These statutes, however, do not preclude the use of parol evidence to establish a constructive trust. Moe v. Brumfield, 27 Wn.2d 714, 717, 179 P.2d 968 (1947), and case cited; Kausky v. Kosten, 27 Wn.2d 721, 727, 179 P.2d 950 (1947). In the instant case, respondent's complaint contains no allegations of fraud relative to the imminence of a tax sale, nor did respondent, as a witness, testify as to any such fraudulent representation or his reliance thereon.
The statute of frauds does not preclude the use of parol evidence to establish a constructive trust. Dowgialla v. Knevage, 48 Wn.2d 326, 333, 294 P.2d 393 (1956) (citing Moe v. Brumfield, 27 Wn.2d 714, 717, 179 P.2d 968 (1947)). A constructive trust occurs when property is taken in the name of a grantee who did not advance the consideration.
He apparently concedes the well settled law in this state that an express trust in real property must be in writing and cannot be proved by parol evidence. RCW 19.36.010; RCW 64.04.010, .020; Silhavy v. Doane, 50 Wn.2d 110, 114, 309 P.2d 1047 (1957); Dowgialla v. Knevage, 48 Wn.2d 326, 335, 294 P.2d 393 (1956); Moe v. Brumfield, 27 Wn.2d 714, 721, 179 P.2d 968 (1947); Diel v. Beekman, 7 Wn. App. 139, 143, 499 P.2d 37, review denied, 81 Wn.2d 1007 (1972). He argues nonetheless that the statute of frauds either is inapplicable or has been fully satisfied because: (1) Valene as a third party to the trust agreement had no standing to raise the statute of frauds defense, Lamereaux v. Pague, 9 Wn. App. 640, 513 P.2d 1053 (1973); (2) the agreement was fully performed when the property was conveyed by Loren back to Marvin; (3) there is a sufficient memorandum to satisfy the statute of frauds (the deed from Loren to Marvin), Knight v. American Nat'l Bank, 52 Wn. App. 1, 4, 756 P.2d 757, review denied, 111 Sn.2d 1027 (1988); and finally (4) the statute of frauds was fully satisfied by admissions of the parties of the existence of the trust in open court, Powers v. Hastings, 20 Wn. App. 837, 842, 582 P.2d 897 (1978), aff'd, 93 Wn.2d 709, 612 P.2d 371 (1980).
[2] An express trust of real estate may not be established by parol evidence but must be in writing. Zucker v. Mitchell, 62 Wn.2d 819, 384 P.2d 815 (1963); Kausky v. Kosten, 27 Wn.2d 721, 179 P.2d 950 (1947); Moe v. Brumfield, 27 Wn.2d 714, 179 P.2d 968 (1947); Georges v. Loutsis, 20 Wn.2d 92, 145 P.2d 901 (1944); Farrell v. Mentzer, 102 Wn. 629, 174 P. 482 (1918). RCW 19.36.010, 64.04.010 and 64.04.020 preclude establishing an express trust in land by parol evidence. Dowgialla v. Knevage, 48 Wn.2d 326, 294 P.2d 393 (1956).