Opinion
H044210
07-31-2017
In re L.O., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. MONTEREY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. D.O., Defendant and Appellant.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Monterey County Super. Ct. No. J48055)
Appellant D.O. (father) seeks review of a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to his son L.O. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. On appeal, father contends that the court abused its discretion by selecting adoption as the permanent plan for L.O., because he and the minor enjoyed a beneficial relationship that was not outweighed by the benefits of adoption. We find the court's decision fully supported by the evidence and within the bounds of its discretion. We will therefore affirm the order.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Background
On September 12, 2014, respondent, the Department of Social Services (DSS or the Department), filed a petition alleging that L.O., then four years old, came within the provisions of section 300, subdivision (b)(1)-(11). Among the allegations of the petition were the following facts. L.O.'s mother, R.O. (mother), had given birth three days earlier to L.O.'s brother G.O., who tested positive for methamphetamine and had been taken into protective custody. Mother reported that she had used methamphetamine throughout her pregnancy with G.O.; she also told DSS that she had been diagnosed as having paranoid schizophrenia and had not taken her medications for the past six months. Mother described father as "very controlling": when she did not do what he wanted, he would "kick her out of the home," leaving her to sleep in her car. Sometimes L.O. would have to sleep there with her when father would not let him return to the home. On other occasions father was physically abusive to L.O. and sometimes would drag L.O. by the ear into the house. Father had a history of gang involvement, and mother claimed that he was a heroin addict and dealt drugs. Mother's confrontational behavior toward medical personnel, including screaming and profanity, escalated after receiving a telephone call from father, who had just been released from jail for assaulting her two days earlier. In the phone call father had threatened to take the baby from her.
L.O. himself described his father as "mean" and said that when his dad was mad he would grab his ear "really hard" and drag him into the house.
L.O. had been born in January 2010, and five referrals to DSS followed that year, eventually culminating in a referral to preventive services. However, two other children had been dependents of the court and had eventually been adopted by their maternal grandparents. Both parents had a history of criminal convictions and drug abuse; father's history included corporal injury on a spouse, and charges were pending for causing or permitting cruelty to a child and inflicting corporal injury on a spouse. L.O. had told the social worker that he had seen domestic violence between his parents "with weapons and punching." Father, however, denied any recent domestic violence and said he had been arrested based on false accusations by mother. He denied gang affiliation, drug use, or drug dealing. Both parents had repeatedly violated restraining orders prohibiting each from contacting the other's parents, and father from contacting mother.
The juvenile court detained L.O. and G.O. and ordered drug testing for the parents. In anticipation of the jurisdictional hearing, DSS submitted a document containing a family mental health assessment from Liz Perez-Cordero, Psy.D. Dr. Perez-Cordero described mother's history of substance abuse and suicide threats and her diagnosis of bipolar disorder and schizophrenia. As to father, the assessment noted his experience in 2010 of being shot 13 times, resulting in significant brain damage Father minimized his criminal history and blamed mother for the domestic violence charges he had incurred over the years. He tested at a low level for empathy, which indicated a low tolerance for the needs of children and a tendency to find hitting easier than listening or talking to them. Father had also tested as one who lacked understanding of children's developmental capabilities and had inappropriate expectations, which indicated a tendency to be "demanding and controlling." During visits with L.O., play was minimal., and father was overly rigid in setting rules and expectations. Dr. Perez-Cordero recommended "mental health services to address his inability to meet his children's emotional needs."
At father's request, we have taken judicial notice of the record in father's appeal from the order terminating father's parental rights to G.O. In re G.O.; Monterey County DSES v. D.O. (H043932).
L.O. and G.O. were initially placed in separate foster homes, but the Department began efforts to transition L.O. to G.O.'s placement so that they could be together. In its jurisdictional/disposition report, the Department recommended not providing reunification services to either parent. The jurisdiction and disposition hearing, originally scheduled for October 28, 2014, was continued multiple times until April 28, 2015, when the court declared L.O. a dependent child and ordered reunification services for both parents.
