Opinion
20-CV-10993 (LLS)
01-04-2021
IRIS MOLINA, Plaintiff, v. HARVARD MAINTENANCE, Defendant.
ORDER TO AMEND
LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge.
Plaintiff brings this pro se action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17, and the New York State and City Human Rights Laws, N.Y. Exec. Law §§ 290 to 297; N.Y.C. Admin. Code §§ 8-101 to 131. Plaintiff alleges that her employer, Harvard Maintenance, discriminated against her based on her national origin. By order dated December 29, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”). For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants Plaintiff leave to file an amended complaint within sixty days of the date of this order.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3).
While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest, ” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But the “special solicitude” in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits -to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.
The Supreme Court has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief “that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009). But it does not have to accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, ” which are essentially just legal conclusions. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff filed this complaint alleging that her former employer discriminated and retaliated against her based on her national origin (“Dominican”). (ECF 1 ¶ III(A).) Plaintiff refers to the notice of right to sue from the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission (EEOC) attached to her complaint “for the facts that support my claim.” (Id. ¶ III(B).) The EEOC notice does not contain facts about Plaintiff's case. (Id. at 9.) Plaintiff seeks “money for damages endured due to discrimination, health-related issues, and job termination as retaliation for my national origin and my complaints.” (Id. VI.)
DISCUSSION
A. Pleading Requirements
Title VII provides that “[i]t shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to [her] compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Title VII prohibits employers from mistreating an individual because of the individual's protected characteristics, Patane v. Clark, 508 F.3d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2007), or retaliating against an employee who has opposed any practice made unlawful by those statutes, see Crawford v. Metro. Gov't, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (holding that conduct is protected when it “confront[s], ” “resist[s], ” or “withstand[s]” unlawful actions). Mistreatment at work that occurs for a reason other than an employee's protected characteristic or opposition to unlawful conduct is not actionable under these federal antidiscrimination statutes. See Chukwuka v. City of New York, 513 Fed.Appx. 34, 36 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting Brown v. Henderson, 257 F.3d 246, 252 (2d Cir. 2001)).
At the pleading stage in an employment discrimination action, a plaintiff must plausibly allege that (1) the employer took adverse employment action against her, and (2) her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor in the employment decision. Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72, 86 (2d Cir. 2015). The plaintiff “may do so by alleging facts that directly show discrimination or facts that indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Id. at 87.
Plaintiff's complaint does not satisfy federal pleading rules because it does not contain facts suggesting that any adverse action was taken because of her national origin. Plaintiff makes conclusory assertions of discrimination, but she fails to allege any facts explaining exactly what her employer did or failed to do, and how those facts give rise to an inference of discrimination based on national origin. In the absence of supporting facts, Plaintiff's assertions are insufficient to “indirectly show discrimination by giving rise to a plausible inference of discrimination.” Vega, 801 F.3d at 87.
Because Plaintiff may be able to allege facts suggesting that her employer discriminated against her based on her national origin, the Court grants her leave to submit an amended complaint that complies with Rule 8 and states a valid Title VII claim.
B. Leave to Amend
Plaintiff proceeds in this matter without the benefit of an attorney. District courts generally should grant a self-represented plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to cure its defects, unless amendment would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione, 657 F.3d 116, 123-24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988). Indeed, the Second Circuit has cautioned that district courts “should not dismiss [a pro se complaint] without granting leave to amend at least once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (quoting Gomez v. USAA Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999)). The Court grants Plaintiff 60 days' leave to amend her complaint to detail her claims.
In the statement of claim, Plaintiff must provide a short and plain statement of the relevant facts supporting each claim against each defendant named in the amended complaint. In her amended complaint, Plaintiff should allege any additional facts suggesting that her national origin was a motivating factor in what occurred.
To the greatest extent possible, Plaintiff's amended complaint must:
a) give the names and titles of all relevant persons;
b) describe all relevant events, stating the facts that support Plaintiff's case including what each defendant did or failed to do;
c) give the dates and times of each relevant event or, if not known, the approximate date and time of each relevant event;
d) give the location where each relevant event occurred;
e) describe how each defendant's acts or omissions violated Plaintiff's rights and describe the injuries Plaintiff suffered; and
f) state what relief Plaintiff seeks from the Court, such as money damages, injunctive relief, or declaratory relief.
Essentially, the body of Plaintiff's amended complaint must tell the Court: who violated her federally protected rights; what facts show that her federally protected rights were violated; when such violation occurred; where such violation occurred; and why Plaintiff is entitled to relief. Because Plaintiff's amended complaint will completely replace, not supplement, the original complaint, any facts or claims that Plaintiff wishes to maintain must be included in the amended complaint.
C. Consent to Electronic Service and Information About NYLAG Clinic
In light of the current global health crisis, parties proceeding pro se are encouraged to submit all filings by email to TemporaryProSeFiling@nysd.uscourts.gov. Instructions for filing by email are located at https://nysd.uscourts.gov/forms/instructions-filing-documents-email. Pro se parties also are encouraged to consent to receive all court documents electronically. A consent to electronic service form is available on the Court's website. Pro se parties who are unable to use email may submit documents by regular mail or in person at a drop box at one of the designated courthouse locations in Manhattan (500 Pearl Street) or White Plains (300 Quarropas Street). For more information, including instructions on this new email service for pro se parties, please visit the Court's website at https://www.nysd.uscourts.gov.
Also, Plaintiff may consider contacting the New York Legal Assistance Group's (NYLAG) Legal Clinic for Pro Se Litigants in the Southern District of New York, which is a free legal clinic staffed by attorneys and paralegals to assist those who are representing themselves in civil lawsuits in this Court. A copy of the flyer with details of the clinic is attached to this order. The clinic is currently only available by telephone.
CONCLUSION
The Clerk of Court is directed to mail a copy of this order to Plaintiff and note service on the docket. Plaintiff is granted leave to file an amended complaint that complies with the standards set forth above. Plaintiff must submit the amended complaint to this Court's Pro Se Intake Unit within sixty days of the date of this order, caption the document as an “Amended Complaint, ” and label the document with docket number 20-CV-10993 (LLS). An Amended Complaint for Employment Discrimination form is attached to this order. No summons will issue at this time. If Plaintiff fails to comply within the time allowed, and she cannot show good cause to excuse such failure, the complaint will be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
SO ORDERED.