Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Super. Ct. No. D477258 Thomas C. Hendrix, Judge.
BENKE, Acting P. J.
In this child support case the record is clear the respondent is an extraordinarily high earner and therefore may attempt to show his child's "needs" can be met with an amount less than is otherwise required by Family Code section 4055, subdivision (a). (§ 4057, subd. (b)(3).) However, respondent did not meet his burden in the trial court. The cases uniformly define a child's "needs" in terms of the standard of living enjoyed by his parents. Such a level of support is required even if the custodial parent directly benefits from the support provided to the child.
All further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.
Here, the record shows a special master appointed by the trial court determined the child's needs primarily on the basis of his mother's expenses rather than on any determination as to his father's standard of living and the cost of providing such a standard of living to the child. In expressly adopting the recommendations of the special master, the trial court erred. Thus we reverse with directions that the trial court determine the child's needs measured in terms of his father's standard of living.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Petitioner Diane Monteil (Diane) and respondent James R. Greenbaum, Jr. (James), had a short and intense romantic relationship in the spring of 2002. Diane gave birth to Erik Greenbaum on November 21, 2002. On May 11, 2003, Diane filed a paternity petition against James.
James acknowledged paternity in July 2003, and in August 2003 the trial court ordered that James pay Diane $6,252 a month in temporary support. Thereafter, Diane served James with extensive discovery requests, and James moved for a protective order. The trial court largely granted James's motion and limited Diane's discovery to production of James's tax returns for calendar years 2001, 2002 and 2003. Based on its review of those tax returns, the trial court determined that James had an annual income of $2 million and that $1.5 million of his annual income was not taxable. After further briefing by the parties with respect to the amount of permanent support, the trial court referred the matter to a special master with directions to respond to two questions: "What are Erik's present and reasonably foreseeable needs as commensurate with the income and lifestyle of his father and his half siblings? And, what are the costs to meet those needs?"
In his report to the trial court, the special master recommended that Diane receive $5,557 a month in child support. According to the special master's report, "[i]n order to determine what I believe are the costs to meet Erik's needs[,] I have used [Diane's] February 2005 [Income & Expense Declaration] as a starting point, and deducted what I believe to be excessive expenses and added appropriate needs. I have deducted the $1500 she currently receives for child support for [her daughter] to arrive at a total 'needs' amount of $5557, which includes her, Erik and [her daughter]." The special master noted Diane and her children were living together in a two-bedroom condominium in La Jolla which was within walking distance of both La Jolla Cove and the park at La Jolla Shores beach. The special master described the neighborhood as very desirable and found that Diane was paying $1,650 a month in rent. The special master found that Erik needed a room of his own and that Diane could rent a three-bedroom condominium in the Carmel Valley area for between $2,200 and $2,600 a month. According to the master, although Carmel Valley "is not La Jolla, it is considered an upper class neighborhood with excellent schools."
With respect to James, the special master stated: "Although I was provided tax returns, vocational evaluations, analysis of Father's income, I found those documents to be irrelevant to my assignment. I was not tasked with an income analysis as the court has already made a finding that James is a 'high-income earner.' His level of income is not a concern to me." The special master did find that James was living in a home in Rancho Santa Fe and that "there is no question he lives in one of the most expensive neighborhoods in the country and his surroundings are opulent."
In response to the master's report, James asked the court to make a permanent child support award that was less than the presumed amount. Diane objected to the special master's report.
Apparently, having revisited the issue, the trial court found that in fact James had $2 million a year in tax free income. The court further found that under section 4055 James was presumed to owe Diane $19,968 a month in child support. The trial court then expressly adopted the special master's report and recommendation, with one deviation. Because of the high cost of housing, the trial court awarded Diane an additional $400, for a total permanent award of $5,957.
Diane filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
I
In her first contention on appeal, Diane argues the trial court erred in refusing to provide her with more discovery. We find no abuse of discretion.
On appeal Diane contends that in addition to James's income tax returns and schedules, she was entitled to discover the IRS Form 1099 statements of income third parties provided to James and discovery with respect to his assets. The law is now fairly clear that while a supporting parent must provide enough information so that the trial court can determine the supporting parent's annual income, detailed discovery with respect to the parent's assets and life style is not necessary. (See Johnson v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 68, 75; see also In re Marriage of Hubner (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 175, 185-187.) The courts have consistently declined to permit extended discovery into the actual lifestyle and assets of the supporting parent because neither a parent's actual living circumstances or assets are accurate measures of a child's needs. "Clearly where the child has a wealthy parent, that child is entitled to, and therefore 'needs' something more than the bare necessities of life. It is also clear that the court is required to consider, in a general sense, the noncustodial parent's standard of living. However, . . . a trial court is not required to consider detailed lifestyle and net worth evidence in reaching a decision as to the needs of the child or the amount of support to be awarded. [¶] . . . [¶]
"We believe evidence of detailed lifestyle and net worth to be relevant only in those situations where the ability of the noncustodial parent to make adequate support payments may be affected by the unwise expenditure of income to the detriment of the supported minor. Where there is no question of the noncustodial parent's ability to pay any reasonable support order, we conclude that evidence of detailed lifestyle to be irrelevant to the issue of the amount of support to be paid and thus protected from discovery and inadmissible in determining the support order." (White v. Marciano (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 1026, 1032; accord McGinley v. Herman (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 936, 944; Johnson v. Superior Court, supra, 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 72; In re Marriage of Hubner, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 187.)
In sum James's income tax returns provided the court with a reasonable factual basis upon which it could determine his support obligation. (See In re Marriage of Loh (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 325, 332.) The trial court was not required to permit any additional discovery.