More continuances followed, as the parents requested contested review hearings and father substituted counsel. The Department recommended terminating services to the parents. By the time the court finally heard the matter, L.O. had been in protective custody for close to 18 months. The court ordered services to continue "for the full 18 months" and continued the matter to March 15, 2016.
The contested 18-month hearing finally took place between April 6 and April 18, 2016. The Department again recommended termination of reunification services for the parents and urged a setting of the matter for a selection and implementation hearing. The placement of L.O. with G.O. had been unsuccessful, due to L.O.'s "aggressive behaviors and extreme tantrums," and he was now in a therapeutic foster home with positive results. Mother wanted L.O. to be placed with her parents, with whom his two older siblings lived. Father had completed a parent education group, but the facilitator reported that "it was somewhat difficult to keep [father] focused on discussion. [Father] appeared to be able to comprehend the discussion topics, but never quite made a clear connection to how he could integrate what he was learning into his case, visits, and how his behavior and decisions impact his children."
According to the social worker, after multiple parenting classes father "still ha[d] a difficult time putting the child's needs in front of his own, listening to the child's needs, and understanding what those needs are." In visits with L.O. and G.O. father had difficulty meeting L.O.'s needs when G.O. was in the room; he was at times able to praise L.O., but when L.O. made noises to get attention, father either did not respond or disciplined L.O. for being loud or in the way of his brother. Father had also attended individual therapy sessions, but the social worker reported that he had not made the progress necessary to create a safe and healthy environment for his children. Father denied the domestic violence L.O. had witnessed, even though he had participated in domestic violence education and knew what the strategies were. He also denied having contact with mother, which was not permitted.
The social worker described an incident in which L.O. vomited in the parking lot before a visit. The foster parents suggested that perhaps they should not have this visit. Father's response, in front of L.O., was, "I bought all this food, when will I get my make up, and this might be any [sic] last visit." He then gave L.O. hot Cheetos, but L.O. then vomited in the therapist's office. L.O. had asked for "healthy foods," a request the social worker passed on to father, but father continued to bring food from Burger King and Kentucky Fried Chicken to the visits, insisting that it was "his Sunday."
The social worker concluded that neither parent was able to provide a safe home for the children. Mother had made little progress in her case plan and could not provide safe housing for herself and the children. Father had not been honest about his continuing interactions with mother and the domestic violence that had continued throughout the 18-month period, and he had not "demonstrated that he would be able to provide a stable, healthy and safe environment for his children."
Father objected to the Department's recommendation, arguing that he had not received reasonable reunification services. The Department responded, noting the three parenting classes, individual counseling and therapeutic visitation, and domestic violence classes; it maintained that father was unable to appreciate the effect the domestic violence still had on his children, and it noted that visits remained supervised. Father had participated in his case plan requirements, but he had not made sufficient progress to justify the return of either child. He remained unable to consistently demonstrate the ability to give attention to L.O., and he continued to "minimize or deny the volatile relationship he has with the mother." Father also had no home to which a child could be safely returned and maintained.
At the hearing the court heard from the social worker, a social service aide who supervised the parents' visitation, father's therapist, L.O.'s therapist, and the therapist who ran a 10-week parent education group in which father had participated. The social worker believed that termination of services was appropriate because father had made insufficient progress for the "treatment team" to feel comfortable that the children would be kept safe from domestic violence. Father had made "some progress" in acknowledging domestic violence occurring since L.O.'s birth, but there were still signs of it in his behavior in the form of verbal aggression and control. L.O. had already shown the effects of that behavior; he displayed a lot of aggression and had difficulty managing and regulating his emotions, with hitting, biting, and tantrums. He was finally showing progress in his fifth foster placement, an "intensive therapeutic foster home." Father had also shown no ability to disengage from mother, who was a "trigger" for a violent response in him. Only in the last six months had father begun to take some responsibility for the domestic violence. The social worker acknowledged that father and L.O. had a close relationship, but L.O. had no trouble disengaging from visits when they ended.
Counsel for mother and the minors' attorney submitted the matter on the social worker's reports.
