Opinion
No. 1 CA-CV 19-0003 FC
09-17-2019
In re the Marriage of: MARCELLA CELI MONTOYA, Petitioner/Appellant, v. JUAN PABLO JIMENEZ, Respondent/Appellee.
COUNSEL Marcella Montoya, Surprise Petitioner/Appellant Juan Pablo Jimenez, Surprise Respondent/Appellee
NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
No. FC2018-050181, FC2018-070033 (Consolidated)
The Honorable Lisa Ann VandenBerg, Judge
AFFIRMED
COUNSEL
Marcella Montoya, Surprise
Petitioner/Appellant
Juan Pablo Jimenez, Surprise
Respondent/Appellee
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Judge James B. Morse Jr. delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.
MORSE, Judge:
¶1 Marcella Montoya appeals from a decree dissolving her marriage with Juan Pablo Jimenez. For the following reasons, we affirm the superior court's decree.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2 Both parties separately filed for dissolution of marriage in January 2018. The cases were then consolidated. At trial, the parties submitted various financial documents, text messages, police reports containing allegations of abuse, and a disclaimer deed signed by Montoya, among other documents. Based on the exhibits and testimony presented, the court issued a dissolution decree, splitting community property equally and ordering equal parenting time. Montoya timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes sections 12-120.21(A)(1) and -2101(A)(1).
DISCUSSION
¶3 Montoya disagrees with many parts of the dissolution decree and argues that the decree was unsupported by or contrary to the evidence. Her statement of facts asserts "a dispute regarding attorney fees due to disparity in income" and "a dispute as to ongoing parenting classes that have been required." She claims that "parallel parenting is the most effective parenting method due to the high conflict in this case" and requests "an electronic application to be used to communicate" between the parties, as opposed to communication by text or email as ordered by the court. She also states that "[t]ravel outside of the United States should be prohibited until good faith can be established that father will not take the children to live in Mexico," but does not seem to have raised this issue at trial. Finally, she mentions two properties that the superior court found to be Jimenez's sole and separate property and points out the disparity
between her and Jimenez's incomes. She concludes by "ask[ing] for fairness in dividing property as well as allocating funds as fair as possible."
¶4 Jimenez disputes Montoya's characterization of the evidence, notes that the record on appeal does not include transcripts of the trial, and asserts that Montoya does not cite to the record or exhibits admitted during trial. As appellant, it was Montoya's duty to provide those transcripts. ARCAP 11(c)(1). Without a transcript of the proceedings, we must presume that the superior court's factual findings were supported by reasonable evidence. Schultz v. Schultz, 243 Ariz. 16, 19, ¶ 9, n.2 (App. 2017) ("In the absence of a transcript, we presume the record supports the[] findings by the trial court.").
¶5 More generally, Montoya failed to make any citations to the record and does not support her contentions with citations to any legal authority or legal argument. See ARCAP 13(a)(7) (requiring argument on appeal to contain supporting reasons, citations to legal authorities, relevant references to the record, and applicable standard of appellate review). A pro se litigant is held to the same standard as an attorney. Higgins v. Higgins, 194 Ariz. 266, 270, ¶ 12 (App. 1999). We decline to fill the gaps in Montoya's brief with arguments she did not make on a record she did not submit on appeal. Therefore, we find that Montoya has waived all issues on appeal. Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, ¶ 62 (App. 2009) ("Failure to [comply with ARCAP 13(a)(7)] can constitute abandonment and waiver of that claim.").
CONCLUSION
¶6 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.