Opinion
No. 09-08-00260-CV
Submitted on October 9, 2008.
Opinion Delivered January 15, 2009.
On Appeal from the 163rd District Court Orange County, Texas, Trial Cause No. B-070299-C.
Before McKEITHEN, C.J., KREGER and HORTON, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiffs-appellees Andy Fred Harvey, Sr., individually and as personal representative of the estate of Alberta Lavon Harvey, deceased; and Evelyn Block, Judy Erway, Edward Russell Harvey, Sr., Albert Leon Harvey and James E. Harvey, sued defendants-appellants Ramin Moheb, M.D. ("Moheb") and Ramin Moheb, M.D., P.A. d/b/a Greater Orange Women's Center ("GOWC") and other defendants for alleged medical malpractice. Appellants filed objections to appellees' expert report and moved for dismissal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351( l) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Appellees filed a supplemental report by the same expert. The trial court denied appellants' motion to dismiss. Appellants then filed this interlocutory appeal, in which they raise four issues for our consideration. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(9) (Vernon 2008). We affirm.
For clarity, when it is necessary to refer to individual appellees, we will refer to them by their first names.
Background
In their petition, appellees alleged that on or about June 22, 2005, the deceased, Alberta Lavon Harvey, sought treatment from appellant Moheb at GOWC for "pain and swelling in her left vulvar area." Appellees further asserted that Moheb took a culture of the affected tissue, cauterized the area, and prescribed Augmentin. According to appellees, Andy informed Moheb the next day that the area had worsened, and Moheb advised him to take Alberta to the hospital. Appellees contended that Alberta was admitted that day to Memorial Hermann Baptist Hospital in Orange by Dr. Marshall B. Packard, who started treatment with the antibiotic Invanz, but Alberta did not significantly improve. Appellees asserted that Alberta was transferred to Continue Care Hospital of Southeast Texas on June 26, 2005, and the culture Moheb had taken "was determined to show Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA)." According to appellees' petition, Alberta's condition continued to deteriorate, and on July 10, 2005, she was transferred to Memorial Hermann Baptist Hospital-Orange "in shock with hypotension, acidosis, renal[,] and respiratory failure." The petition further alleged as follows:
Exploratory surgery was performed on July 12, 2005 for possibly peritonitis and gangrenous bowel. She continued to worsen and was transferred to Memorial Hermann Baptist Hospital-Beaumont on July 13, 2005 to begin dialysis. On July 23, 2005, Mrs. Harvey's condition of Multiple Organ Failure Syndrome and Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome worsened. She declined into a coma and died later that same day from [s]epsis and abdominal/pelvic infection.
The petition alleged that Moheb was negligent by improperly diagnosing Alberta with cellulitis, failing to timely follow up on the culture he performed, failing to properly diagnose Alberta's condition, failing to prescribe "sufficient proper antibiotics to combat the infection[,]" and failing to control Alberta's infection. Appellees also contended in their petition that appellants, "either individually, or through their agents, servants[,] or employees, failed to exercise the care required by law in the medical care and treatment of Alberta Lavon Harvey. The inappropriate care provided to Alberta Lavon Harvey was a proximate cause of severe personal injuries to her and ultimately caused her death." Appellees filed an expert report by Dr. Carl M. Berkowitz, a specialist in internal medicine and infectious diseases, with their petition. Moheb and GOWC filed objections to Berkowitz's report, in which they argued that: (1) Berkowitz was not qualified to offer an opinion as to liability and causation as to each defendant; and (2) Berkowitz's report failed to meet the requirements of Chapter 74 and Palacios for the following reasons:
it fails to identify the defendants by name; fails to identify duty, standard of care, breach thereof, and causation as to each defendant; fails to provide a factual basis for his opinions and link his conclusions to the facts of the case; fails to inform each of the defendants with sufficient specificity of the defendant's conduct the plaintiffs have called into question; fails to discuss the elements of medical negligence as to each defendant with sufficient specificity to provide the trial court with a basis to conclude that the claims have merit against each defendant; and the opinions are speculative, conclusory, vague, and assume facts.
