Opinion
Case No. 4:01-cv-28
April 10, 2001
ORDER
In accordance with the opinion filed this date,
IT IS ORDERED that defendant's motion to dismiss (dkt # 6) is GRANTED and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for speedy trial (dkt # 8), and motion for dismissal (dkt # 9) are DISMISSED AS MOOT.
OPINION
This is a civil rights action filed by plaintiff proceeding pro se against defendant Richard A. Santoni, Judge of the Eighth Judicial District Court for the State of Michigan. Plaintiff alleges the Judge Santoni improperly ordered him removed from the district courthouse in violation of "Michigan discrimination law," and improperly dismissed a number of state lawsuits which plaintiff had filed in the Small Claims Division of the Eighth District Court because defendant was "prejediced (sic)." The complaint also alleges that certain Kalamazoo County Sheriff's Department deputies improperly arrested plaintiff on an invalid warrant. Plaintiff, however, does not name any Sheriff's Department deputies as defendants. The matter presently is before the court on defendant Santoni's motion to dismiss. For the reasons that follow, the motion is GRANTED.
I.
On February 22, 2001, plaintiff Thomas K. Moore filed the instant "Complaint with Restraining Order" in this court. The following day, plaintiff filed an additional document with the court entitled "Supplementell (sic) to Complaint." Those documents consist of poorly connected narrative and copies of certain state court civil pleadings and dismissal orders, together with a copy of a criminal bond. Taken together, it appears that plaintiff challenges the actions of Hon. Richard A. Santoni in ordering plaintiff's removal from the Kalamazoo district courthouse, as well as Judge Santoni's dismissal of plaintiff's civil cases filed in that court. Plaintiff alleges that Judge Santoni's actions were taken for the sole purpose of violating plaintiff's civil rights because Judge Santoni stated that he had "dismissed the case because he was prejedice (sic)." Plaintiff therefore asserts that his civil rights have been violated. Finally, plaintiff contends that certain Kalamazoo County deputy sheriffs improperly arrested him on an expired warrant. Plaintiff, however, does not name any deputy sheriff as defendant in this action.
II.
Defendant Santoni moves to dismiss the instant action on two grounds. First, he contends that, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), plaintiff has failed to allege a claim within this court's subject matter jurisdiction. Second, defendant asserts, pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), that plaintiff's complaint fails to state a cause of action upon which this court may grant relief.
Defendant alleges that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Plaintiff's complaint contains no allegations that would support diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Jurisdiction, therefore, must be based under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Defendant contends, however, that plaintiff raises no claim under "the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." Id.
I disagree. While plaintiff's complaint is less than precise, the complaint and attachments attempt to raise a claim that defendant dismissed plaintiff's civil actions and had him removed from the courthouse because of prejudice against an African American. Such allegations, if sufficient to state a claim at all, would state a claim of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. As a consequence, if the complaint states any claim at all, this court would have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.
Nevertheless, defendant is entitled to dismissal of plaintiff's complaint under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) because "it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). In considering a motion to dismiss, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and its well-pleaded facts must be accepted as true. Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). However, the court need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences. Lewis v. ACB Business Serv., Inc., 135 F.3d 389, 405 (6th' Cir. 1998). A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1177 (1994).
In the instant case, defendant is entitled to judicial immunity for plaintiff's claims for money damages. It is well-established that a judge generally is immune from suit for money damages. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9 (1991); Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). "Although unfairness and injustice to a litigant may result on occasion," a judge must be able to exercise his judicial authority "`without apprehension of personal consequences to himself.'" Mireles, 502 U.S. at 10 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 13 Wall, 335, 347, 20 L.Ed. 646 (1871)); Cameron v. Seitz, 38 F.3d 264 (6th Cir. 1994).
"Like other forms of official immunity, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages." Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11(citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985)). In determining absolute immunity, the Supreme Court has taken a functional approach, focusing on the nature of the acts of which plaintiff complains. See Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 224 (1983). The court has explained that absolute immunity is "based on the policy of protecting the judicial process." Id. (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 439). Judicial immunity is overcome only in two limited sets of circumstances: (1) where a judge is being sued upon nonjudicial actions, and (2) where the judge has taken judicial actions in the complete absence of all jurisdiction. Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11-12. Even if the judge is accused of having acted in bad faith or corruptly, he is entitled to immunity. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554; Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11.
In the instant case, plaintiff alleges that defendant improperly had him excluded from the courthouse and improperly dismissed his civil actions. Both allegations squarely fall within the judge's judicial role and jurisdiction. See Cameron, 38 F.3d at 271 (determining who may enter a courtroom clearly constitutes judicial action); Barrett v. Harrington, 130 F.3d 246, 255 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The touchstone for judicial immunity is the function of dispute resolution, or of authoritatively adjudicating private rights."). Accordingly, defendant is entitled to absolute immunity from money damages.
Plaintiff has not specified whether he seeks prospective injunctive relief. Admittedly, he has entitled his complaint as a "Complaint With Restraining Order." However, the allegations in his complaint fail to suggest what, if any, prospective injunctive relief would be permissible under the circumstances of the case.
In any event, plaintiff's allegations do not support a claim of discrimination. Plaintiff alleges that he is the only African American being treated in the manner of which he complains. He therefore specifically has denied any race-based factual scenario. Plaintiff's sole allegation supporting his claim of "prejudice" is the content of a "letter" sent by Judge Santoni, which plaintiff refers to in his narrative and has attached to the supplement to his complaint. That "letter" is in reality a copy of the judgments issued by defendant in two lawsuits, dismissing both cases "with prejudice" because the "case is not appropriate for small claims." See Supplemental to Complaint (dkt # 3). Plaintiff appears to have misunderstood the dismissal of his complaints with prejudice as dismissal of his complaints on the grounds that the judge was prejudiced against him. The court is not required to accept as true plaintiff's unwarranted factual inferences. Lewis, 135 F.3d 389 at 405. As a consequence, plaintiff's allegations fail to state a claim of discrimination and no grounds exist that would support the award of prospective injunctive relief.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted. Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss (dkt # 6) is GRANTED and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice.
Also pending are two motions filed by plaintiff: (1) motion for speedy trial (dkt # 8), and (2) motion for dismissal (dkt # 9). In light of this court's disposition of defendant's motion to dismiss, plaintiff's motions are DENIED AS MOOT.