II
Next, we turn to the trial court's actual award of child support.
A. Standard of Review
"An award of child support rests in the court's sound discretion and cannot be overturned absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion. 'An appellate court does not substitute its own judgment; rather it interferes only if no judge could reasonably have made the order under the circumstances.' [Citation.]" (In re Marriage of Hubner, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 184.)
B. Child Support Awards
In 1992 the Legislature adopted a uniform statewide guideline for child support in order to remain in compliance with federal child support regulations. (§ 4050; Stats. 1993, ch. 219, § 138.) Under section 4055 child support is calculated in the first instance by way of a complex algebraic formula. The amount produced by application of the formula is the presumed amount of child support. (§ 4057, subd. (b).) However, the presumption is rebuttable under a number of circumstances, including in particular when "[t]he parent being ordered to pay child support has an extraordinarily high income and the amount determined under the formula would exceed the needs of the children." (§ 4057, subd. (b)(3); italics added.)
The central issue in this case is the nature of the circumstances a court must consider in determining the "needs" of a child whose parent has extraordinarily high income. In this regard we note the Legislature has directed that, among others, we adhere to the principle that "[c]hildren should share in the standard of living of both parents. Child support may therefore appropriately improve the standard of living of the custodial household to improve the lives of the children." (§ 4053, subd. (f).) Consistent with this principle, our courts have repeatedly found that a parent's duty of support is not measured by the amount needed to keep a child adequately or even comfortably clothed and fed if the parent can afford to pay more. (See Bailey v. Superior Court (1932) 215 Cal. 548, 555; In re Marriage of Chandler (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 124, 129 (Chandler).) Rather, a child's needs are measured by the supporting parent's standard of living. (Ibid.; see In re Marriage of Hubner, supra, 94 Cal.App.4th at p. 178; § 4053, subd. (f); Cal. Practice Guide, Family Law (Cont.Ed.Bar 2007) § 6:529a, p. 6-114.)
In posing questions to the special master, the trial court correctly synthesized its duty under section 4057, subdivision (b)(3), and the cases which have defined the needs of a child whose parent has an extraordinarily high income. As we have noted, the trial court directed the special master to determine "Erik's present and reasonably foreseeable needs as commensurate with the income and lifestyle of his father and his half siblings[.] And, . . . the costs to meet those needs[.]"
C. The Trial Court's Orders
As we have seen, however, the special master expressly based his findings on Diane's previous expenses, the special master's deductions of what he determined were excessive expenses, appropriate additions, and the amount of child support she received from her daughter's father. This approach was erroneous. (See Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 129.)
In the case of a child with high income earning parents, it is error to base a support award on the assumption that the child's historic expenses define the child's needs because the assumption "ignores the well-established principle that the 'child's need is measured by the parents' current siltation in life.'" (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 269, 293.) Similarly, it is error for a trial court "'to calculate the child's needs by attributing specified monthly expenses to the custodial parent and subtracting that sum from the custodial household's total monthly expenses.'" (Ibid.; Hogoboom & King, Cal. Practice Guide: Family Law, ¶ 6:259ce, pp. 6-108.4 to 6-109, citing Chandler, supra, 60 Cal.App.4th at p. 128.) To do so, again assumes the child's needs are defined by their expenses, and "[w]here the children of a high earner are involved . . . this is not always so." (In re Marriage of Cheriton, supra, 92 Cal.App.4th at p. 297.)
In Chandler, although the supporting parent was an extraordinarily high income earner, in calculating his child's needs the trial court apparently started with the custodial parent's expenses and deducted $7,000 in expenses attributable to the custodial parent, leaving a child support award of $3,000. In rejecting this methodology, the court stated: "A monthly support award of $3000 would not even come close to providing Ashley with the amenities provided by the lifestyle she was used to before her parents separated." (Id. at p. 129.) Here, the special master committed the same error and arrived at a figure which was not related to James's standard of living and the amenities that standard of living would provide Erik.
In adopting the special master's report, the trial court erred. Thus the support award must be reversed and, as the trial court's initial directions to the special master indicate, rather than relying on Diane's expenses, the trial court must provide Erik with a reasonable amount of support commensurate with James's standard of living.
III
During the course of the trial court's proceedings, the trial court awarded Diane a total of $30,000 in attorney fees. On appeal she contends this award was inadequate in light of the fact James spent considerably more than that in opposing her support request and in light of the fact that James has considerably more income.
The trial court has a great deal of discretion in awarding attorney fees as a means of leveling the playing field in paternity cases. (§ 7640; White v. Marciano, supra, 190 Cal.App.3d at p. 1034.) Where, as here, James bore the burden of justifying deviation from the guideline amount, the trial court could reasonably limit the amount of attorney fees paid to Diane in opposing that effort. Thus we find no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
Although we reverse the trial court's support order, we think it is important to note in adopting section 4057, subdivision (b)(3), the Legislature clearly recognized that in the case of extraordinarily high income earners, such as James, a support order which is less than the presumptive amount may nonetheless provide a child with a lifestyle consonant with his parents' standard of living. Thus we emphasize the difficulty we have with the record here is not with the fact that the trial court deviated from the guideline. We reverse because there is no evidence or findings by the special master with respect to the cost of providing Erik a standard of living similar to his father's standard of living.
The child support award is reversed and the trial court is directed to award Diane an amount which will provide Erik a lifestyle commensurate with his father's standard of living. The trial court is further instructed to make an appropriate award to Diane of attorney fees incurred on appeal.
WE CONCUR: HALLER, J., IRION, J.