After receiving appellants' objections to the report, appellees filed a supplemental report by Berkowitz within the 120-day deadline provided by Chapter 74. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Berkowitz's second report alleged as follows, in pertinent part:
Although Berkowitz called his second report a "supplement," it includes the full text of his original report, as well as additional material.
History
At the time of the events in question Ms. Alberta Harvey was a 67 year old woman with a history of diabetes mellitus, hypothyroidism, cerebral vascular disease[,] and hypertension. On 6/22/05 she presented to the Greater Orange Women's [C]enter complaining of a painful area of swelling in her left vulvar area. She was seen by Dr. Ramin Moheb. She was felt by Dr. Moheb to have an area suspicious for an abscess in the left labia majora. An attempt at incision and drainage was performed, but no fluid was obtained. A culture of the tissue was taken. The area was cauterized and Ms. Harvey was dismissed on Augmentin. According to the laboratory report . . ., the culture report was finalized as having MRSA on 6/26/05. I can not be certain as to when Dr. Moheb became aware of the culture because, while the report was found in his medical records, it was not initialed, nor is there any mention of it in his records. Dr. Moheb dictated a report on 6/28/05 to [another physician] about the evaluation [of] Ms. Harvey. It makes no mention of the labial culture or the culture result.
On 6/23/05 the patient's husband called stating that the area of cellulitis had worsened. Laboratory data from the previous day revealed an elevated white blood cell count (WBC) of 15.1. The patient was advised to go to the emergency room to be seen by her internist.
Ms. Harvey was admitted to Memorial Hermann Baptist Hospital on 6/23/05 by Dr. Marshall Packard. She was found to have a swollen tender erythematous left labia. She had an elevated WBC of 17.2. She was given the antibiotic Invanz intravenously. . . . Although Ms. Harvey showed a normalization of her WBC, her labial process showed no significant improvement. She continued to have considerable pain. On 6/26/05 she was transferred to Continue Care [H]ospital of Southeast Texas for ongoing antibiotic therapy with Invanz and wound care.
At Continue Care the patient was continued on Invanz. The labial area remained erythematous and tender. . . . On 6/28/0[5] Dr. Packard became aware of the MRSA culture from the office of Dr. Moheb. The Invanz was discontinued, and Vancomycin and Clindamycin were started. . . . On 6/30/05 the patient was confused. Her labial lesion was minimally improved. . . . On 7/5/0[5] the patient had 2 bowel movements. The nurses reported her to be confused, short of breath[,] and trying to get out of bed. Her abdomen was noted to be large and distended. . . . On 7/8/05 the patient was documented to have complained of diarrhea. Her labial lesion was unchanged. The Vancomycin and Clindamycin were discontinued, and the antibiotics Cubicin and Fluconazole were started. A stool sample was sent for clostridium difficile toxin and on 7/8/05 it was reported as being positive. . . . She was felt to have sepsis and acute renal insufficiency. . . . A CT scan showed marked mucosal thickening of the colon suggesting colitis.
Ms. Harvey was admitted to Memorial Hermann Baptist Hospital-Orange on 7/10/05. She was continued on Cubicin and Fluconazole. She was in shock with hypotension, acidosis, renal and respiratory failure. She was diagnosed with the Multiple Organ Failure Syndrome (MOFS) caused by a severe inflammatory colitis. . . . Intravenous Flagyl was added. . . . She was seen by [another physician] in surgical consultation. He felt that she had shock due to left colon pathology. . . . [The other physician] felt the patient was more stable, and that given signs suggesting peritonitis, and the possibility of gangrenous bowel, surgical exploration of her abdomen should be performed.
