Opinion
C. A. 1:24-458-JFA-SVH
03-04-2024
Richard Kareem Moore, Plaintiff, v. Solicitor Elizabeth B. Young and Head Public Defender DeGrant Gibbons, Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
SHIVA V. HODGES UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Richard Kareem Moore (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed this civil action, alleging violations of his constitutional rights by Solicitor Elizabeth B. Young (“Solicitor”) and Head Public Defender DeGrant Gibbons. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(i) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the district judge. For the reasons that follow, the undersigned recommends this matter be dismissed without further leave to amend.
I. Factual Background
Plaintiff alleges he was arrested without an arrest warrant and was never informed of the reason for his arrest. [ECF No. i at 5]. He alleges Solicitor held him against his will and tampered with evidence “to plant someone else['s] drug test result” to make it look like he was guilty. Id.
On February 9, 2024, the undersigned issued orders (1) directing Plaintiff to submit documents necessary to bring this case into proper form and (2) advising Plaintiff of the deficiencies of his complaint and permitting him until March 1, 2024, to file an amended complaint. [ECF Nos. 4, 5]. Plaintiff filed proposed service documents, but did not file an amended complaint.
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
Plaintiff filed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss a case upon a finding that the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted or is frivolous or malicious. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). A claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff's allegations are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Prosecutorial Immunity (Solicitor)
Plaintiff appears to sue Solicitor for actions associated with the proceedings resulting in his arrest and continued detention. Prosecutors have absolute immunity for activities in or connected with judicial proceedings, such as a criminal trial, bond hearings, bail hearings, grand jury proceedings, and pretrial hearings. See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2000). Because Plaintiff's claims relate to actions taken by Solicitor in connection with the judicial proceedings, they are barred by prosecutorial immunity and are subject to summary dismissal.
2. Public Defender
Although Plaintiff lists Public Defender Gibbons as a defendant, he has made no allegations against Gibbons. Regardless, a criminal defense attorney, whether retained or appointed, does not act under color of state law or federal law, which is a jurisdictional prerequisite for any civil action brought under § 1983. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 317-24 no. 8-9, 12-14 (1981); see also Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 940 (1982) (finding purely private conduct is not actionable under § 1983). Therefore, Gibbons is entitled to summary dismissal.
III. Conclusion and Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the undersigned recommends this case be dismissed without further leave for amendment.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties are directed to note the important information in the attached “Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation.”
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. “[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
901 Richland Street
Columbia, South Carolina 29201
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).