In reaching this conclusion, we do not preclude the possibility that proof as to inability to attend a job regularly, at least if combined with other factors, might support a finding of disability. See Montgomery v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1211, 1214 (6th Cir. 1975). Affirmed.
It is well-settled in this circuit that after a claimant for benefits under the Social Security Act has presented a prima facie case of total and permanent disability with respect to his normal work, the burden then shifts to the Government to go forward with proof that the claimant has residual capacity for substantial gainful activity. Noe v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1975); Montgomery v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1975). Both appellants sustained the foregoing burden.
Once a prima facie case is established, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts to the Secretary to show that the claimant, in his physical condition, can perform other substantial gainful work, and that there are jobs in the national economy which claimant can perform. Montgomery v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1211, 1212 (6th Cir. 1975); see Garrett v. Finch, supra at 18; Vaughn v. Finch, 431 F.2d 997, 998 (6th Cir. 1970). The Secretary maintains that appellant failed to prove that he was disabled with respect to his tool selling business.
Cole v. Secretary of Health Human Services, 820 F.2d 768, 771 (6th Cir. 1987); Noe v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 588 (6th Cir. 1975). See also, Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1978); Montgomery v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1211 (6th Cir. 1975). The Secretary must make a finding, based upon substantial evidence, that the claimant has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs. Richardson v. Secretary of Health Human Services, 735 F.2d 962, 964 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); O'Banner v. Secretary of H.H.S., 587 F.2d 321 (6th Cir. 1978).
Furthermore, it is entirely proper for the ALJ to take administrative notice that such general clerical work exists in the local economy.Small v. Califano, 565 F.2d 797, 800 (1st Cir. 1977); McLamore v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 572, 574 (4th Cir. 1976); Montgomery v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1211, 1212 (6th Cir. 1975); Taylor v. Weinberger, 512 F.2d 664, 666 (4th Cir. 1975); Hernandez v. Weinberger, 493 F.2d 1120, 1122 (1st Cir. 1974); Williams v. Mathews, 439 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 (E.D.Va. 1977); Lightfoot v. Mathews, 430 F. Supp. 620, 621-22 (N.D.Cal. 1977); Kenney v. Weinberger, 417 F. Supp. 393, 398 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).Cf. McLamore v. Weinberger, 538 F.2d 572, 575 (4th Cir. 1976).
However, the Secretary's concession as to plaintiff's obvious preclusion from the types of work he had previously performed was sufficient to shift the burden to the Secretary to adduce evidence that plaintiff could engage in substantial work with his lessened capacity, and that jobs are existent within the national economy which plaintiff could carry out. Montgomery v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1211, 1212 (6th Cir.1975); Myers v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 293, 294 (6th Cir.1975). In relation to the Secretary's burden, the testimony of Phyllis C. Shapero, a vocational consultant, was elicited (Tr.79 94).