Ms. Harvey was taken to surgery on 7/12/05. She was found to have an acute surgical abdomen with peritonitis and colonic exudates secondary to transcolonic inflammation from severe colitis. . . .
Post-operatively Ms. Harvey continued to do poorly. She was given intravenous Vancomycin. Her acidosis worsened as did her blood pressure. She became oliguric and was felt to need dialysis. For these reasons she was transferred to Memorial Hermann Baptist Hospital-Beaumont on 7/13/05.
While at Memorial Hermann Baptist Hospital-Beaumont, Ms. Harvey was treated aggressively. . . . By 7/17/0[5] she was felt to be hemodynamically stable, but still in a septic state. On 7/17/0[5] she developed a fever, the etiology of which was unclear. She was noted to begin making urine and dialysis was discontinued. Her overall status was felt to be improved. . . .
On 7/22/05 dialysis was reinstituted due to recurrent electrolyte abnormalities. The patient was noted to have an increasing WBC count. On 7/23/05 Ms. Harvey was felt to be worsening, with the need for increasing oxygen, decreasing urine output, respiratory failure. She was felt to have worsening MOFS with the Adult Respiratory Distress Syndrome (ARDS). Her mental status declined into a deep coma and at 1908 she expired.
Standards of Care
It is well established that MRSA is an increasingly common cause of soft tissue infections in the United States. This organism has a propensity to cause infections in the labial and gluteal areas. This organism is resistant to the antibiotics used to treat cellulitis, which is more often caused by more sensitive staphylococcal and streptococcal organisms. The presentation of an indurated, erythematous, tender circumscribed lesion in the labia should have immediately suggested the possibility of MRSA. In this setting the standard of care was to suspect this organism and treat the patient with an appropriate antibiotic. Dr. Moheb should have started an antibiotic regimen that would have treated MRSA as well as other likely pathogens. The presentation was so typical of MRSA, that the standard of care required Dr. Moheb to start treatment with an appropriate antibiotic. This antibiotic could have been given orally. Alternately, in a diabetic patient the argument could be made that hospitalization and initiation of intravenous antibiotic was appropriate until such time as it was clear that the infection was improving.
. . . Neither Augmentin nor Invanz have [sic] efficacy against MRSA and were not appropriate antibiotic choices.
When culture data is obtained, it is the standard of care to follow-up on that data. This ensures that the patient is treated with an appropriate antibiotic. It also ensures that the patient is not exposed to an ineffective antibiotic. In the latter case one is exposing the patient to the risks of antibiotic side effects without any benefit. When a physician has obtained cultures in the office setting, it is the standard of care to be certain that any consultant helping treat the infection be [apprised] of the results. Thus, the standard of care required that Dr. Moheb inform Dr. Packard as soon as the MRSA culture returned.
When treating any patient for an infection, one should closely follow the patient's clinical response. In the case of Ms. Harvey, it was clear that she was not improving. The standard of care would have necessitated Dr. Moheb and Dr. Packard entertaining an alternate diagnosis or an alternate infectious agent, resulting in changing the antibiotic.
. . . .
Violations of the Standards of Care
Upon initially evaluating Ms. Alberta Harvey, Dr. Moheb made the diagnosis of cellulitis, despite the clinical picture being incompatible with cellulitis. He did not consider MRSA nor did he treat the patient for this possibility. This was a violation of the standard of care by Dr. Moheb.
. . . .
Dr. Moheb did not follow up on the culture he did in his office in a timely fashion. Because of this the initiation of appropriate therapy was delayed for at least 48 hours. This was a violation of the standard of care by Dr. Moheb.
From the time Ms. Harvey was admitted . . . on 6/23/05 until the Vancomycin was initiated on 6/28/05 her labial lesion showed little, if any, improvement. Despite this, consideration of alternate diagnoses was not reflected in the chart. No antibiotic changes were made. This reflected a breach of the standard of care by both Dr. Moheb and Dr. Packard.
