Summary
In Moore, we reversed the judgment because the trial court had incorrectly allocated the burden of production of evidence on the issue whether the deed had been authorized or ratified to Moore.
Summary of this case from Moore v. QuatesOpinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. BC369069, Brett C. Klein, Judge.
No appearance by Respondent.
EPSTEIN, P. J.
Terry Moore appeals from the judgment against her in this action to quiet title to property purportedly transferred to Kim Denise Quates by quitclaim deed. Appellant claims, and we conclude, that upon the trial court’s finding that the signature on the quitclaim deed was not the grantor’s, and that the deed notarization was defective, the burden of production shifted to respondent Quates to demonstrate the deed was authorized or ratified by the grantor. The trial court erred when it required appellant to make that showing. We reverse the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
Appellant and Walter Moore married in May 1996 and separated in 1997. Walter filed a petition for dissolution of marriage on June 15, 2001, but remained married to appellant until his death on July 1, 2002. In addition to appellant, Walter is survived by several siblings, including Eva Moore, Kavin Quates, Bernadette Bryant, and respondent. Appellant asserts, without citing evidentiary support, that respondent is not Walter’s sister.
We note that many of the facts at issue in this case are disputed, including basic facts such as the relation between the parties. In reviewing these facts, we apply the familiar appellate standard that “‘[o]n appeal, we... construe the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Curl (2009) 46 Cal.4th 339, 342, fn. 3.)
Walter purchased the property located at 1513 East Helmick Street, Carson in 1983 with a down payment provided by his mother and a loan guaranteed by the Veteran’s Administration. Respondent began living at the property at the time of its purchase and continues to live there with her minor niece.
Appellant filed a petition for probate of Walter’s estate on November 22, 2004. According to appellant, respondent produced the quitclaim deed transferring the property to respondent at the probate proceedings, and appellant was unable to challenge its validity at that time.
Appellant did not seek judicial notice of the probate proceedings, and respondent did not file a brief with this court. We glean from the Los Angeles Superior Court’s civil case summary that appellant sought an interest in Walter’s estate as a surviving spouse. Respondent filed objections, and the probate ultimately was dismissed.
Appellant brought the present action to quiet title on April 6, 2007, claiming that respondent forged Walter’s name on the quitclaim deed with the aid of a notary who knowingly notarized the false signature. Appellant demanded title and possession of the property as Walter’s widow and sole heir. Appellant also alleged that a will purportedly devising Walter’s estate to his siblings was forged. Respondent answered, asserting she had paid $80,000 toward the mortgage on the property in return for the deed.
At trial, respondent testified that she has made monthly mortgage payments directly to the mortgage owner, currently CitiMortgage, since 1986. Appellant asserted that respondent and Walter agreed that these mortgage payments were in lieu of rent. The parties presented contradictory expert evidence on the validity of Walter’s signature on the quitclaim deed. The deed was purportedly executed on January 18, 1994, and recorded on December 5, 1997.
The trial court found that the deed was prepared by the notary the same day it was notarized and that the signature on the deed was not Walter’s. The court noted the form used for the quitclaim deed was not in existence when the deed was purportedly executed. Nevertheless, the court found the deed was valid because appellant failed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it was not authorized or ratified by Walter. In its statement of decision, the trial court concluded it did not have authority to award title to appellant without making an equitable adjustment of expenses related to the payments made by and benefits received by the respondent, which was not possible because such evidence was not presented. The trial court further ruled equity could not afford relief to appellant because other possible heirs to Walter’s estate were not joined in the action. For that reason, it did not reach the question of whether the will was valid. The trial court entered judgment against appellant, who filed this timely appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
The trial court’s statement of decision regarding the validity of the deed reads as follows:
“Here’s what I have decided. The deed was not signed in January 1994. The deed was prepared by Tika Smith the same day she notarized it. I know this because it’s easy to see from looking at the original that the typed words in the notarization were typed at the same time as the body of the deed.
“In addition, the form used to create the deed was Wolcott’s form 790 revised March 1994, and this form would not have been in existence yet on January 18, 1994.
“I have also determined that Walter was not the person who signed Walter’s name to the deed. The signature is distinctively different from every other signature of Walter that I have been shown.
“This does not end the inquiry about the validity of the deed. However, if Walter authorized another person to sign his name to the deed, then the signature would be valid and the deed would be effective. Or if someone signed Walter’s name to this deed without Walter’s advanced authorization but Walter subsequently ratified, that is, approved the act of the person who signed his name on the deed, then the fact that Walter was not himself the person who signed his name to the deed would not invalidate the deed.
“Plaintiff has the burden in this case of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the signature of Walter’s name on the deed was neither genuine nor authorized nor ratified. Plaintiff has succeeded in proving the first proposition by a preponderance of the evidence but not the second or third propositions. Accordingly, the deed recorded December 5, 1997, is valid as between the two parties to this lawsuit.”
