Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 00-2585-CM
June 29, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Anthony Molina brings this action requesting injunctive and declaratory relief against defendants Ben Christensen, Brent Kemnitz, and George Stephenson. This matter is before the court on defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson's motion to dismiss (Doc. 9).
I. Background Facts
Plaintiff was a student at the University of Evansville, Evansville, Indiana and a member of its intercollegiate baseball team. On April 23, 1999, plaintiff participated in a regularly scheduled game between the University of Evansville and Wichita State University. While plaintiff was warming up to be the lead-off batter, he was struck with a baseball thrown by defendant Christensen who was, at the time, throwing warm-up pitches.
Plaintiff initially brought suit against Ben Christensen and Wichita State University in the District Court of Sedgwick County, Kansas. Plaintiff's claims against Wichita State University for negligence were based upon the actions of it employees Kemnitz and Stephenson. Defendant Kemnitz was the pitching coach, and defendant Stephenson was the head coach, for the Wichita State University baseball team.
On Wichita State University's motion for summary judgment, the state court ruled that Wichita State University was immune from liability pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann § 75-6104(o). Plaintiff has appealed that judgment to the Kansas Court of Appeals.
At the time the instant motion was filed, the Kansas Court of Appeals had yet to render a decision.
Plaintiff then moved to dismiss without prejudice the remaining case against defendant Christensen. Attached to plaintiff's motion to dismiss was an affidavit, which stated that plaintiff was surprised by the summary judgment ruling and that he wished to resolve questions about the case, re-evaluate the case, and explore his options before going forward with trial, then scheduled only weeks away. The state court ruled that plaintiff would be allowed to dismiss without prejudice, but further ordered, "(2) Any subsequent action commenced by the plaintiff against this defendant arising out of this incident shall only be filed in Sedgwick County District Court."
Plaintiff has now brought suit in this court, naming Christensen, Kemnitz, and Stephenson as defendants. The facts alleged by plaintiff are exactly the same as those facts alleged in the state court action. Plaintiff requests that this court enjoin defendants from utilizing the state courts of Kansas in any manner that would seek to punish plaintiff for pursuing his cause of action in federal court or that would seek any form of dismissal or other order that would deprive plaintiff of his cause of action in federal court. Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief, requesting the court to declare that it has jurisdiction over plaintiff's action, that plaintiff has a right to pursue this cause of action in federal court, that item (2) of the state court's order of dismissal is of no force and effect in this court, and that the state court cannot take away plaintiff's right to bring this cause of action in federal court. Finally, plaintiff seeks the right to file a proposed complaint, alleging that defendants Christensen, Kemnitz and Stephenson were negligent and that plaintiff was damaged as a result thereof.
II. Standards
The court will dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the theory of recovery that would entitle him or her to relief, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998), or when an issue of law is dispositive, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). The court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, Maher, 144 F.3d at 1304, and all reasonable inferences from those facts are viewed in favor of the plaintiff, Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1998). The issue in resolving a motion such as this is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
III. Discussion
Defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson move for dismissal of plaintiff's complaint. Specifically, these defendants argue that 1) they are entitled to immunity under the Eleventh Amendment; 2) this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this action pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; 3) this case should be dismissed pursuant to the Younger abstention doctrine; and 4) plaintiff has failed to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirement. The court will consider each argument in turn.
A. Eleventh Amendment
Wichita State University is a member institution of the Kansas Board of Regents and is, therefore, an agency of the State of Kansas. Defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson were, at all pertinent times, employees of Wichita State University. These defendants assert that they have sovereign immunity based upon their employment with Wichita State University, an agency of the State of Kansas.
Eleventh Amendment immunity bars actions against a state in federal court, even by its own citizens, unless the state waives that immunity. U.S. Const. amend. XI; Sturdevant v. Paulsen, 218 F.3d 1160, 1164 (10th Cir. 2000). Furthermore, when a suit is brought against state officials in their official capacities, the real party in interest is the state, and the state may raise the defense of sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1985). On the other hand, state employees who are sued in their individual capacities are not protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity. Wrenn v. State of Kansas, 561 F. Supp. 1216, 1220 (D.Kan. 1983). Defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson contend that plaintiff has sued them in their official capacities and that, as a result, the instant case is really a case against Wichita State University subject to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Plaintiff argues that he has sued Kemnitz and Stephenson in their individual capacities.
