Opinion
E072598
11-09-2021
DENISE MOONEY, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. GARY EVERETT THOMAS II, Defendant and Respondent.
Law Offices of Ernest Calhoon and Ernest Calhoon for Plaintiff and Appellant. Gary Everett Thomas II, in pro. per, for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. No. FAMMS1900061 John W. Burdick, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.) Affirmed.
Law Offices of Ernest Calhoon and Ernest Calhoon for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Gary Everett Thomas II, in pro. per, for Defendant and Respondent.
OPINION
FIELDS J. 1
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiff and appellant Denise Mooney (Mother) and defendant and respondent Gary Everett Thomas II (Father) are the parents of L.T. (daughter). Mother and Father have been litigating custody issues related to their daughter for years in the superior courts of Ventura, Orange, Los Angeles, and now San Bernardino Counties. In November 2017, a final custody order and judgment was entered following proceedings before the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. In December 2018, the case was transferred to the Superior Court of San Bernardino County; and, on January 31, 2019, Mother filed a petition pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (Fam. Code, § 6200 et seq.), seeking a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against Father.
Undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.
Mother's petition alleged that their daughter recently returned from Father's custody with a head injury, and that Father refused to explain how the injury occurred. Father filed a responsive declaration in which he denied causing any injury to their daughter, explained that their daughter fell while playing on a playground, and attached a copy of a message sent to Mother via their court-ordered, third-party Internet communication platform, contemporaneously disclosing the incident to Mother. Following a hearing in which Mother's counsel was unable to identify any additional evidence or testimony regarding recent acts of alleged abuse, the trial court denied Mother's request for a DVRO, and Mother appeals. We find no abuse of discretion in the record before us, and we affirm the order. 2
II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
A. Procedural History
Mother and Father have been litigating custody issues related to their daughter for years in the superior courts of Ventura, Orange, Los Angeles, and now San Bernardino Counties. They currently share custody of their daughter pursuant to a final custody order and judgment issued in 2017, following a trial held in the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. The judgment provides for Mother's sole custody of their daughter, with Father entitled to visitation with their daughter on specified weekends each month. The judgment further provides a detailed schedule for custody on holidays and school breaks; designates the time and place for exchange of custody; sets forth procedures for reimbursement of shared childcare expenses; and awards a monthly amount of child support to Mother.
In August 2018, Mother filed a series of requests for orders with the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, including a request for a DVRO ordering that Father stay 100 yards away from Mother, her family, and her home, as well as prohibiting Father from communicating with her except in emergencies. She alleged that since entry of the 3 child custody judgment, Father abused her by stalking her during custody exchanges and calling her derogatory names during these exchanges. Mother also alleged that on one occasion, Father took a toy from their daughter and threw it on the ground during a custody exchange. Finally, Mother alleged that Father was harassing her by sending her text messages, and that she attached various messages purportedly documenting this harassment.
Specifically, Mother requested a temporary restraining order, a DVRO, a separate order repeating the terms of the requested DVRO, an order seeking resolution of a dispute over payment of expenses, an order that Father immediately disclose his home address, an order directing appointed counsel for daughter to address alleged noncompliance with prior court directives, and an order requiring Father to provide or pay for all transportation related to custody exchanges. Mother immediately moved ex parte for an order shortening time on all of these requests. The trial court denied the request to shorten time for hearing, finding no exigent circumstances, and further entered an order requiring Mother to seek preclearance prior to filing any new ex parte requests.
Of the 37 pages of messages attached, the vast majority of them were addressed directly to daughter, stating that Father loved daughter and was looking forward to seeing daughter at their next exchange of custody. The remaining messages consisted of communications regarding compliance with court orders and arrangements for exchange of custody. There was one exchange in which Father called Mother a "sorry excuse for a mother" and a "crazy mother," while arguing over whether Mother had a right to restrict the time and frequency of phone calls between Father and daughter.