Father's therapist testified that father had made "definite progress" in gaining insight and in being honest about past violence and his relationship with mother, as well as progress in using therapeutic tools to control his own behavior. L.O.'s therapist recalled L.O.'s having told her on more than one occasion that father had struck him and that his mother had protected him from father. She had never seen any problems for L.O. in separating from father; but on some occasions he would declare that their visit was too short. He had expressed a preference for his mother.
Finally, Phil Sherwood, who ran the Parent Education Group, testified that father had completed the program not only by attending the sessions but by sufficiently engaging in the process. Sherwood did have some difficulty keeping father focused on the discussion; father tended to wander into the subject of his own situation rather than staying on the general topic of discussion.
Father also testified. He described the various classes he had attended; there were none that he did not attend after being referred by the Department. He recognized that his relationship with mother had been "very hazardous" and that it took him a long time to accept that fact. He acknowledged convictions in 2007 and 2008 for domestic violence against mother and an ensuing violation of his probation for the 2008 offense. Father denied any physical abuse of mother since 2011, however. He admitted being charged with domestic violence against mother in July 2014, but he said he was not convicted; in that event mother had struck him in the face while he was sleeping and he only "moved her away" from him.
Father stated that he and L.O. were "really bonded." He brought "joy" to L.O., who always enjoyed seeing him and liked hugging him. They learned from each other. Father planned to have L.O. share a room he was renting in the home of a friend, the friend's "significant other," and their three children. He would quit his part-time job and stay home to take care of L.O., relying on his monthly social security disability income of $743.00; L.O. "gets his own check, too." He admitted that G.O. would be traumatized to be placed with him; G.O. was very attached to his foster mother and foster father.
On cross-examination, father admitted the screaming and yelling that had taken place in front of L.O.; he also admitted that such violence, even verbal, had triggered some of L.O.'s tantrums and that witnessing verbal abuse could affect the development of a young child's brain.
In closing argument, father's counsel pointed out that services were not offered to father until April 2015, in response to the juvenile court's order. Yet father had participated in programs where he could, and he moved out of the home to separate from mother. In Sherwood's program, he "participated maybe even too much." In short, "[t]his man has done everything he can. He has done it even more than what he can." The solution father wanted was to receive maintenance services to enable him to protect both himself and L.O. from difficult situations involving mother.
In its closing argument, the Department listed the services father had received or been offered. The Department pointed out that "not all services have to work for [parents] for them to be reasonable." Father had resisted further domestic violence education, he had been guarded and defensive in therapy, he minimized the past domestic violence that L.O. had been subjected to, and he had had difficulty acknowledging the unhealthy relationship with mother, a relationship that triggered behavior that made it an unsafe situation for his children. It was "obvious" to the Department that father "has not been able to put his own child's needs above his own" and "cannot consistently demonstrate [that] he understands what the child's needs are." Accordingly, though father had made some progress, it was not significant enough to conclude that L.O. could be safely returned to father's care. L.O.'s attorney agreed that father had not progressed sufficiently to be able to take care of the child.
On April 18, 2016, the court ruled that reasonable services "definitely" were offered to the parents, including, for father, individual counseling and services aimed at developing his parenting skills. The social worker met at least monthly with him regarding the ongoing issues of the case, conducted home visits, coordinated services and family team meetings, provided a behavioral mental health assessment, referred father to a domestic violence program even though he had completed one in 2009, and provided parenting classes, "including Triple P, Circle of Security parenting classes, Parents as Teachers, and also the Parent Education Group." Nevertheless, the court found, these therapeutic services "did not have a substantial effect, unfortunately, on [father]." He had shown "minimal compliance" with the Parent Education Group and had trouble staying focused; his therapist was working on issues of honesty . . . and . . . managing anger, although there had been progress; an additional six months would be necessary. Father had also been dishonest regarding the continuing "toxic" relationship with mother; he tended to blame her rather than taking responsibility for his own part in that situation and had tried to minimize the effect that relationship had caused for L.O. The court concluded that returning either child to the parents "would create [a] substantial risk o[f] detriment to the physical and emotional wellbeing [sic] of the children." That ruling was in the best interest of the children, who "really deserve stability." The court therefore terminated family reunification services and ordered the Department to prepare a selection and implementation hearing pursuant to section 366.26.