Plaintiff in this case has failed to designate in what capacity he is suing Kemnitz and Stephenson. Plaintiff alleges in the complaint that Kemnitz "was the pitching coach for the Wichita State University baseball team," and that Kemnitz taught the pitchers "to throw at or in the general vicinity of an on-deck hitter." Plaintiff further alleges that Stephenson "was the Head Coach of the Wichita State University baseball team" and that Stephenson was aware that Kemnitz "taught their pitchers in the manner alleged." Where a complaint fails to designate expressly the nature of the suit, and where a plaintiff names defendants along with their job titles, "the court may presume that the officials have been sued in their official capacities only." Croft v. Harder, 730 F. Supp. 342, 349 (D.Kan. 1989) (emphasis supplied). However, "[t]his presumption is not conclusive, since the complaint may be amended at any time to conform to the evidence." Id. Moreover, the court is mindful that it must liberally construe plaintiff's complaint. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). For purposes of analyzing the current motion, the court will assume that plaintiff sued defendants in their individual and official capacities.
The court is aware that, under Ex parte Young, federal jurisdiction exists over a suit against a state official when that suit seeks only prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing violation of federal law. Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985). Thus, a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity seeking prospective injunctive relief is not considered a suit against the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n. 10 (1989). Plaintiff in this case seeks injunctive relief to allow him to pursue his underlying case, which is based on allegations of state law violations and which seeks only money damages. As a result, plaintiff's true cause of action does not seek only prospective injunctive relief in order to end a continuing violation of federal law. Accordingly, the court finds that Ex parte Young does not provide a basis upon which plaintiff can proceed against these defendants in their official capacities. To the extent that plaintiff has sued Kemnitz and Stephenson in their official capacities, the court finds that the real party in interest is the state, and, accordingly, the state may raise the defense of sovereign immunity. See Graham, 473 U.S. at 166-67 (1985). Any suit against Kemnitz and Stephenson in their official capacities is, therefore, barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
To the extent that plaintiff asserts a cause of action against Kemnitz and Stephenson in their individual capacities, the court finds that such an action is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment.
B. Rooker-Feldman Doctrine
Defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson argue that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes plaintiff's cause of action. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars a party losing in state court from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights. Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 414 (1923); Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983). As a general rule, a federal district court cannot review matters actually decided by a state court, Rooker, 263 U.S. at 415, nor can it issue "any declaratory relief that is 'inextricably intertwined' with the state court judgment." Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483-84 n. 16). If the purpose of the federal action is "'separable from and collateral to'" the state court judgment at issue, then the claim is not inextricably intertwined, even though the action necessitates some consideration of the merits of the state court judgment. Kiowa Indian Tribe of Ok. v. Hoover, 150 F.3d 1163, 1170 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting Texaco Inc. v. Penzoil Co., 481 U.S. 1, 21 (1987)).
The only remaining claims against Kemnitz and Stephenson in this action are in their individual capacities. In the previous action, the state court ruled on summary judgment that Wichita State University was immune from liability. Any judgment by this court regarding the liability of Kemnitz and Stephenson in their individual capacities is separate from and collateral to the state court judgment since the state court judgment merely held that the state was immune from suit. The issue of these defendants' individual liability was not decided by the state court, nor is the claim inextricably intertwined with the state court judgment. Moreover, the state court's ruling that any subsequent action shall only be filed in Sedgwick County District Court applied to defendant Christensen, not defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson in their individual capacities. Thus, any decision by this court regarding whether Kemnitz and Stephenson can be sued in federal court is not intertwined with the state court's ruling. The court finds that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude plaintiff's suit against defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson in their individual capacities.
C. Younger Abstention
Defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson contend that this case violates the Younger abstention doctrine. "The Younger doctrine, which counsels federal court abstention when there is a pending state proceeding, reflects a strong policy against federal intervention in state judicial processes in the absence of great and immediate irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff." Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). The prerequisites for Younger abstention are: (1) interference with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the presence of an important state interest; and (3) an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Okla., 874 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1989). If these elements are satisfied, Younger abstention is mandatory absent extraordinary circumstances. Id.
The court finds that the first prerequisite has not been satisfied. Plaintiff is correct in pointing out that the state court's summary judgment is currently pending before the Kansas Court of Appeals. However, the state court ruled only that Wichita State University was immune from liability. The pending appeal, therefore, relates to the dismissal of Wichita State University-not these defendants in their individual capacities. The court finds that there is no ongoing state judicial proceedings involving defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson in their individual capacities and that, as a result, Younger abstention is not warranted.