On October 16, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Mother's requests for orders. The trial court denied Mother's request for an order that Father stay 100 yards away from her, and it further ordered the parties to utilize a third-party Internet communication platform as their primary means of nonemergency communication. The trial court otherwise continued the hearing on Mother's request for a DVRO. Months later, Mother requested dismissal of the DVRO petition without prejudice, and the trial court granted her request.
In December 2018, the family law case was transferred to the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. 4
B. Mother's New Request for a DVRO
On January 31, 2019, shortly after transfer of the case to the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, Mother filed a new request for a DVRO. She requested the court issue an order prohibiting Father from engaging in acts of abuse, prohibiting Father from directly or indirectly contacting her, requiring Father to stay at least 100 yards away from her, and permitting Mother to record any unlawful communications. In support of this new request, Mother alleged their daughter was abused because she noticed abrasions to their daughter's head following a custody exchange, and Father refused to explain the cause of the injury. As evidence of past abuse, Mother simply incorporated the allegations of her 2018 DVRO petition by reference.
The petition was accompanied by a declaration of counsel, who declared: Father had caused their daughter to test positive for drugs; there was "substantial information" on the Internet detailing Father's history of drug use; Father had repeatedly violated prior court orders; and law enforcement had to intervene in past child custody exchanges as a result of Father's actions. Counsel did not provide the factual basis for any of these allegations and did not indicate how he would have personal knowledge to attest to any of these matters.
Mother's petition was also accompanied by various exhibits. The exhibits included medical records indicating their daughter had been examined for abrasions and a possible closed head injury, but showing their daughter was discharged that same date with general instructions to keep her abrasions clean, to monitor her for potential signs of a closed head injury, and to follow up with her doctor in a couple of days. The exhibits 5 also included a copy of the order transferring the case to the Superior Court of San Bernardino County, a copy of the 2017 child custody judgment, and a copy of the entire DVRO petition previously filed by Mother in 2018.
C. Father's Opposing Declaration
Father filed a declaration in opposition to Mother's petition. According to Father, Mother has repeatedly accused him of abuse and domestic violence in court proceedings, and all of Mother's prior requests for restraining orders have been denied. Father attached a copy of the 2017 order and judgment in the family law proceeding, as well as October 2018 minute orders on Mother's prior requests for orders. Finally, Father expressly denied causing any harm to their daughter or engaging in any violent acts against their daughter. He attached a January 20, 2019 communication sent on the third-party communication platform, wherein he informed Mother that their daughter had fallen while running on the playground. The communication also indicated that Mother had viewed the communication that same date. 6
Father also purported to attach orders issued after proceedings in December 2018 and January 2019, but the written orders for those hearings do not appear in the record on appeal. It is unclear whether the orders were omitted from the appellant's appendix or were never part of the record before the trial court.
Father also attached documents that indicated he had a civil harassment case pending against mother's counsel in the Superior Court of Ventura County. He also attached a prior declaration by Mother accusing her counsel of engaging in inappropriate behavior toward her children, taking legal action on her behalf without her consent, and advising her to violate court orders regarding custody of daughter.
D. Hearing on DVRO Petition
The trial court denied Mother's request for a temporary restraining order on an ex parte basis and, instead, set the matter for hearing.
On February 26, 2019, the trial court held a hearing on Mother's petition. The transcript of oral proceedings regarding this hearing was not included as part of the record on appeal. Following the hearing, the trial court ordered the parties to direct all communication regarding their daughter through a third-party Internet communication platform; ordered that each party may record exchanges of custody to document any unlawful conduct; and granted permission for Father to communicate with their daughter directly through an Internet communication service. According to the minutes, the parties agreed to set the matter for a further review hearing.
On March 26, 2019, the trial court held a review hearing. At the outset of the hearing, Mother's counsel handed the trial court a written brief, which mirrored the allegations made in the declaration counsel submitted with Mother's DVRO petition. The trial court then asked Mother to describe how exchanges of custody had been proceeding since the last hearing. Before Mother could respond, her counsel interjected and stated, "That's really not what the issue is that's before the Court . . . . This is here on a DV restraining order application."