The section 366.26 hearing did not take place until six months later, October 11, 2016. The Department had approved of L.O.'s maternal grandparents in Louisiana as a potential adoptive placement; they were committed to having him join his older siblings there. The Department noted that the grandparents had shown a history of willingness to allow father to be a part of his other children's lives, and it believed that they would allow contact between father and L.O. Parental rights to G.O. by this time had been terminated, and father's appeal was pending. The Department acknowledged the positive relationship father had with L.O. It nevertheless urged the court to allow L.O. to "be given to a family [i.e., the grandparents] who makes a permanent commitment," because "there may be issues," stemming from the domestic violence, such as L.O.'s tendency to "act out in anger."
That appeal (H043932) was dismissed as abandoned on December 9, 2016.
Father's attorney disagreed with the Department's recommendation. She emphasized the positive interactions father and L.O. had had during visits, including his bringing treats for L.O., the games they played together, father's encouragement and praise of L.O., and father's efforts to apply what he had learned in classes about reading the child's cues. Father had learned what his "triggers" were and how differently he would handle them. Father conceded that L.O. was adoptable, but he objected to termination of his parental rights because he and L.O. had a "strong bond," and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. The bond between them, counsel argued, was one of mutual love between parent and child, and retaining father's parental rights would benefit the child. In his testimony father said that he "would be fine with a legal guardianship with the maternal grandparents."
The Department, however, argued that guardianship would not result in additional contact for father, "but will significantly impact the permanence and stability of [L.O.'s] life . . . While [L.O.'s] visits with his father are now pleasant, after much work by the father and the Department, they are not indicative of such a parental bond as would outweigh the benefits of adoption for [L.O.]."
L.O.'s attorney agreed with the Department. His counsel noted that all of the visits between father and L.O. had been supervised, so there was an insufficient basis to determine how they would interact in an unrestrictive setting. In counsel's view, the relationship was more like that of buddies than of parent and child. The person L.O. had trusted the most to "show [his] bad side" was his foster mother. Yet while he would miss his foster family, he had stated that he wanted to live with his grandmother and siblings. He should not be accorded guardianship status knowing that his siblings had had the benefit of adoption.
The court, having been familiar with the entire case history, agreed that father had maintained regular visitation and that there was a bond between L.O. and him. Yet it was "crucial" for L.O. to be in a permanent placement with a family that was committed to working through L.O.'s "issues." His grandparents had made that commitment, and he wanted to live with them. Guardianship would not provide the child with the "permanency and stability" that he needed. The court therefore terminated parental rights and declared adoption to be the child's permanent plan. Father then filed this timely appeal.
Discussion
The sole issue on appeal is whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by terminating father's parental rights. Father contends that there was substantial evidence of a beneficial parental relationship between him and L.O. which outweighed the benefit of adoption. Because severing that relationship would be detrimental to L.O., he argues, the court should have ordered guardianship as L.O.'s permanent plan.
As applied to this case, however, the law compels a different result from the one advocated by father. The overriding objective of the dependency process "is to protect abused or neglected children and those at substantial risk thereof and to provide permanent, stable homes if those children cannot be returned home within a prescribed period of time. [Citations.]" (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 307 (Marilyn H.).) "When the child is removed from the home, the court first attempts, for a specified period of time, to reunify the family. [Citation.]" (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 52 (Celine R.).) Where reunification efforts have failed, " 'the court must terminate reunification efforts and set the matter for a hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan. [Citation.]' " (Ibid.)
In selecting that permanent plan, the court must recognize the legislative preference for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1).) " 'Adoption is the Legislature's first choice because it gives the child the best chance at [a full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.' [Citation.] 'Guardianship, while a more stable placement than foster care, is not irrevocable and thus falls short of the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind for the dependent child.' [Citation.]" (Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.) Thus, "the court must order adoption and its necessary consequence, termination of parental rights, unless one of the specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. The specified statutory circumstances—actually, exceptions to the general rule that the court must choose adoption where possible—'must be considered in view of the legislative preference for adoption when reunification efforts have failed.' [Citation.] At this stage of the dependency proceedings, 'it becomes inimical to the interests of the minor to heavily burden efforts to place the child in a permanent alternative home.' [Citation.] The statutory exceptions merely permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption." (Ibid.)