D. Jurisdictional Amount
Defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson argue that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the jurisdictional amount requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Paragraph 1 of plaintiff's complaint alleges that "[t]he matter in controversy exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum of Seventy Five Thousand and No/100ths Dollars ($75,000)."
In an action seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, the amount in controversy for jurisdictional purposes is measured by the value of the object of the litigation. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Adver. Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 347 (1977). Moreover, the amount claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. Adams v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 225 F.3d 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2000). In the underlying action, plaintiff alleges that, as a result of defendants' negligence, he suffered severe and permanent injuries, including a blowout fracture of the skull around the eye, glaucoma, reduced visual activity, retinal damage, and blind spots in his field of vision. There is no evidence that plaintiff's claim for damages in excess of $75,000 was made in bad faith. The court denies defendants' motion to dismiss on this basis.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson's motion to dismiss (Doc. 9) is granted only to the extent that plaintiff asserted a cause of action against defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson in their official capacities. Defendants Kemnitz and Stephenson's motion to dismiss is denied in all other respects.
Plaintiff Anthony Molina brings this action requesting injunctive and declaratory relief against defendants Ben Christensen, Brent Kemnitz, and George Stephenson. This matter is before the court on defendant Christensen's motion to dismiss (Doc. 11).
I. Background Facts
Plaintiff was a student at the University of Evansville, Evansville, Indiana and a member of its intercollegiate baseball team. On April 23, 1999, plaintiff participated in a regularly scheduled game between the University of Evansville and Wichita State University. While plaintiff was warming up to be the lead-off batter, he was struck with a baseball thrown by defendant Christensen who was, at the time, throwing warm-up pitches.
Plaintiff initially brought suit against Ben Christensen and Wichita State University in the District Court of Sedgwick County, Kansas. Plaintiff's claims against Wichita State University for negligence were based upon the actions of it employees Kemnitz and Stephenson. Defendant Kemnitz was the pitching coach, and defendant Stephenson was the head coach, for the Wichita State University baseball team.
On Wichita State University's motion for summary judgment, the state court ruled that Wichita State University was immune from liability pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann § 75-6104(o). Plaintiff has appealed that judgment to the Kansas Court of Appeals.
At the time the instant motion was filed, the Kansas Court of Appeals had yet to render a decision.
Plaintiff then moved to dismiss without prejudice the remaining case against defendant Christensen. Attached to plaintiff's motion to dismiss was an affidavit, which stated that plaintiff was surprised by the summary judgment ruling and that he wished to resolve questions about the case, re-evaluate the case, and explore his options before going forward with trial, then scheduled only weeks away. The state court ruled that plaintiff would be allowed to dismiss without prejudice, but further ordered, "(2) Any subsequent action commenced by the plaintiff against this defendant arising out of this incident shall only be filed in Sedgwick County District Court."
Plaintiff has now brought suit in this court, naming Christensen, Kemnitz, and Stephenson as defendants. The facts alleged by plaintiff are exactly the same as those facts alleged in the state court action. Plaintiff requests that this court enjoin defendants from utilizing the state courts of Kansas in any manner that would seek to punish plaintiff for pursuing his cause of action in federal court or that would seek any form of dismissal or other order that would deprive plaintiff of his cause of action in federal court. Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief, requesting the court to declare that it has jurisdiction over plaintiff's action, that plaintiff has a right to pursue this cause of action in federal court, that item (2) of the state court's order of dismissal is of no force and effect in this court, and that the state court cannot take away plaintiff's right to bring this cause of action in federal court. Finally, plaintiff seeks the right to file a proposed complaint, alleging that defendants Christensen, Kemnitz and Stephenson were negligent and that plaintiff was damaged as a result thereof.
II. Standards
The court will dismiss a cause of action for failure to state a claim only when it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the theory of recovery that would entitle him or her to relief, Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957); Maher v. Durango Metals, Inc., 144 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 1998), or when an issue of law is dispositive, Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326 (1989). The court accepts as true all well-pleaded facts, as distinguished from conclusory allegations, Maher, 144 F.3d at 1304, and all reasonable inferences from those facts are viewed in favor of the plaintiff, Witt v. Roadway Express, 136 F.3d 1424, 1428 (10th Cir. 1998). The issue in resolving a motion such as this is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but whether he or she is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).
