These statutes, however, do not preclude the use of parol evidence to establish a constructive trust. Moe v. Brumfield, 27 Wn.2d 714, 717, 179 P.2d 968 (1947), and case cited; Kausky v. Kosten, 27 Wn.2d 721, 727, 179 P.2d 950 (1947). In the instant case, respondent's complaint contains no allegations of fraud relative to the imminence of a tax sale, nor did respondent, as a witness, testify as to any such fraudulent representation or his reliance thereon.
The statute of frauds does not preclude the use of parol evidence to establish a constructive trust. Dowgialla v. Knevage, 48 Wn.2d 326, 333, 294 P.2d 393 (1956) (citing Moe v. Brumfield, 27 Wn.2d 714, 717, 179 P.2d 968 (1947)). A constructive trust occurs when property is taken in the name of a grantee who did not advance the consideration.
[2] An express trust of real estate may not be established by parol evidence but must be in writing. Zucker v. Mitchell, 62 Wn.2d 819, 384 P.2d 815 (1963); Kausky v. Kosten, 27 Wn.2d 721, 179 P.2d 950 (1947); Moe v. Brumfield, 27 Wn.2d 714, 179 P.2d 968 (1947); Georges v. Loutsis, 20 Wn.2d 92, 145 P.2d 901 (1944); Farrell v. Mentzer, 102 Wn. 629, 174 P. 482 (1918). RCW 19.36.010, 64.04.010 and 64.04.020 preclude establishing an express trust in land by parol evidence. Dowgialla v. Knevage, 48 Wn.2d 326, 294 P.2d 393 (1956).