Summary
holding that the plain language of § 14–295 allows only for punitive damages against one who operates a vehicle and recognizing that “the recent trend favors precluding the recovery of punitive damages under § 14–295 against parties who are only vicariously liable for the acts of others”
Summary of this case from Ghimbasan v. S&H Express, Inc.Opinion
No. NNH CV 10-6012915
December 6, 2010
MOTION TO STRIKE #122
FACTS
This claim arises out of a fatal motor vehicle accident which occurred on November 5, 2008 on Interstate 91 in Connecticut. On June 25, 2010, the plaintiff, Jacqueline Moncrieffe-Went, administratrix of the estate of Pearleta Silvera (the decedent), filed an eight-count complaint alleging negligence against each of the defendants, Transportation General, Inc. (Metro Taxi), Yasser Abdallah (Abdallah), Jimmy Acevedo (Acevedo), Bertrand St. Pierre (St. Pierre), Tuxis Ohr's Fuel Incorporated, Milton Valdez and Patricia Valdez, as well as one count of recklessness against Abdallah and Metro Taxi seeking double or treble damages under General Statutes § 14-295.
Of the seven defendants, Metro Taxi is the only party to the present motion. Hereinafter, the term defendant will refer to Metro Taxi, individually.
In her complaint, the plaintiff makes the following allegations. On the morning of November 5, 2008, the decedent was riding as a fare paying passenger in a taxi cab owned by the defendant and operated by Abdallah. Abdallah picked the decedent up at her home in West Haven, Connecticut with the agreement to transport her to a destination in Meriden, Connecticut. At some point after picking the decedent up, but before reaching the intended destination, Abdallah was traveling on Interstate 91 in the far left lane of a four-lane segment of the highway at approximately sixty-five miles per hour when an altercation ensued between him and another driver, Acevedo. For at least several miles, both Abdallah and Acevedo alternatively sped up, moved into each other's lanes, abruptly slowed down and chased each other down the highway. The altercation between Abdallah and Acevedo continued and they eventually came upon a tractor trailer, owned by Tuxis-Ohrs Fuel Incorporated and operated by St. Pierre, traveling in the center lane of the highway. Acevedo passed the tractor trailer on the right side at a high rate of speed and proceeded to move in front of the tractor trailer in the center lane. Abdallah subsequently passed the tractor trailer on the left side at a high rate of speed and he too moved in front of the tractor trailer and directly behind Acevedo. At some point thereafter, both Acevedo and Abdallah abruptly slowed down and moved into the right lane of the highway, at which point the vehicles were struck by the tractor trailer. After the vehicles had been struck, Acevedo left the scene of the accident, but Abdallah's taxi cab remained stationary in the right lane of the highway. It was at that point that a third vehicle, owned by Patricia Valdez and operated by Milton Valdez, struck the Abdallah taxi cab from behind causing the decedent to suffer severe, painful, and ultimately fatal personal injuries.
Those injuries included multiple crush injuries, a lacerated aorta, collapsed gallbladder, pulverized spleen, collapsed bladder, ring fracture with transaction of the mid brain, fracture of the thoracic anterior vertebral column, multiple bilateral displaced rib fractures, multiple fractures of the sternum, as well as severe physical, mental, and emotional pain and anguish leading up to her death.
The plaintiff filed suit on June 25, 2008, and on October 1, 2010, the defendant filed a motion to strike count two of the complaint on the ground that vicarious liability for recklessness cannot be imposed on a nonoperator owner of a motor vehicle. The defendant submitted a memorandum of law in support of its motion. On October 6, 2010, the plaintiff filed an objection to the defendant's motion to strike. The matter was heard at short calendar on October 25, 2010.
DISCUSSION
"[A] motion to strike challenges the legal sufficiency of a pleading and, consequently, requires no factual findings by the trial court . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, 295 Conn. 240, 252, 990 A.2d 206 (2010). "[The court takes] the facts to be those alleged in the complaint . . . and [construes] the complaint in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Violano v. Fernandez, 280 Conn. 310, 317-18, 907 A.2d 1188 (2006). "It is fundamental that in determining the sufficiency of a complaint challenged by a defendant's motion to strike, all well-pleaded facts and those facts necessarily implied from the allegations are taken as admitted." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Connecticut Coalition for Justice in Education Funding, Inc. v. Rell, supra, 252-53. "[I]f facts provable in the complaint would support a cause of action, the motion to strike must be denied." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 252.
In support of its motion, the defendant argues that it is not vicariously liable for the recklessness of its employee, as a matter of law, and therefore, count two seeking punitive damages under § 14-295 should be stricken. Specifically, the defendant argues that neither the plain language of § 14-295 nor its legislative history indicate any intent by the legislature to abrogate the common-law rule that an employer generally cannot be held vicariously liable for the reckless conduct of its employees. In her objection to the defendant's motion, the plaintiff counters that there is a split of authority on this issue at the superior court level, and the court should follow the reasoning of Goss v. Wright, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 5001164 (March 15, 2006, Lopez, J.) [ 40 Conn. L. Rptr. 882], which supports her position. Alternatively, the plaintiff argues that even if an action under § 14-295 cannot be maintained against the defendant, the entire count should not be stricken because an action may still lie against Abdallah.