III. Discussion
Defendant Christensen argues that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed on the grounds that the state court's order is entitled to full faith and credit and that the court should abstain from interfering in the state court proceedings
A. Abstention
Defendant Christensen asserts that this court should abstain from deciding whether the state court's ruling, which ordered that any subsequent action commenced by plaintiff against defendant Christensen shall only be filed in Sedgwick County District Court, is void and unenforceable. For support, defendant Christensen cites Amanatullah v. Colorado Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999), which in turn sets forth the Younger abstention doctrine. Defendant Christensen presents no clear argument and cites no other legal authority to support his argument that this court should abstain from hearing this case. The court will, therefore, assume that defendant Christensen bases his argument on Younger.
"The Younger doctrine, which counsels federal court abstention when there is a pending state proceeding, reflects a strong policy against federal intervention in state judicial processes in the absence of great and immediate irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff." Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). The prerequisites for Younger abstention are: (1) interference with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the presence of an important state interest; and (3) an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Okla., 874 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1989). If these elements are satisfied, Younger abstention is mandatory absent extraordinary circumstances. Id.
The court finds that there is no ongoing state judicial proceeding which would require abstention. Defendant Christensen admits that "on the eve of trial [plaintiff] chose to dismiss his case without prejudice." Because the state court case against defendant Christensen was dismissed, the litigation cannot be "ongoing." The first prerequisite for Younger abstention is not satisfied. The court may properly determine the state court's ruling's enforceability.
B. Full Faith and Credit
Defendant Christensen contends that the state court's ruling is entitled to full faith and credit and should, therefore, be given preclusive effect. The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires a federal court to give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment that the judgment would be given in the courts of the state in which the judgment was rendered. Jarrett v. Gramling, 841 F.2d 354, 356 (10th Cir. 1988). However, the Full Faith and Credit Act makes only valid judgments enforceable. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 (1977). Moreover, any such judgments must be final and on the merits. Jarrett v. Gramling, 841 F.2d 354, 357 (10th Cir. 1988).
The issue thus becomes whether the state court's ruling is valid as applied to this federal lawsuit. The Supreme Court has held that state courts are without power to take away a plaintiff's right to file a case in federal court. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1964). In Donovan, the Court addressed whether a state court could enjoin a party from prosecuting or appealing an in personam action in federal court or whether a state court could divest a plaintiff's federal right to access to federal courts by contempt proceedings or otherwise. The court reasoned:
[P]laintiffs in the second suit chose to file that case in the federal court. They had a right to do this, a right which is theirs by reason of congressional enactments passed pursuant to congressional policy. And whether or not a plea of res judicata in the second suit would be good is a question for the federal court to decide. While Congress has seen fit to authorize courts of the United States to restrain state-court proceedings in some special circumstances, it has in no way relaxed the old and well-established judicially declared rule that state courts are completely without power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions like the one here. And it does not matter that the prohibition here was addressed to the parties rather than to the federal court itself.
Id.; see also Gen. Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 12 (1977) (holding that state courts are without power to bar litigants from filing and prosecuting in personam actions in the federal courts).
As applied to the facts of this case, the court concludes that the state court's ruling requiring the instant case to be re-filed in Sedgwick County District Court is not valid. Although the state judge's approach to the issue of refiling was understandable in light of the circumstances of the case, the court nevertheless finds that the state court's order violates plaintiff's right to choose to prosecute his action in a federal court. Pursuant to Donovan, the state court is without power to restrain plaintiff from filing and prosecuting his action in this court. Accordingly, the state court's ruling is not entitled to full faith and credit.
Moreover, the state court's ruling is not considered a final order. Brower v. Bartal, 268 Kan. 43, 45, 990 P.2d 1235, 1236-37 (1999) (citing Hodge v. Hodge, 190 Kan. 492, 493, 376 P.2d 822, 822 (1962). In Brower, the Kansas Supreme Court held that a Sedgwick County District Court journal entry granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss a party, subject to certain conditions, was not a final order. The state court's ruling is, therefore, not a final order. For this additional reason, the court finds that the state court's ruling is not entitled to full faith and credit. Defendant Christensen's motion to dismiss is denied.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Christensen's motion to dismiss (Doc. 11) is denied.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff Anthony Molina brings this action requesting injunctive and declaratory relief against defendants Ben Christensen, Brent Kemnitz, and George Stephenson. This matter is before the court on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 21).
I. Background Facts
The pertinent facts are not in dispute. Plaintiff was a student at the University of Evansville, Evansville, Indiana and a member of its intercollegiate baseball team. On April 23, 1999, plaintiff participated in a regularly scheduled game between the University of Evansville and Wichita State University. While plaintiff was warming up to be the lead-off batter, he was struck with a baseball thrown by defendant Christensen who was, at the time, throwing warm-up pitches.
