Opinion
E066267
03-05-2020
MONSTER ENERGY COMPANY, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. BRUCE L. SCHECHTER et al., Defendants and Appellants.
Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara, Keith G. Bremer, Jeremy S. Johnson, and Benjamin L. Price; Grignon Law Firm and Margaret M. Grignon for Defendants and Appellants. Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Frank C. Rothrock, and Gabriel S. Spooner for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super.Ct.No. RIC1511553) OPINION APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County. Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge. Affirmed. Bremer Whyte Brown & O'Meara, Keith G. Bremer, Jeremy S. Johnson, and Benjamin L. Price; Grignon Law Firm and Margaret M. Grignon for Defendants and Appellants. Shook, Hardy & Bacon, Frank C. Rothrock, and Gabriel S. Spooner for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In this action, plaintiff Monster Energy Company (Monster) alleges that defendants R. Rex Parris Law Firm and Bruce Schechter (collectively the Attorneys) breached the confidentiality provision of a settlement agreement. The "Parties" to the settlement agreement were defined as Monster and certain clients of the Attorneys; however, the settlement agreement stated that it was also binding on the parties' attorneys, and the Attorneys signed the settlement agreement, under the words, "Approved as to form and content."
The Attorneys filed a special motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. They argued, among other things, that Monster could not show a probability of prevailing on its breach of contract cause of action because the Attorneys were not parties to the settlement agreement. The trial court granted the motion with respect to other causes of action, but it denied the motion with respect to the breach of contract cause of action.
The Attorneys appealed. We reversed, holding that the Attorneys were not bound by the settlement agreement. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2018) 236 Cal.Rptr.3d 669.) The Supreme Court granted review. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (Nov. 14, 2018, S251392) 429 P.3d 827.) It then issued an opinion reversing our judgment and holding instead that Monster had made a prima facie showing that the Attorneys were bound. (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter (2019) 7 Cal.5th 781.)
In this opinion, we examine the contentions that the Attorneys have raised on appeal, and we conclude that the Supreme Court's opinion is dispositive of all of them.
Hence, without further ado, we will affirm the trial court's order.
I
THE ATTORNEYS' CONTENTIONS
The Attorneys contend that Monster failed to show a probability of prevailing because, on this record:
1. The Attorneys are not parties to the settlement agreement.
2. The Attorneys did not consent to be bound.
3. Under the statute of frauds, the settlement agreement is unenforceable against the Attorneys because they did not sign it as parties.
These all boil down to the single argument that the Attorneys are not personally bound by the settlement agreement. In Monster, however, the Supreme Court rejected this argument; it held "that an attorney's signature on a document with a notation that it is approved as to form and content does not, as a matter of law, preclude a factual finding that the attorney intended to be bound by the document's terms." (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 795.) It also held that the terms of the settlement agreement here could be construed as meaning that it was binding on the Attorneys. (Id. at pp. 792-794.) Thus, it expressly rejected the Attorneys' reliance on the statute of frauds. (Id. at p. 794, fn. 7.)
The Attorneys also contend that they did not waive their constitutional right to free speech. The Supreme Court mentioned (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 787) but did not specifically address this argument. When one examines this argument more closely, however, it, too, rests on the premise that the Attorneys are not bound by the settlement agreement. Accordingly, the Supreme Court appropriately concluded globally that: "Monster Energy has met its burden of showing its breach of contract claim has 'minimal merit' sufficient to defeat an anti-SLAPP motion. [Citation.]" (Id. at p. 796.)
Finally, the Attorneys contend that Monster did not show that they materially breached the confidentiality provision. While the bulk of the Supreme Court's opinion dealt with their contention that they were not bound, the court added, "Further, assuming the confidentiality provisions applied to him, sufficient evidence was presented that Schechter violated them by making public comments about the settlement . . . ." (Monster Energy Co. v. Schechter, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 796.)
In sum, then, the Supreme Court's opinion is dispositive of all of the issues raised in this appeal. There is nothing left for us to do but to affirm the trial court's order.
II
DISPOSITION
The order appealed from is affirmed. Monster is awarded costs on appeal against the Attorneys.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
RAMIREZ
P. J. We concur: McKINSTER
J. MILLER
J.