In response, both the trial court and Father expressed the belief that the domestic violence issue had already been resolved at the prior hearing. The trial court specifically stated:" [W]e were previously here on a request for DV restraining orders. And that impacts the custody and visitation because the parties share a child. And, therefore, 7 custody and visitation is an ancillary issue on any DV request. And the DV was based upon an injury to child, which I found there was not sufficient evidence to support DV orders." Mother's counsel did not dispute the trial court's recollection but instead argued that the injury to their daughter was not the only issue raised in Mother's petition, and that the trial court did not make any findings with respect to the allegations of past abuse.
The trial court reviewed the minute order from the February 2019 hearing and agreed that the minute order was ambiguous. The trial court explained that the minute order did not make clear whether there was a final determination on the issue of domestic violence restraining orders; as a result, the court stated, "I'll make the finding that I did not completely address the request for DV orders," and offered to hear any remaining issues related to Mother's request for a DVRO.
Following a break in the proceedings, the trial court inquired of Mother's counsel: "So back to the issue about whether we need to have a further hearing on the domestic violence. Reviewing the application, request for domestic violence restraining orders, looking over the brief, looking over the history of the file . . . is there anything in addition to the child's fall on the playground and what you've described as a course of-I guess, that's some form of mental abuse. Is there anything else that you would offer, by way of an offer of proof, on which to have an evidentiary hearing?" In the ensuing colloquy, the trial court repeated its request for counsel to identify any additional evidence Mother intended to produce on the issue of domestic violence on at least nine separate occasions. Each time, counsel did not respond to the trial court's inquiry but instead sought to raise a 8 separate issue. Eventually, counsel indicated that Mother could testify further on the issues she disclosed in her August 2018 DVRO petition. Counsel admitted that the same allegations of abuse had already been raised and considered in prior proceedings, but he argued there had never been specific factual findings made on each of Mother's allegations.
For example, Mother's counsel sought to obtain a tentative ruling from the court, requested a statement of decision based solely on the written submissions thus far, objected to various attachments submitted in Father's opposing declaration, and asked the court what the appropriate legal standard for domestic violence should be.
The trial court found that Mother failed to make an offer of proof establishing the need for a formal evidentiary hearing on her petition, formally denied the request for a DVRO based upon the papers submitted, and dismissed the petition. Mother appeals from this order.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Mother's Claims Have Been Forfeited for Failure to Provide an Adequate Record for Review, Failure To Adequately Cite to the Record Provided, and Failure To Address the Standard of Review
"[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment. [Citations.] 'This is not only a general principle of appellate practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.' [Citation.] 'In the absence of a contrary showing in the record, all presumptions in favor 9 of the trial court's action will be made by the appellate court. . . .'" (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609 (Jameson).)
Consistent with this principle, the appellant bears the burden of providing an adequate record for review, citing to specific facts in the record in support of any argument made on appeal, and tailoring any argument to the appropriate standard of review; the failure to comply with any of these requirements constitutes forfeiture of any claim of error on appeal. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at pp. 608-609 [failure to provide adequate record on appeal requires issue be resolved against appellant]; Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 476, 483 [reporter's transcript is often "indispensable" to error under abuse of discretion or substantial evidence standards of review]); Alki Partners, LP v. DB Fund Services, LLC (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 574, 589 [failure to cite accurately to record forfeits issue on appeal]; Hernandez v. First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 Cal.App.5th 270, 276-277 [same]; Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948 [failure to acknowledge proper scope of review is concession of lack of merit]; People v. Foss (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 113, 126 [failure to tailor arguments to appropriate standard of review constitutes failure to show error in judgment].)
Here, the trial court held two hearings relevant to Mother's petition for a DVRO, one in February 2019, and a second hearing in March 2019; yet, Mother did not include a reporter's transcript of the February 2019 hearing as part of the record on appeal. The omission of this transcript is fatal to Mother's claims on appeal because the record indicates the trial court entertained argument and made factual findings addressing some 10 of the issues raised in Mother's petition at the time of the February 2019 hearing. With respect to Mother's request for a DVRO, the trial court held the March 2019 hearing because it believed its prior minutes were ambiguous; it did not "completely" address all the issues raised in Mother's petition; and, as a result, it wanted to offer Mother the opportunity to address any additional issues. Clearly, the record is inadequate for review where at least some of the findings relevant to Mother's DVRO petition were made at the time of the February 2019 hearing, and the transcript of that proceeding is not included for our review.