. . . .
Causation
Ms. Harvey died as a result of severe MOFS resulting from severe Clostridium difficile induced colitis. Inappropriate antibiotic treatment of her original labial abscess led to the Clostridium difficile infection. Failure to timely recognize the clostridium difficile infection as well as inappropriate evaluation, diagnosis[,] and treatment of the complications of the Clostridium difficile infection led to the development of severe MOFS with respiratory, renal and metabolic and hemodynamic derangements ultimately causing her demise.
By treating the original labial infection of Ms. Alberta Harvey with inappropriate antibiotics, the labial infection was allowed to progress. This prompted the initiation of more potent and broader spectrum antibiotic therapy. These antibiotics were equally ineffective. Exposing Ms. Harvey to these unnecessary and ineffective antibiotics put her at risk for becoming colonized with Clostridium difficile. Ultimately she did become colonized and infected with Clostridium difficile, which was a proximate cause of her death. Thus[,] inappropriate evaluation and treatment of the original labial lesion by Dr. Moheb and Dr. Packard was a proximate cause of the death of Ms. Harvey.
Had Dr. Moheb started appropriate treatment in his office it is probable that the labial infection would have been improved or stabilized. Had she been admitted to the hospital and started on intravenous antibiotics, the infection would never have progressed as far as it did. This would have lessened her time in the hospital, decreased her exposure to antibiotics, and in medical probability prevented the Clostridium difficile colitis.
After appellees filed Berkowitz's supplemental report, appellants filed a motion to dismiss. The trial court entered an order overruling appellants' objections to Berkowitz's reports and denying their motion to dismiss, and appellants filed this appeal.
Issue One
In their first issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred by determining that appellees' expert is qualified to render liability and causation opinions under Chapter 74. Specifically, appellants assert that since an expert must have training in the specific medical care services the defendant was providing to the patient, Berkowitz may not opine concerning the care provided by Moheb because Berkowitz is an infectious disease specialist rather than a gynecologist.
Appellants' brief also discusses a report by a registered nurse, Sheri Innerarity, regarding alleged breaches of the standard of care during the course of the nursing care provided to Alberta; however, appellees do not discuss Innerarity's report in their brief. Therefore, we presume that the appellees intend to rely solely on Berkowitz's report to support the trial court's judgment, and we will not address Innerarity's report.
With respect to his qualifications, Berkowitz's report provided as follows, in pertinent part:
I am a board certified specialist in Internal Medicine and Infectious Diseases. . . .
I am frequently called upon to treat patients with Methicillin Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (MRSA) infection. This bacterium can infect a number of sites of the adult body. Specialists in Infectious Diseases, such as me, are called upon to evaluate and treat infections in all of these sites. The labia are not uncommon areas of involvement. As such I am quite familiar with the evaluation and treatment of labial MRSA lesions. I do not believe that the standard of care for treating such lesions differs substantively between an Obstetrician/Gynecologist and an Infectious Diseases specialist.
I am knowledgeable as to the evaluation, treatment[,] and natural history of patients with Clostridium difficile induced colitis. I am also knowledgeable as to the causes and treatment of Multiple Organ Failure Syndrome (MOFS) as well as its prognosis in patients. I am frequently consulted . . . to care for patients with these illnesses.
A person who offers an opinion concerning a breach of the standard of care in a healthcare liability claim must qualify as an expert under section 74.401 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 74.401 (Vernon 2005). To offer an opinion regarding whether a physician departed from accepted standards of care, a person must be a physician who:
(1) is practicing medicine at the time such testimony is given or was practicing medicine at the time the claim arose;
(2) has knowledge of accepted standards of medical care for the diagnosis, care, or treatment of the illness, injury, or condition involved in the claim; and
(3) is qualified on the basis of training or experience to offer an expert opinion regarding those accepted standards of medical care.
