Cir. 1995), citing Thomas v. Farley, 31 F.3d 557, 558-59 (7th Cir. 1994). In this case the parties' briefing on the defendant's motion has spelled out the plaintiff's theories in ways that show he is not entitled to relief.
II. Factual Allegations
The following allegations are set forth in the complaint, and the court treats them as true for purposes of defendant's motion. Plaintiff Moranski works as a desktop computing architect for GM at the company's Allison Transmission Division in Indianapolis. GM has initiated what it calls the "Affinity Group Program," under which employees can form groups based on aspects of shared identity such as gender, disability, race, or ethnicity. Under the Affinity Group Program, the company makes available certain resources such as meeting facilities, equipment, and funding to support the group's goals. The following Affinity Groups presently exist at GM: People with Disabilities; General Motors African Ancestry Network; GM Plus (for gays and lesbians); North American Women's Advisory Council; GM Hispanic Initiative Team; GM Asian Indian Affinity Group; GM Chinese Affinity Group; GM Mid-East/South-East Asian Affinity Group; and Veterans' Affinity Group.
According to GM, the purpose of the Affinity Group Program is "to ensure that diverse constituencies feel welcomed at and valued by GM." The program is also intended to facilitate mentoring, networking, career development, outreach to diverse communities among GM's customers, and communication between employees from diverse backgrounds and GM management.
To be eligible for the resources the company makes available to an Affinity Group, a group must register with and be officially recognized by the company. To be officially recognized, the group must adhere to certain policy guidelines regarding group formation, structure, organization, operation, activities, and eligibility requirements. These policy guidelines are provided by GM in a document entitled GM Affinity Group Guidelines ("Guidelines"). Def. Br. Ex. A. The court may consider this document in deciding the motion to dismiss because the complaint refers to it and it is central to the case. E.g., Menominee Indian Tribe v. Thompson, 161 F.3d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1998).
The Guidelines state that membership in an Affinity Group must be open to current, active, salaried, full-time employees who share the group's goals. Membership may not be limited on the basis of race, ethnicity, or gender, for example, even if race, ethnicity, or gender is the basis of the Affinity Group. The Guidelines also state as follows:
The Affinity Group process is designed to be driven by employees, and Affinity groups will form based on employee initiative. Any group of employees that believe that they would benefit from affinity or networking can request recognition as a group, provided they are able to meet the guidelines. . . .
In addition to the eight original groups [recognized by GM] (African American, Asian American, Gay Lesbian, Hispanic, Non-U.S. Citizens working in the U.S., People with Disabilities, White Males, and Women), typical groups in other companies include Native American employees, employees with Appalachian heritage, and employees of Middle Eastern descent, among others. Groups are typically created around an aspect of common social identity that influences how others see them at GM. [GM] will not provide recognition for groups that are created as a result of a common interest or activity only, for example, golf, exercise, theatre, or other interests or hobbies.
Def. Br. Ex. A. at 3-4.
The provision of the Guidelines central to this case states:
The following groups and activities will not be approved for registration as a GM Affinity Group:
• those that have a purpose of opposing other groups
• groups whose agendas promote division of employees or that are exclusive of other GM employees
• those that promote or advocate particular religious or political positionsId. at 7.
Plaintiff Moranski describes himself as a born-again Christian. Cplt. ¶ 7. In December 2002 he submitted an application to GM for recognition of his proposed Affinity Group. He called his proposed group the "GM Christian Employee Network." The mission statement he provided with his application stated that the group would be "an interdenominational group and will not promote a particular church or religious denomination in the workplace." Among the stated goals of the group was to "support a climate of inclusiveness and [a] work environment that is free of harassment." Cplt. ¶ 14.
GM denied Moranski's application based on its stated policy of not recognizing Affinity Groups that promote or advocate particular religious positions. Moranski believes that GM's denial of his application constitutes discrimination against him on the basis of his religion in violation of Title VII. He filed a complaint with the EEOC in June 2003, and received a notice of his right to sue in January 2004. He filed this action in April 2004.
III. Discussion
Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer "to discriminate against any individual . . . because of such individual's . . . religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). The issue here is whether GM's refusal to sanction an Affinity Group based on Christianity violates Title VII. The answer is no, because the GM policy treats all religions alike.
Plaintiff Moranski has not pled or argued that GM has approved and registered any Affinity Group based on any other religion. Under the GM policy on Affinity Groups, GM's denial of Affinity Group recognition would be the same for Muslims, Jews, Buddhists, Hindus, Roman Catholics, or atheists. Thus, plaintiff's complaint cannot be fairly read as alleging that GM treats him worse because of his religion than it treats any other employee of any different faith.