Section 14-295 provides: "In any civil action to recover damages resulting from personal injury, wrongful death or damage to property, the trier of fact may award double or treble damages if the injured party has specifically pleaded that another party has deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of section 14-218a, 14-219, 14-222, 14-227a, 14-230, 14-234, 14-237, 14-239 or 14-240a, and that such violation was a substantial factor in causing such injury, death or damage to property. The owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle shall not be responsible for such damages unless the damages arose from such owner's operation of the motor vehicle." "[A]t common law, there is no vicarious liability for punitive damages . . . and [therefore] . . . the owner of a motor vehicle is not vicariously liable for punitive damages resulting from the driver's reckless operation of the vehicle." Matthiessen v. Vanech, 266 Conn. 822, 837, 836 A.2d 394 (2003). "[It would be] improper to award punitive damages against someone who is innocent and, therefore, only liable vicariously." Stohlts v. Gilkinson, 87 Conn.App. 634, 654, 867 A.2d 860 (2005). There is indeed a split of authority on the lower courts regarding the imposition of § 14-295 punitive damages on one who is only vicariously liable. Compare Hollis v. Alamo Financing, L.P., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford, Docket No. CV 08 5024043 (October 7, 2009, Rittenband, J.T.R.) [ 48 Conn. L. Rptr. 620], and Otis v. Montesi, Superior Court, judicial district of Middlesex, Docket No. CV 07 5002196 (January 25, 2008, Jones, J.), and Goss v. Wright, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket No. CV 05 5001164 (March 15, 2006, Lopez, J.) (holding vicarious liability may be basis for statutory recklessness claim under § 14-295), with Zwicker v. Sabetta, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven, Docket. No. CV 07 5008853 (February 1, 2008, Skolnick, J.T.R.) [ 45 Conn. L. Rptr. 9], and, Hronis v. EBO Logistics, LLC, 641 F.Sup.2d 139, 140 (D.Conn. 2009) (holding § 14-295 does not abrogate common-law rule that there can be no imposition of punitive damages on one who is only vicariously liable).
The plaintiff alleges in count two, paragraph seventeen, that "The defendant Metro Taxi is liable as the authorized carrier, the lessor, and for the owner of the subject taxi, and/or in its capacity as the employer or the principal of the defendant Abdallah." In count two, paragraph nineteen, the plaintiff further alleges that "Metro Taxi [is] liable to the plaintiff for double or treble damages under . . . § 14-295 in that . . . Abdallah violated [several of the statute's enumerated traffic violations] with reckless disregard and such violations [were] `a substantial factor in causing the decedent's injuries and death." The complaint is devoid, however, of any allegations that the defendant, itself, was reckless. Instead, the plaintiff seeks to recover § 14-295 damages from the defendant solely on the basis of vicarious liability.
The federal district court case of Hronis v. EBO Logistics, LLC is most instructive. In that case, the complaint alleged that the decedent was killed by a tractor trailer owned by the defendant/employer and operated by the defendant's employee. It alleged further that, pursuant to § 14-295, the defendant/employer was "vicariously liable for the recklessness of their employee, servant, and/or agent . . ." Id., 140. The court, in discussing the relationship between § 14-295 and the Supreme Court's decision in Matthiessen, held: "Since Matthiessen, numerous Connecticut Superior Courts have considered whether . . . § 14-295 makes owners or employers vicariously liable for double and treble damages, and the results are mixed . . . Having considered those opinions, this Court is persuaded by those courts that have held that § 14-295 does not abrogate the common-law doctrine prohibiting vicarious liability for punitive damages such as that imposed by § 14-295. The Court says so for two reasons, each of which is founded on the holding in Matthiessen. First, there is nothing in the language of § 14-295 that suggests that the legislature intended to abrogate the common-law rule or impose vicarious liability on owner/employers for the conduct of reckless employees. [B]y its plain language, § 14-295 applies only to an operator of a vehicle, and not to its nonoperating owner . . . The last sentence of § 14-295, concerning the owner of a rental or leased motor vehicle, does not change this analysis . . . Indeed, § 14-295 by its own terms applies only to vehicles operated by a defendant. Second, neither party has directed the Court to any legislative history of § 14-295 that indicates the legislature intended to impose vicarious liability for punitive damages or to abrogate the common-law rule against such liability. As the Connecticut Supreme Court held in Matthiessen, `Although the legislature may eliminate a common law right by statute, the presumption that the legislature does not have such a purpose can be overcome only if the legislative intent is clearly and plainly expressed.'" (Citations omitted, emphasis in the original.) Id., 140-41.
Similarly, in the present case, the plaintiff does not point to any legislative history of § 14-295 that indicates the legislature's intent to abrogate the common-law rule against vicarious liability for punitive damages. The plain language of the statute does, however, states unequivocally that only one who "deliberately or with reckless disregard operated a motor vehicle in violation of [one of the statute's enumerated traffic laws]" may be subjected to § 14-295 punitive damages. Furthermore, despite the split of authority on the lower courts, the recent trend favors precluding the recovery of punitive damages under § 14-295 against parties who are only vicariously liable for the acts of others. The plaintiff does not allege that the defendant was reckless, but only that the defendant is vicariously liable for the recklessness of Abdallah "as the authorized carrier, the lessor, and/or the owner of the subject taxi, and/or in its capacity as the employer or the principal of the defendant Abdallah." In light of these particular allegations, the court will follow the Hronis line of cases, which have chosen not to impose § 14-295 punitive damages for vicarious liability, which includes a nonoperating owner of a motor vehicle for the recklessness of the motor vehicle's driver.
Accordingly, the motion to strike count two is granted.