Summary
holding that evidence of purchase price of four-year-old vehicle not too remote where surveillance video and high-speed police pursuit established the vehicle was in good working condition
Summary of this case from Beene v. StateOpinion
No. CACR12-461
02-20-2013
SAMUEL P. MOORE APPELLANT v. STATE OF ARKANSAS APPELLEE
David Suddeth Deputy Public Defender, by: Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by:
APPEAL FROM THE PULASKI COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT, FIRST DIVISION [NO. CR2010-0707]
HONORABLE LEON JOHNSON, JUDGE
AFFIRMED
BILL H. WALMSLEY, Judge
Appellant Samuel Moore appeals from a Pulaski County jury's verdict finding him guilty of aggravated robbery, first-degree battery, theft of property, and fleeing. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to an aggregate term of sixty years in prison. On appeal, Moore challenges the sufficiency of the evidence only with respect to his conviction for theft of property as a Class B felony. Moore contends that the trial court erred in denying his directed-verdict motion because the State failed to prove that the vehicle he had stolen had a fair market value of $2500 or more. We affirm.
On January 23, 2010, Nicholas Stanford was preparing to enter his 2006 Pontiac G6 at his place of business when Moore overpowered him and drove away in the car. Following a high-speed chase by police, Moore wrecked Stanford's car. At trial, the State introduced a surveillance video showing the condition of Stanford's car at the time it was stolen and photographs of the damage after Moore wrecked the car. Stanford testified that his car was not damaged at the time it was stolen. He further testified that he paid $20,000 for the car and still owed $6500.
We treat a motion for directed verdict as a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence. Reed v. State, 353 Ark. 22, 109 S.W.3d 665 (2003). When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is challenged on appeal, we view the proof and all reasonable inferences deducible therefrom in the light most favorable to the State. Davis v. State, 2011 Ark. App. 561. We will affirm if the finding of guilt is supported by substantial evidence. Id. Substantial evidence is that which is of sufficient force and character that it will, with reasonable certainty, compel a conclusion one way or the other, without resorting to speculation or conjecture. Reed, supra.
Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-36-103(a)(1) (Repl. 2006) provides that a person commits theft of property if he knowingly takes or exercises unauthorized control over the property of another person. Theft of property is a Class B felony if the value of the stolen property is $2500 or more. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-103(b)(1)(A). "Value" is defined as the market value of property at the time and place of the offense. Ark. Code Ann. § 5-36-101(12)(A)(i) (Repl. 2006).
The State has the burden of proving the value of the property stolen, and the preferred method of establishing value is by expert testimony. Reed, supra. However, value may be sufficiently established by circumstances that clearly show a value in excess of the statutory requirement. Coley v. State, 302 Ark. 526, 790 S.W.2d 899 (1990). Our supreme court has held that the original cost of property may be one factor considered by the jury in determining market value, as long as it is not too remote in time and relevance. Reed, supra. While the jury may not substitute its knowledge for evidence, jurors are not required to set aside their common knowledge and may consider the evidence presented them in accordance with their own observation and experience in the affairs of life. Jones v. State, 6 Ark. App. 7, 636 S.W.2d 880 (1982).
On appeal, Moore argues that, although Stanford paid $20,000 for the car, he did not testify as to when he purchased the car and whether it was new or used when he bought it. According to Moore, even assuming that Stanford bought the car in 2006, the purchase price four years earlier was too remote to establish the car's value at the time it was stolen. Moore also contends that Stanford's testimony that his car was not damaged, as depicted in the photographs, does not prove that the car was in good condition when it was stolen.
In his directed-verdict motion at trial, Moore did not argue that the car's purchase price up to four years earlier was too remote in time to be taken into consideration when assessing value. Thus, his argument is not preserved for review. Golden v. State, 2010 Ark. App. 350. Even if Moore's argument had been preserved, we would affirm.
Moore relies on Riley v. State, 267 Ark. 916, 593 S.W.2d 45 (Ark. App. 1979), where this court held that there was insufficient evidence to establish that a lawnmower had a value in excess of $100 because the purchase price was too remote. There was evidence that the lawnmower had been purchased for $537.90 approximately four years before it was stolen; that appellant was to pay $300 for the lawnmower; that the victim described the lawnmower as "inoperable" and considered selling it for $50 or $75; and that a lawnmower repairman testified that the mower could be worth more or less than $100, depending on its condition. Moore's reliance on Riley is misplaced. Here, Stanford's car was not inoperable and in fact appeared to be in fine working order given that Moore was able to speed away from Stanford in the parking lot and later led police on a high-speed chase before crashing the car.
In Coley v. State, 302 Ark. 526, 790 S.W.2d 899 (1990), the victim testified that she bought her car new and paid $22,000 for it. She stated that it was in good condition and that only $400 had been spent on repairs. A police officer's testimony as to the model of the victim's car established that the car was three years old at the time it was stolen. On those facts, our supreme court held that there was substantial evidence to prove that the car's value was $2500 or more. In Stewart v. State, 302 Ark. 35, 786 S.W.2d 827 (1990), the victim testified that she paid $14,000 for her car and still owed money on it. The car was three years old, and a photograph was introduced into evidence showing the car to be in good condition. Based on that evidence, our supreme court held there was substantial evidence that the car's value was $2500 or more. More recently, in Beasley v. State, 2009 Ark. App. 625, a car was thirteen years old at the time it was stolen; the victim had paid $9800 for it ten years earlier; the victim's insurance company paid almost $3000 for the car after it was declared a total loss; and the victim testified that she had maintained the car, driven it conservatively, and kept it in a garage. This court held that there was substantial evidence that the car's value was $2500 or more.
Here, Stanford's car was four years old; he paid $20,000 for it and still owed over $6000 on it; a surveillance video showed the car's condition as Moore was in the process of stealing it; and the jury viewed clear, close-up photographs of the damaged car and heard Stanford's testimony that his car was not in that damaged condition at the time it was stolen. With respect to Moore's argument that Stanford's testimony did not prove that his car was in good condition, we note that the jury was not left to rely solely on Stanford's testimony. The jury could reasonably conclude that the car was in good condition based on the surveillance video. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, we hold that there was substantial evidence that Stanford's car was valued at $2500 or more. Therefore, we affirm Moore's conviction for theft of property as a Class B felony.
Affirmed.
GLOVER and BROWN, JJ., agree.
David Suddeth Deputy Public Defender, by: Clint Miller, Deputy Public Defender, for appellant.
Dustin McDaniel, Att'y Gen., by: Christian Harris, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.