The point is best illustrated by Title VII sex discrimination cases in which the evidence indicated that the employer treated both men and women badly. Such evidence does not show discrimination "because of sex." Holman v. Indiana, 211 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 2000), affirming 24 F. Supp. 2d 909 (N.D. Ind. 1998). Similarly here, plaintiff is alleging that GM has failed to offer the benefit of an Affinity Group based on religion to all employees, of any and all religions. This is not discrimination against plaintiff because of his religion. "Laws against discrimination protect persons, not classes." Carson v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 82 F.3d 157, 158 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying Title VII), citing O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308 (1996).
Plaintiff points out that GM recognizes Affinity Groups based on race, national origin, ethnicity, and sex — the other categories of discrimination prohibited by Title VII. From this premise, he contends that GM violates Title VII by refusing also to recognize religious Affinity Groups.
Plaintiff's logical leap across categories would have the effect of treating GM and its Affinity Group initiative as if GM were a federal or state actor creating a public or non-public forum for First Amendment purposes. Under First Amendment doctrines, a government body may not be able to open a forum for private speech and to exclude from that forum speech regarding the entire subject matter of religion. See, e.g., Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth., 63 F.3d 581, 592 (7th Cir. 1995) (city policy violated First Amendment with policy allowing private holiday displays in public building, but prohibiting all religious holiday displays). This court is not aware of any legal authority for extending similar duties to private employers under Title VII.
In the First Amendment field of non-public forums, a government may cure a discriminatory policy by simply closing the forum altogether, as occurred in the Grossbaum case. See Grossbaum v. Indianapolis-Marion County Bldg. Auth., 100 F.3d 1287, 1298-99 (7th Cir. 1996) (affirming denial of injunction after city closed forum to all private displays of any kind).
In fact, plaintiff has not come forward with any authority requiring such cross-categorical equality under Title VII. A race discrimination case requires proof that an employer treats an employee badly because of his race. A sex discrimination case requires proof that an employer treats an employee badly because of her sex. An argument that an employer treats blacks better than it treats women, or Hispanics better than Baptists, is an invitation for confusion.
"The central question in any employment-discrimination case is whether the employer would have taken the same action had the employee been of a different race (age, sex, religion, national origin, etc.) and everything else had remained the same." Carson, 82 F.2d at 158. In this case, the plaintiff has alleged facts that show that GM would have taken the same action if the plaintiff had been of a different religion. The plaintiff or any other employee of any religion or no religion who sought recognition of an Affinity Group based on religion would be denied. Title VII does not forbid this.
The parties' briefs raise two issues that should be noted. First, GM argues that its refusal to approve an Affinity Group does not amount to a sufficiently serious adverse employment action to support even a possible claim under Title VII. See, e.g., Bell v. EPA, 232 F.3d 546, 555 (7th Cir. 2000) ("For an employment action to be actionable, it must be a `significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.'"), quoting Burlington Industries v. Ellerth, 542 U.S. 742, 761 (1998); Grube v. Lau Industries, 257 F.3d 723, 728 (7th Cir. 2001) (transfer of plaintiff to second shift was not an adverse employment action under Title VII where plaintiff's "pay and job title remained the same, and she suffered no significantly diminished job responsibilities"). The requirement of an adverse employment action was developed under the indirect method of proving employment discrimination set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). It is at least doubtful whether the same requirement applies in cases of direct and explicit discrimination. For example, the court assumes that GM might violate Title VII if it authorized an Affinity Group for Christians but refused to authorize one for Jewish or Muslim employees, just as it would violate Title VII if it required black and white employees to eat in separate but equal lunchrooms.
Second, the parties have briefed the case in terms of the familiar direct and indirect methods of proving disparate treatment under Title VII. See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, supra; Bennett v. Roberts, 295 F.3d 687, 694 (7th Cir. 2002); Troupe v. May Department Stores Co., 20 F.3d 734, 736 (7th Cir. 1994). Moranski's claim does not present any issue arising from the difficulties of proof that led to recognition of the indirect method of proof. His claim challenges the express provision in the GM policy on Affinity Groups: "those that promote or advocate particular religions or political positions" will not be approved. The issue is whether that clear and direct limit on Affinity Groups violates Title VII. It does not, for the reasons explained here, but without any need to follow the analytic trail of the indirect method of proof.
IV. Conclusion
Plaintiff has alleged facts establishing that GM has a policy of denying Affinity Group recognition to all proposed groups based on religion, and that the policy applies to all employees without regard to any employee's religion or lack of religion. These facts show that the plaintiff cannot be entitled to the relief he seeks under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The defendant's motion to dismiss the complaint is granted. As is customary, the dismissal is without prejudice to plaintiff's ability to file an amended complaint, no later than March 28, 2005. See Barry Aviation, Inc. v. Land O'Lakes Municipal Airport Comm'n, 377 F.3d 682, 687 (7th Cir. 2004) ("better practice is to allow at least one amendment regardless of how unpromising the initial pleading appears").
Plaintiff's motion for oral argument is also denied. The parties' briefs have framed the issue clearly, and the further delay and expense involved in an oral hearing would not be warranted here.
So ordered.