We also note that Mother's opening brief repeatedly makes assertions of fact without any citation to the record and does not identify any standard of review, let alone tailor arguments related to any specific claim of error toward any particular standard of review. The failure to provide an adequate record, to cite to the record in support of arguments made, and to tailor arguments to the applicable standard of review is fatal to Mother's claims of error. These deficiencies alone warrant upholding the trial court's order on appeal.
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in Denying the Request
Notwithstanding our conclusion that Mother has forfeited her claims of error on appeal, we have examined the record and conclude that even in the absence of forfeiture, Mother could not prevail on the merits.
1. General Legal Principles and Standard of Review
"Pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) (§ 6200 et seq.), a court may issue a protective order to restrain any person for the purpose of preventing a 11 recurrence of domestic violence and ensuring a period of separation of the persons involved. [Citations.] Specifically, section 6300 provides, 'An order may be issued under this part, with or without notice . . . if an affidavit or, if necessary, an affidavit and any additional information provided to the court pursuant to Section 6306, shows, to the satisfaction of the court, reasonable proof of a past act or acts of abuse.'" (S.M. v. E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1249, 1264 (S.M.).) However, a party is not necessarily entitled to a restraining order simply because the opposing party has engaged in an act that upsets the petitioning party. (Curcio v. Pels (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 13 (Curcio).) "The DVPA was not enacted to address all disputes between former couples, or to create an alternative forum for resolution of every dispute between such individuals." (Id. at p. 13.)
"A grant or denial of injunctive relief is generally reviewed for abuse of discretion. [Citation.] This standard applies to a grant or denial of a protective order under the DVPA.'" (S.M., supra., 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 1264; see In re Marriage of Fregoso & Hernandez (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 698, 702.)"' The abuse of discretion standard is not a unified standard; the deference it calls for varies according to the aspect of a trial court's ruling under review. The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for substantial evidence, its conclusions of law are reviewed de novo, and its application of the law to the facts is reversible only if arbitrary and capricious.'" (In re Marriage of DeSouza (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 25, 33 .)
Further, as relevant here, it is the party seeking a restraining order that bears the burden of establishing the circumstances justifying the order. 12 (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 14; § 6300 [petitioner bears the burden of producing "reasonable proof" "to the satisfaction of the court"].)" 'In the case where the trier of fact has expressly or implicitly concluded that the party with the burden of proof did not carry the burden and that party appeals, it is misleading to characterize the failure-of-proof issue as whether substantial evidence supports the judgment. . . . [¶] . . . [Instead] the question for a reviewing court becomes whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a matter of law.'" (Dreyer's Grand Ice Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838.) In such situations, "' "it is almost impossible for [the appellant] to prevail on appeal by arguing the evidence compels a judgment in his [or her] favor. That is because unless the trial court makes specific findings of fact in favor of the losing [party], we presume the trial court found [that party's] evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to carry the burden of proof. [Citations.] We have no power on appeal to judge the credibility of witnesses or to reweigh the evidence." '" (Jennifer K. v. Shane K. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 558, 579 (Jennifer K.).)
2. The Record Provided Does Not Disclose an Abuse of Discretion
Here, the only recent allegation of abuse presented in Mother's DVRO petition was that their daughter had abrasions to her face following a period of time in Father's custody, and that Father refused to explain the injury. At the time of the February 2019 hearing, the trial court purportedly found that Mother did not present sufficient evidence that the injury to their daughter constituted abuse warranting a restraining order. This finding was supported by substantial evidence. 13
The record contains a responsive declaration by Father, in which he denied causing their daughter's injury and explained that their daughter fell while playing on a playground. It also included an exhibit showing that Father had contemporaneously informed Mother of the playground incident, and Mother had viewed the message that same day, contradicting Mother's claim that Father had refused to explain the injury. Thus, while we have not been provided with the transcript of the February 2019 proceeding and are, therefore, not aware of what other evidence may have been presented to the trial court at that time, the record contains substantial evidence upon which the trial court could rely to conclude that their daughter's injuries were accidental and, therefore, did not rise to the level of abuse necessary to support issuance of a DVRO.