In this case, father invokes the exception for a beneficial parent-child relationship set forth in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). Under that provision the court may forgo termination if it "finds a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child" because "[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship." The element of benefit from continuing the relationship "means that 'the relationship promotes the well-being of the child to such a degree as to outweigh the well-being the child would gain in a permanent home with . . . adoptive parents.' (In re Autumn H[. (1994)] 27 Cal.App.4th [567,] 575.) The juvenile court 'balances the strength and quality of the natural parent/child relationship in a tenuous placement against the security and the sense of belonging [an adoptive] family would confer.' (Ibid.) 'If severing the natural parent/child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parent's rights are not terminated.' (Ibid.)" (In re C.B. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 102, 124 (C.B.); In re Breanna S. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 636, 646 (Breanna S.).)
However, "the exception does not permit a parent who has failed to reunify with an adoptable child to derail an adoption merely by showing the child would derive some benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation with the parent." (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1348 (Jasmine D.), italics added; Breanna S., supra, 8 Cal.App.5th at p. 646; In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 466 (Angel B.).) "Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the child's needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parent's rights will prevail over the Legislature's preference for adoptive placement." (Jasmine D., supra, at p. 1350.)
It was father's burden to establish the applicability of the parent-child relationship exception. (In re Mary G. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 184, 207; In re Bailey J. (2010) 189 Cal.App.4th 1308, 1314 (Bailey J.).) "To overcome the preference for adoption and avoid termination of the natural parent's rights, the parent must show that severing the natural parent-child relationship would deprive the child of a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed. [Citations.] . . . A child who has been adjudged a dependent of the juvenile court should not be deprived of an adoptive parent when the natural parent has maintained a relationship that may be beneficial to some degree, but that does not meet the child's need for a parent." (Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.)
On appeal from a court order terminating parental rights following the court's determination that the beneficial parent-child relationship exception does not apply, we review the juvenile court's findings of fact under a substantial evidence standard and its discretionary decision regarding the existence of a compelling reason under an abuse of discretion standard. (Bailey J., supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1314-1315; see In re K.P. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 614, 621-622; C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 123.) Accordingly, "[s]ince the proponent of the exception bears the burden of producing evidence of the existence of a beneficial parental . . . relationship, which is a factual issue, the substantial evidence standard of review is the appropriate one to apply to this component of the juvenile court's determination." (Bailey J., supra, at p. 1314.) The second question, however — whether there is a compelling reason not to terminate parental rights based on a beneficial parent-child relationship—is "a quintessentially discretionary" decision, which calls for the juvenile court to determine the importance of the relationship in terms of the detrimental impact that its severance can be expected to have on the child and to weigh that against the benefit to the child of adoption. (Jasmine D. supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351; accord, Bailey J., supra, at p. 1314; see also C.B., supra, at pp. 123-124.)
" ' ["]The appropriate test for abuse of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its decision for that of the trial court." ' [Citation.]" (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.) "The abuse-of-discretion standard requires us to uphold a ruling which a reasonable judge might have made, even though we would not have ruled the same and a contrary ruling would also be sustainable. We cannot substitute our own judgment. [Citations.]" (Cf. People v. Woods (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 1139, 1153.)
Father maintains that both elements of the parent-child relationship exception were met here: He consistently visited with L.O. and they had a beneficial relationship in which their interactions were "positive for L.O. and resulted in a strong bond." Father recalls visits in which L.O. "rushed" in to see him, was consistently described as " '[j]oyful' " during visits, and shared hugs and kisses with father.