Plaintiff initially brought suit against Ben Christensen and Wichita State University in the District Court of Sedgwick County, Kansas. Plaintiff's claims against Wichita State University for negligence were based upon the actions of it employees Kemnitz and Stephenson. Defendant Kemnitz was the pitching coach, and defendant Stephenson was the head coach, for the Wichita State University baseball team.
On Wichita State University's motion for summary judgment, the state court ruled that Wichita State University was immune from liability pursuant to Kan. Stat. Ann § 75-6104(o). Plaintiff has appealed that judgment to the Kansas Court of Appeals.
At the time the instant motion was filed, the Kansas Court of Appeals had yet to render a decision.
Plaintiff then moved to dismiss without prejudice the remaining case against defendant Christensen. Attached to plaintiff's motion to dismiss was an affidavit, which stated that plaintiff was surprised by the summary judgment ruling and that he wished to resolve questions about the case, re-evaluate the case, and explore his options before going forward with trial, then scheduled only weeks away. The state court ruled that plaintiff would be allowed to dismiss without prejudice, but further ordered, "(2) Any subsequent action commenced by the plaintiff against this defendant arising out of this incident shall only be filed in Sedgwick County District Court."
Plaintiff has now brought suit in this court, naming Christensen, Kemnitz, and Stephenson as defendants. The facts alleged by plaintiff are exactly the same as those facts alleged in the state court action. Plaintiff requests that this court enjoin defendants from utilizing the state courts of Kansas in any manner that would seek to punish plaintiff for pursuing his cause of action in federal court or that would seek any form of dismissal or other order that would deprive plaintiff of his cause of action in federal court. Plaintiff also seeks declaratory relief, requesting the court to declare that it has jurisdiction over plaintiff's action, that plaintiff has a right to pursue this cause of action in federal court, that item (2) of the state court's order of dismissal is of no force and effect in this court, and that the state court cannot take away plaintiff's right to bring this cause of action in federal court. Finally, plaintiff seeks the right to file a proposed complaint, alleging that defendants Christensen, Kemnitz and Stephenson were negligent and that plaintiff was damaged as a result thereof.
II. Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party demonstrates that there is "no genuine issue as to any material fact"and that it is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, the court views the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670 (10th Cir. 1998) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986)). A fact is "material" if, under the applicable substantive law, it is "essential to the proper disposition of the claim." Id. (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). An issue of fact is "genuine" if "there is sufficient evidence on each side so that a rational trier of fact could resolve the issue either way." Id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact and entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Id. at 670-71. In attempting to meet that standard, a movant that does not bear the ultimate burden of persuasion at trial need not negate the other party's claim; rather, the movant need simply point out to the court a lack of evidence for the other party on an essential element of that party's claim. Id. at 671 (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986)).
Once the movant has met this initial burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256; see Adler, 144 F.3d at 671 n. 1 (concerning shifting burdens on summary judgment). The nonmoving party may not simply rest upon its pleadings to satisfy its burden. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 256. Rather, the nonmoving party must "set forth specific facts that would be admissible in evidence in the event of trial from which a rational trier of fact could find for the nonmovant." Adler, 144 F.3d at 671. "To accomplish this, the facts must be identified by reference to affidavits, deposition transcripts, or specific exhibits incorporated therein." Id.
Finally, the court notes that summary judgment is not a "disfavored procedural shortcut;" rather, it is an important procedure "designed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 1).
III. Discussion
Plaintiff seeks summary judgment against defendants on his request for injunctive and declaratory relief regarding the state court's ruling that any subsequent action commenced by plaintiff be filed in Sedgwick County District Court. Specifically, plaintiff requests that this court enjoin defendants from proceeding against plaintiff in the state courts to seek involuntary dismissal or contempt or otherwise prejudice plaintiff's right to proceed in federal court. Plaintiff also requests that this court declare that plaintiff has the right to utilize this federal court for purposes of pursuing his diversity action against these defendants. Defendant argues that plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment because this court must abstain from deciding the enforceability of the state court's ruling and because the state court's ruling is entitled to full faith and credit.
A. Abstention
Defendants argue that summary judgment is inappropriate because, they contend, this court should abstain from deciding whether the state court's order is enforceable. In support, defendants rely on the Younger abstention doctrine.
