Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
San Mateo County Super. Ct. Nos. CIV 450151 and 454150.
Jenkins, J.
In a prior consolidated appeal, Moore v. Hill (2010) 188 Cal.App.4th 1267 (Moore I), we addressed plaintiff and appellant Jennifer Moore’s challenge to two orders issued by the trial court in the course of Moore’s ongoing case against defendants and respondents Richard Hatfield, financial corporations controlled by Hatfield, including Alliance Financial Capital, Inc. (AFC), and numerous persons holding promissory notes against monies they loaned to Hatfield’s corporations (collectively, Lenders). In the published part of our opinion relating to case No. A117526, we affirmed the trial court’s grant of judgment on the pleadings in favor of two Lenders, concluding that Moore’s usury claim against them failed because AFC’s dealings with the Lenders were exempt from the usury restrictions set forth in Article XV of the California Constitution. (Moore I, supra, 188 Cal.App.4th at p. 1283.)
In the unpublished part of our opinion relating to case No. A118678, we reversed the trial court’s ruling that a settlement agreement, entered between Hatfield and the Lenders in the latter’s cross-complaint against Hatfield, was entered in good faith. (Moore I, supra, slip op. at pp. 21-22.) We reversed the trial court’s good faith determination on the basis that the settlement agreement was “patently unfair to Moore” in regard to the apportionment of liability between Moore and Hatfield under the settlement agreement. (Moore I, supra, slip op. at p. 20.)
On October 22, 2007, the trial court granted the Lenders’ motion to enforce the above-referenced settlement agreement and awarded judgment as set forth therein. Notice of Entry of Judgment was served on October 26, 2007, and Moore filed a timely notice of appeal on December 21, 2007.
On May 12, 2008, we stayed the appeal pending further order from this court after Moore advised the court that Hatfield had filed bankruptcy proceedings in federal court.
On January 24, 2011, Moore filed a motion to summarily reverse the judgment based on our reversal of the trial court’s good-faith determination in Moore I, supra. Moore’s motion is unopposed. Accordingly, and upon due consideration, we conclude that our reversal of the trial court’s good faith determination in Moore I, supra, means that the judgment entered by the trial court prior to Moore I cannot stand. Accordingly, the judgment is summarily reversed. (See Weinstat v. Dentsply Internat., Inc. (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1213, 1224, [noting that the remedy of summary reversal is appropriate “where the proper resolution of the appeal is so obvious and without dispute that briefing would not serve any useful purpose”].)
Concurrently with her motion of January 24, 2011, Moore provided notice, pursuant to rule 12(d) of the Local Rules of the First District Court of Appeal, of the entry of final orders by the federal bankruptcy court pertaining to Hatfield’s bankruptcy petitions, and requested that we vacate the bankruptcy stay. Upon due consideration of Moore’s notice, this court’s stay order of May 12, 2008 is hereby vacated.
Disposition
Appellant Jennifer Moore’s unopposed motion to summarily reverse the judgment is granted. The judgment is reversed. The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal.
We concur: McGuiness, P. J., Pollak, J.