Generally, to obtain a DVRO, a petitioner is required to show either that respondent's action was" 'an intentional or reckless act that causes or attempts to cause bodily injury'" "' [or] an act that places a person in reasonable apprehension of imminent serious bodily injury.'" (Jennifer K., supra, 47 Cal.App. 5th at pp. 577-578.) A trial court is not required to accept a petitioner's testimony or characterization of events and is entitled to weigh the credibility of competing testimony in determining the petitioner's showing on this issue. (Id. at p. 579)
With respect to the allegations of past abuse, Mother identified only allegations previously raised before the trial court in a prior DVRO petition. Yet the record also shows that the parties appeared in court on multiple occasions since Mother filed that prior petition; multiple court orders had been issued since the filing of that petition 14 related to the underlying conduct alleged to constitute abuse; and Mother could not identify any new allegations of abuse when asked to do so. This was substantial evidence upon which the trial court could rely to reasonably infer that the subsequent court orders had sufficiently addressed the underlying causes of any past alleged abuse such that a DVRO was not warranted.
For example, mother claimed that Father was harassing her by sending text messages directed to their daughter and seeking to resolve disputes related to custody issues. However, an order on October 2018 required the parties to register for a third-party Internet communication platform and use that as the primary means of communication regarding custody. Likewise, mother alleged inappropriate conduct that occurred during the physical exchanges of custody, and the trial court permitted Mother to record any alleged unlawful conduct during custody exchanges.
While acts of past abuse can be the basis of finding the need for a DVRO, it is not, in itself, dispositive. The statutes provide that the trial court "may" issue an order upon a showing of past acts of abuse (§ 6300, subd. (a)) but also provides that the trial court must "consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether to grant or deny a petition for relief (§ 6301, subd. (c)). Indeed, the statutory purpose of the DVPA is not intended to punish persons for past acts of abuse, but "to prevent acts of . . . abuse and to provide for a separation of the persons involved in the domestic violence for a period sufficient to enable these persons to seek a resolution of the causes of the violence." (§ 6220.) Thus, where the record supports a reasonable conclusion that the parties-with the assistance of the court-have already resolved the underlying causes of the alleged past abuse, a trial court can reasonably conclude that the statutory purpose for which a DVRO is intended is not present. Because the record supports such a reasonable 15 conclusion in this case, we find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of Mother's DVRO petition.
Additionally, we note that the majority of mother's claims of past abuse appear to involve only verbal statements and insults. While the definition of "abuse" under the DVPA can include acts of harassment or disturbing the peace of the other party (see §§ 6203, 6320), a trial court's reasonable exercise of discretion in issuing a DVRO necessarily requires tailoring the scope of any protective order to the acts of abuse alleged. Even if these allegations were found true, such verbal acts alone would not justify the wide-ranging protective order requested by Mother in this case.
3. Any Alleged Procedural Errors Do Not Warrant Reversal
Finally, we briefly address Mother's claims of procedural error. Specifically, Mother contends the trial court erred when it refused to conduct an evidentiary hearing with live witnesses and when it refused to issue a statement of decision. We find no grounds for reversal based upon these arguments.
First, a party does not have an absolute right to present live testimony regardless of the circumstances. While section 217 generally provides litigants a right to present live testimony in relation to a request for order under the Family Code, "the family court is required to receive live testimony under section 217 only if that testimony is 'relevant and within the scope of the hearing.'" (In re Marriage of George & Deamon (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 476, 484.) Even if the anticipated testimony may be relevant, the trial court also has discretion to refuse to receive live testimony for good cause. (§ 217, subd. (b).)