There is no question that father maintained regular visitation; the court expressly found that fact. It went on to point out, however, that the parent "must play a significant parental role in the child's life to establish benefit to the relationship to meet the burden of proof of [the] statutory exception." The court correctly noted that to establish the parent-child exception to adoption " 'the parent must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond with the child, or pleasant visits—the parent must show that he or she occupies a parental role in the life of the child.' " (C.B., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 126, quoting In re Derek W. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 823.)
Father maintains that he did occupy a parental role for L.O.: he used flashcards to teach L.O. English and Spanish, and he "acted as a parent by attending frequent visitation, conducting himself in a loving manner and providing for L.O.'s nutritional needs during visitation." He also provided shoes and guidance to L.O., and he provided for the child's emotional needs "by having L.O. prepare for the end of each visit." The court, however, looked to the testimony of the current social worker, Susan Gleason, who described father's last visit with L.O. before he left to go to his grandparents' home in August 2016. L.O. appeared comfortable with father and responded positively to him; they were affectionate with each other. Others who had supervised had told the social worker that the visits had gone well. Gleason agreed that father and L.O. had a "positive relationship," but she did not believe it was "such a bond that . . . would outweigh the benefits this child would get from adoption." She saw it "as more of a bond with somebody he knows that he is going to visit with, and he is going to go on and live like his brother and sister and be like they are and still have contact with his parents." L.O. expressed no concerns about going to Louisiana; on the contrary, he was excited to be joining his brother and sister and grandparents. He told the social worker that he would be "just like" his brother and sister now. He did say that he would miss his father sometimes, but he expected he would still be able to talk to him, as his older siblings did. The court also referred to the past visits, in which "there were some serious issues" requiring continued supervision.
At the 366.26 hearing father testified that at the beginning of each visit, he and L.O. "would hug and greet, and he was expecting food. He was expecting food, because he was trying to get that homemade food that my mom would make, or I would make something that was not given to him while he was at foster care." Father also said that he would teach him his letters with flashcards—in Spanish and English — to prepare him for school; and after that, he would let L.O. play video games.
The court had heard testimony from the social worker at the April 2016 hearing that father was unable to read the children's cues. The day before that hearing she observed father having trouble communicating with L.O., using questions that were not age appropriate in his effort to understand the child. She also described the visit in which L.O. was sick and father insisted on continuing with the visit, later giving the child hot Cheetos. (See fn 3, ante.) On another occasion father made an inappropriate telephone call to mother during his visit with L.O., who then spoke to mother and had tantrums and irritability for the rest of the week. --------
Father insists that termination of his parental rights was an abuse of discretion because the court relied on his lack of insight, which was irrelevant to the question of whether that termination would be detrimental to L.O. That assertion selectively represents the court's ruling. The court did call attention to father's lack of insight, noting "a lot of finger pointing towards [mother]," and eventually an admission that it was his fault, "but he couldn't be specific as to how it was his fault. As a matter of fact, he indicated, I don't remember why [L.O.] was removed from my care." But the court also cited the behavioral challenges the child had, which were unlikely to appear in a supervised setting. Indeed, the court found it "really very, very telling" that visits continued to be supervised. And it spoke "volume[s]" to the court that L.O. did not talk about his father when he was leaving for Louisiana. Substantial evidence supports the court's factual findings. It was within the province of the court to determine that the parental bond between father and L.O. was insufficient to outweigh the benefit the child would receive from being adopted by his grandparents. As discussed earlier, some benefit from continuing the relationship is not enough to "derail an adoption" after reunification efforts have failed. (Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1348.) The reasons cited by the court for respecting the statutory preference for adoption here evince no abuse of discretion.
We thus conclude that the juvenile court properly found that the relationship between L.O. and father did not rise to the level of a "compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child." (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) By the time of the permanency planning hearing L.O. had been in the custody of the Department for two years, in multiple foster placements. "While this may not seem a long period of time to an adult, it can be a lifetime to a young child. Childhood does not wait for the parent to become adequate." (Marilyn H. supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 310.)
Disposition
The order is affirmed.
/s/_________
ELIA, ACTING P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
BAMATTRE-MANOUKIAN, J. /s/_________
MIHARA, J.