Id. § 74.401(a)(1)-(3) (emphasis added). Section 74.401(c) provides as follows:
(c) In determining whether a witness is qualified on the basis of training or experience, the court shall consider whether, at the time the claim arose or at the time the testimony is given, the witness:
(1) is board certified or has other substantial training or experience in an area of medical practice relevant to the claim; and
(2) is actively practicing medicine in rendering medical care services relevant to the claim.
Id. § 74.401(c) (emphasis added).
A physician need not be a practitioner in the same specialty as a defendant to qualify as an expert. See Broders v. Heise, 924 S.W.2d 148, 153 (Tex. 1996). The plain language of section 74.401 "focuses not on the defendant doctor's area of expertise, but on the condition involved in the claim." Blan v. Ali, 7 S.W.3d 741, 746 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.); see also McKowen v. Ragston, 263 S.W.3d 157, 162 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). Therefore, an expert is not required to "be able to articulate the standard of care applicable to a specialty other than his own." McKowen, 263 S.W.3d at 162 (citing Blan, 7 S.W.3d at 746-47 n. 3). "Under the Rules of Evidence, the test is whether the offering party has established that the expert has knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education on the specific issue before the court." Reddy v. Seale, No. 09-07-372 CV, 2007 WL 5011608, at *3 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Mar. 20, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.). In Broders, the Supreme Court cited with approval Nunley v. Kloehn, in which the district court held that "[t]he focus . . . is on the `fit' between the subject matter at issue and the expert's familiarity therewith, and not on a comparison of the expert's title or specialty with that of the defendant." Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153 (citing Nunley v. Kloehn, 888 F.Supp. 1483, 1488 (E.D. Wis. 1995)).
In their brief, appellants argue that "[t]he treatment or medical care services at issue . . . is the evaluation of a patient presenting with suspected cellulitis, vulvular abscess[,] or some other labial process in a gynecological setting[,]" yet "Dr. Berkowitz neither practices nor specializes in gynecology." Appellants also argue that McKowen is distinguishable because, in that case, the physician continued to provide treatment to the patient, whereas Moheb did not.
Berkowitz's second report states that he is a board-certified specialist in internal medicine and infectious diseases, is engaged in the full-time practice of infectious diseases, and is frequently called upon to treat patients with MRSA. Berkowitz's curriculum vitae indicates that he has served as medical director of San Antonio Infectious Diseases Consultants Infusion Center since 1997, and that he has been a partner at San Antonio Infectious Diseases Consultants since 1993. Berkowitz also states in the report that the labia are not an uncommon area for MRSA infections. In addition, Berkowitz asserts that the standard of care for treating labial MRSA lesions does not differ substantively between a gynecologist and a specialist in infectious diseases. Berkowitz explains in his report that Alberta's "presentation was so typical of MRSA[] that the standard of care required Dr. Moheb to start treatment with an appropriate antibiotic[,]" and that Augmentin is not an effective antibiotic against MRSA. Furthermore, Berkowitz opines in the report that Moheb violated the standard of care by initially diagnosing Alberta with cellulitis "despite the clinical picture being incompatible with cellulitis."
Appellees' claim against Moheb clearly involves Moheb's alleged failure to properly diagnose and treat Alberta's MRSA infection during her office visit. Therefore, we find that appellants' proposed distinction between this case and the facts of McKowen to be without merit. We hold that the trial court acted within its discretion in concluding that Dr. Berkowitz's report, when considered as a whole, demonstrated his knowledge of accepted standards for the diagnosis, care and treatment of the condition involved in this suit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 74.401; Broders, 924 S.W.2d at 153; McKowen, 263 S.W.3d at 162; Blan, 7 S.W.3d at 746-47. Accordingly, we overrule issue one.