Appellant contends that the court erred in ruling that she had “the burden of production as to all evidence showing that the signature was neither authorized nor ratified by Decedent.” Although a trial court’s findings of fact bind a reviewing court if substantial evidence supports them, the trial court’s legal conclusions are not binding on appeal, and must be reviewed de novo. (PJNR, Inc. v. Department of Real Estate (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1176, 1183.) The court’s ruling on appellant’s burden of production is a legal conclusion that we review de novo. “Questions of law relate to the selection of a rule; their resolution is viewed independently.” [Citation.] (Kellogg v.Garcia (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 796, 802.) Appellant argues, and we agree, that it was error for the court to allocate the burden of production of evidence that the deed was not authorized or ratified to the appellant.
Evidence Code section 1600 provides that a recorded deed is prima facie evidence that the person identified as the owner in the deed is the legal owner of the property. A party challenging this presumption has the burden of proving the deed is not valid. (Evid. Code, § 606.) The burden of showing the invalidity of a deed is a burden of proof. The terms burden of proof and burden of persuasion are synonymous and refer to “the notion that if the evidence is evenly balanced, the party that bears the burden of persuasion must lose.” (Sargent Fletcher, Inc. v. Able Corp. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1658, 1666-1667.) The burden of proof does not shift during trial—it remains with the party who originally bears it. (Ibid.) In challenging the validity of respondent’s deed, appellant bore the burden of proof throughout the trial of showing the deed’s invalidity. However, “[u]nlike the burden of proof, the burden of producing evidence may shift between plaintiff and defendant throughout the trial.... Once [the party bearing the burden of proof] produces evidence sufficient to make its prima facie case, the burden of producing evidence shifts to the other party to refute the prima facie case.” (Id. at pp. 1667-1668.)
Evidence Code section 1600 reads: “(a) The record of an instrument or other document purporting to establish or affect an interest in property is prima facie evidence of the existence and content of the original recorded document and its execution and delivery by each person by whom it purports to have been executed if: [¶] (1) The record is in fact a record of an office of a public entity; and [¶] (2) A statute authorized such a document to be recorded in that office. [¶] (b) The presumption established by this section is a presumption affecting the burden of proof.”
“Except as otherwise provided by law, a party has the burden of proof as to each fact the existence or nonexistence of which is essential to the claim for relief or defense that he is asserting.” (Evid. Code, § 500.)
The prima facie case of ownership established by the recorded deed was rebutted by appellant’s showing that the purported signature of the grantor was false and the notarization defective. Having made this showing, the burden of producing evidence of the deed’s validity returned to respondent, the deed’s proponent. (Wilson v. Nichols (1940) 39 Cal.App.2d 527, 530-532.) In Wilson, the plaintiff who challenged the validity of a deed offered testimony of a purported grantor, who denied signing the deed, and the testimony of a notary, who denied acknowledging it. (Ibid.) The court treated this testimony as rebutting the prima facie evidence of ownership established by the deed and shifting the burden of production to the defendants to show the deed’s validity. (Ibid.)
Similarly, in this case, the trial court’s finding that the notary prepared the deed the same day it was notarized, rather than on the date of its purported execution, with the finding that Walter did not sign the deed, rebutted the presumption of its validity under Evidence Code section 1600. The burden of production then shifted to respondent to produce evidence of the deed’s validity. (Wilson v. Nichols, supra, 39 Cal.App.2d at p. 532.)
An agent may be given express authority to execute a deed on behalf of a principal, and the agent’s execution can be subsequently ratified. (Estate of Stephens (2002) 28 Cal.4th 665, 671-677.) But the trial court erred in placing the burden of producing evidence disproving authorization and ratification on appellant. Respondent bore the burden of producing evidence showing the deed was authorized or ratified. The issue of authorization or ratification had not been raised, or at least not in clear terms, until the judge rendered his statement of decision.
Respondent testified to the circumstances surrounding the execution and notarization of the deed but did not offer any specific evidence of authorization or ratification.
II
The trial court was concerned about its power to grant equitable relief to the appellant by awarding her title without making an equitable adjustment of expenses related to the payments made and benefits received by the respondent from owning the property. It also ruled that equity could not afford relief to appellant because other possible heirs to Walter’s estate were not joined in the action. These findings do not provide a basis for denying appellant relief. Should the trial court find that the deed is valid consistent with this opinion, it should so declare. But if the trial court finds that the deed is invalid, ownership of the property would be in Walter’s estate, which would then be a matter for adjudication in probate. (Prob. Code, §1 et seq.; Super. Ct. L.A. County, Local Rules, rule 2.5 (i).)
DISPOSITION
We reverse the court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
Appellant is to have her costs on appeal.
We concur: MANELLA, J., SUZUKAWA, J.