"The Younger doctrine, which counsels federal court abstention when there is a pending state proceeding, reflects a strong policy against federal intervention in state judicial processes in the absence of great and immediate irreparable injury to the federal plaintiff." Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 423 (1979). The prerequisites for Younger abstention are: (1) interference with an ongoing state judicial proceeding; (2) the presence of an important state interest; and (3) an adequate opportunity to raise federal claims in the state proceedings. Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. Okla., 874 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1989). If these elements are satisfied, Younger abstention is mandatory absent extraordinary circumstances. Id.
Because the state court case was dismissed, the litigation cannot be "ongoing." However, defendants contends that, despite the fact that the case has been dismissed, the state court proceeding is ongoing because plaintiff has not yet exhausted all of his remedies. Defendants cite Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 608, which stated that "we believe that a necessary concomitant of Younger is that a party in appellee's posture must exhaust his state appellate remedies before seeking relief in the District Court." Defendant points out that plaintiff did not appeal the state court's order of dismissal and argues that plaintiff's remedy is, therefore, to re-file his suit in Sedgwick County District Court.
The court notes that Huffman requires a party to "exhaust his state appellate remedies" first. Id. (emphasis added). Under Kansas law, plaintiff in this case could not have appealed the state court's ruling. In Brower v. Bartal, 268 Kan. 43, 45, 990 P.2d 1235, 1236-37 (1999), the Kansas Supreme Court held that a Sedgwick County District Court journal entry granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss a party, subject to certain conditions, was not appealable.
The court finds that, because plaintiff could not have appealed the state court's order, there were no appellate remedies available for plaintiff to exhaust. Thus, the requirement set forth in Huffman has been satisfied. Accordingly, the court holds that there is no ongoing state judicial proceeding against these defendants which would require abstention.
B. Full Faith and Credit
Defendants contend that the state court's ruling is entitled to full faith and credit and should, therefore, be given preclusive effect. The Full Faith and Credit Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738, requires a federal court to give the same preclusive effect to a state court judgment that the judgment would be given in the courts of the state in which the judgment was rendered. Jarrett v. Gramling, 841 F.2d 354, 356 (10th Cir. 1988). However, the Full Faith and Credit Act makes only valid judgments enforceable. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 (1977). Moreover, any such judgments must be final and on the merits. Jarrett v. Gramling, 841 F.2d 354, 357 (10th Cir. 1988).
The issue thus becomes whether the state court's ruling is valid as applied to this federal lawsuit. The Supreme Court has held that state courts are without power to take away a plaintiff's right to file a case in federal court. Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1964). In Donovan, the Court addressed whether a state court could enjoin a party from prosecuting or appealing an in personam action in federal court or whether a state court could divest a plaintiff's federal right to access to federal courts by contempt proceedings or otherwise. The court reasoned:
[P]laintiffs in the second suit chose to file that case in the federal court. They had a right to do this, a right which is theirs by reason of congressional enactments passed pursuant to congressional policy. And whether or not a plea of res judicata in the second suit would be good is a question for the federal court to decide. While Congress has seen fit to authorize courts of the United States to restrain state-court proceedings in some special circumstances, it has in no way relaxed the old and well-established judicially declared rule that state courts are completely without power to restrain federal-court proceedings in in personam actions like the one here. And it does not matter that the prohibition here was addressed to the parties rather than to the federal court itself.
Id.; see also Gen. Atomic Co. v. Felter, 434 U.S. 12, 12 (1977) (holding that state courts are without power to bar litigants from filing and prosecuting in personam actions in the federal courts).
As applied to the facts of this case, the court concludes that the state court's ruling requiring the instant case to be re-filed in Sedgwick County District Court is not valid. Although the state judge's approach to the issue of refiling was understandable in light of the circumstances of the case, the court nevertheless finds that the state court's order violates plaintiff's right to choose to prosecute his action in a federal court. Pursuant to Donovan, the state court is without power to restrain plaintiff from filing and prosecuting his action in this court. Accordingly, the state court's ruling is not entitled to full faith and credit.
IV. Conclusion
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (Doc. 21) is granted. Accordingly, the court hereby:
1) Declares that plaintiff has a right to utilize this federal court for purposes of pursuing his diversity action against defendants Christensen, Kemnitz, and Stephenson, and
2) Enjoins defendants Christensen, Kemnitz, and Stephenson from proceeding against plaintiff in the state courts to seek involuntary dismissal or contempt based on plaintiff's filing of his cause of action in this federal court.