Issue Two
In their second issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred by denying their objections to Berkowitz's report and their motion to dismiss because the report does not meet the requirements of Chapter 74 and Palacios. We review a trial court's decision regarding the adequacy of an expert report under an abuse of discretion standard. Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 877 (Tex. 2001). "A trial court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner without reference to any guiding rules or principles." Bowie Mem'l Hosp. v. Wright, 79 S.W.3d 48, 52 (Tex. 2002). A trial court also abuses its discretion if it fails to analyze or apply the law correctly. Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 (Tex. 1992).
A plaintiff asserting a healthcare liability claim must provide each defendant physician and healthcare provider with an expert report no later than the 120th day after filing suit. Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a). The statute defines "expert report" as
a written report by an expert that provides a fair summary of the expert's opinions as of the date of the report regarding applicable standards of care, the manner in which the care rendered by the physician or health care provider failed to meet the standards, and the causal relationship between that failure and the injury, harm, or damages claimed.
Id. § 74.351(r)(6) (Vernon Supp. 2008). If a plaintiff furnishes the required report within the time permitted, the defendant may file a motion challenging the report. Id. § 74.351( l).
The statute provides that the trial court "shall grant a motion challenging the adequacy of an expert report only if it appears to the court, after hearing, that the report does not represent an objective good faith effort to comply with the definition of an expert report in Subsection (r)(6)." Id. When determining whether the report represents a good-faith effort to comply with the statutory requirements, the trial court's inquiry is generally limited to the four corners of the report. Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 53; Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 878. To constitute a good-faith effort, the report "must discuss the standard of care, breach, and causation with sufficient specificity to inform the defendant of the conduct the plaintiff has called into question and to provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that the claims have merit." Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 875. When a plaintiff sues more than one defendant, the expert report must set forth the standard of care for each defendant and explain the causal relationship between each defendant's individual acts and the injury. See Doades v. Syed, 94 S.W.3d 664, 671-72 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2002, no pet.); Rittmer v. Garza, 65 S.W.3d 718, 722-23 (Tex.App.-Houston [14h Dist.] 2001, no pet.); see also Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a), (r)(6) (A claimant must provide each defendant with an expert report that sets forth the manner in which the care rendered failed to meet the standards of care and the causal relationship between that failure and the injuries claimed.). A report that omits any of the statutory elements is not a good-faith effort. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 879. However, an expert report need not marshal all of the plaintiff's proof. Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52.
Appellants contend that Berkowitz's report is inadequate because it fails to identify the defendants by name; fails to identify duty, standard of care, breach of duty, and causation as to each defendant; fails to provide a factual basis for Berkowitz's opinions and to link his conclusions to the facts; fails to inform each defendant with sufficient specificity of the conduct the plaintiffs have called into question; fails to discuss the elements of medical negligence as to each defendant with sufficient specificity; and contains opinions that are "speculative, conclusory, vague[,] and assume facts." With respect to Moheb, Berkowitz's report explains that Alberta presented to Moheb with an "indurated, erythematous, tender circumscribed lesion [of] the labia" that "should have immediately suggested the possibility of MRSA[;]" however, Moheb incorrectly diagnosed Alberta's condition as cellulitis despite the clinical indications to the contrary and prescribed an ineffective antibiotic.
We will address the sufficiency of Berkowitz's reports as to GOWC in our discussion of appellants' fourth issue.
In addition, the report explains that Moheb violated the standard of care by failing to consider MRSA as an alternate diagnosis and failed to provide appropriate treatment for MRSA despite the fact that Alberta failed to improve. Furthermore, Berkowitz's report states that Moheb's initial inappropriate evaluation and treatment of Alberta's labial lesion allowed her infection to progress and caused her to be exposed to unnecessary and ineffective antibiotics, leading to the Clostridium difficile which proximately caused her death. According to Berkowitz, if Moheb had started appropriate treatment, Alberta's infection would have improved or stabilized, and if Moheb had admitted Alberta to the hospital and given her intravenous antibiotics, "the infection would never have progressed as far as it did. This would have lessened her time in the hospital, decreased her exposure to antibiotics, and in medical probability prevented the Clostridium difficile colitis."