Here, the trial court provided Mother's counsel multiple opportunities to make an offer of proof as to what evidence or anticipated testimony could be presented at a further 16 evidentiary hearing. Indeed, the record indicates the trial court gave Mother at least 10 opportunities to make an offer of proof, and Mother was unable to do so. The purpose of an offer of proof is to advise the trial court of the "substance, purpose, and relevance" of potential evidence. (Evid. Code, § 354, subd. (a).) Where Mother failed to make an offer of proof despite multiple opportunities to do so, the trial court could reasonably conclude that her anticipated testimony would not be relevant and within the scope of the hearing. In this context, the denial of an evidentiary hearing was not an abuse of discretion and does not warrant reversal.
Second, "the 'general rule' [is] that a statement of decision is not required in connection with the ruling on a motion and . . . that a statement of decision is not required in a special proceeding." (In re Marriage of Fong (2011) 193 Cal.App.4th 278, 295.) Thus, the trial court does not err simply because it does not make specific factual findings related to every allegation made in Mother's petition. While the DVPA does provide that "[t]he court shall, upon denying a petition under this part, provide a brief statement of the reasons for the decision in writing or on the record" (§ 6340, subd. (b)), there is no requirement that the trial court address every issue requested by a party in explaining its reasons.
Nor is there a sufficient record for us to conclude the trial court failed to comply with this obligation. As we have already noted, the trial court believed it had made factual findings and denied Mother's petition at the time of the February 2019 hearing, and the transcript of that proceeding was not made part of the record on appeal. While the trial court allowed Mother to further argue the matter in March 2019, to the extent it 17 may not have "completely" addressed all the issues during the prior hearing, it was not necessarily required to restate its factual findings and reasoning to the extent it may have already addressed those issues on the record. Since the record of the February 2019 hearing was not provided for our consideration, we cannot conclude the trial court failed to comply with its statutory obligation here.
Further, even if the trial court had failed to provide a brief statement of its reasons for denial of Mother's petition, it would not warrant reversal in this case. Our Supreme Court has recently explained that the failure to provide an otherwise statutorily required statement of reasons "is not reversible per se, but is subject to harmless error review." (F.P. v. Monier (2017) 3 Cal.5th 1099, 1108.) This same principle has been applied in a wide variety of contexts in which the trial court fails to comply with a statutory mandate to make findings or state reasons in support of its decision. (See Main Street Plaza v. Cartwright & Main, LLC (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1044, 1057 [trial court's failure to perform statutory duty to provide statement of reasons in granting summary judgment does not require automatic reversal]; People v. Sanchez (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1685 [harmless error review applies to trial court's failure to provide reasons for its discretionary sentencing choices]; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1218 [failure to make statutorily required findings regarding minor's change of custody subject to harmless error review].)
Here, Mother has not suggested how she could have been prejudiced by any failure to comply with section 6340, subdivision (b). As we have already noted, the statute only requires a "brief" statement of reasons and does not require the trial court to 18 make specific findings directed toward every issue raised by the parties. While such a statement would have provided Mother with an explanation for the trial court's decision, nothing in the record suggests that, had the court provided this explanation, the outcome of the proceeding would have been any different.
We observe that this is not a case in which the trial court summarily denied a petition for DVRO on an ex parte basis. The trial court held two hearings on Mother's DVRO petition. During the second hearing, the trial court specifically took a break to review all of the written briefs, declarations, and exhibits submitted by both parties. Following the break, the trial court engaged in an extensive colloquy with the parties during which it made specific reference to evidence and exhibits; requested counsel direct the court to any evidence in support of various arguments; and permitted Mother's counsel multiple opportunities to suggest what additional evidence might exist to support her claims. In light of this record, we do not believe Mother has shown that the outcome of the proceeding would have been any different, had the trial court placed its reasons on the record. 19
IV. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Father to recover his costs on appeal.
We concur: McKINSTER, Acting P. J. CODRINGTON, J. 20