Berkowitz's report named Moheb individually and discussed how he breached the standard of care. See Doades, 94 S.W.3d at 671-72. In addition, it was within the trial court's discretion to conclude that the report adequately stated the standard of care. See generally Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(r)(6). The report discussed standard of care, breach, and causation with sufficient specificity to inform appellants of the conduct appellees have called into question and to provide a basis for the trial court to conclude that appellees' claims have merit. See Palacios, 46 S.W.3d at 875; Doades, 94 S.W.3d at 671-72; Rittmer, 65 S.W.3d at 722-23. Berkowitz's report explained the factual basis for his statements and linked his conclusions to the facts. See Wright, 79 S.W.3d at 52. Therefore, we overrule issue two.
Issue Three
In their third issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred by considering Berkowitz's supplemental report. According to appellants, because appellees filed Berkowitz's supplemental report after receiving appellants' objections to the first report, the trial court should not have considered the supplemental report. According to appellants, "the Texas Legislature did not intend to allow a plaintiff unlimited opportunities to cure the deficiencies in the expert report up until the 120-day deadline. Such an interpretation of the statute is contrary to the plain language and intent of Chapter 74 and leads to an absurd result."
As previously discussed, appellees filed Berkowitz's supplemental report within the 120-day deadline. See Tex. Civ. Prac. Rem. Code Ann. § 74.351(a). The Supreme Court recently held that when a plaintiff files a supplemental report within the 120-day deadline, but after the defendant has objected to the sufficiency of the report, a trial court does not err by considering the supplemental report. Leland v. Brandal, 257 S.W.3d 204, 205-06 (Tex. 2008). Appellants do not attempt to distinguish Leland; in fact, neither their brief nor their reply brief discusses Leland. We hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering Berkowitz's timely-filed supplemental report. See id. Accordingly, we overrule issue three.
Issue Four
In their fourth issue, appellants argue that the trial court erred by failing to dismiss appellees' claims against GOWC because appellees "failed to provide a Chapter 74 expert report as to [its] alleged negligence." Appellees' petition alleged that Moheb evaluated Alberta at his office at GOWC. Appellees' petition does not explicitly state that appellees' claims against GOWC are based upon respondeat superior; however, it does allege that the entity defendants acted through their agents, servants, or employees. Additionally, the petition asserts that Moheb "practices medicine through" GOWC. Appellees' claims against GOWC necessarily involve only GOWC's vicarious liability for the actions of Moheb, since professional entities cannot practice medicine. See Young v. Pinto, No. 09-08-299 CV, 2008 WL 4998346, at *8 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Nov. 26, 2008, no pet. h.) (mem. op.); Hiner v. Gaspard, No. 09-07-240 CV, 2007 WL 2493471, at *5 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Sept. 6, 2007, pet. denied) (mem. op.); Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Dale, 188 S.W.3d 877, 879 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2006, no pet.); In re CHCA Conroe, L.P., No. 09-04-453 CV, 2004 WL 2671863, at *1 (Tex.App.-Beaumont Nov. 23, 2004) (orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); Clements v. Conard, 21 S.W.3d 514, 522-23 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2000, pet. denied). "When a party's alleged health care liability is purely vicarious, a report that adequately implicates the actions of that party's agents or employees is sufficient." Gardner v. U.S. Imaging, Inc., No. 08-0268, slip op. at 3 (Tex. Dec. 19, 2008) (per curiam). The conduct of GOWC is not measured by a medical standard of care; rather, the basis of its liability involves legal principles. See In re CHCA Conroe, L.P., 2004 WL 2671863, at *1. Therefore, appellees were not required to provide an additional expert report as to GOWC. See id.; see also Hiner, 2007 WL 2493471, at *5. Accordingly, we overrule issue four and affirm the trial court's judgment.
AFFIRMED.