Quite obviously the facts as found are not exactly as the plaintiff wished, but we find there was substantial evidence upon which the trial court based its findings, and they must therefore control. Libby v. De Baca, 51 N.M. 95, 179 P.2d 263; Mobley v. Garcia, 54 N.M. 175, 217 P.2d 256; Mobley v. Garcia, 54 N.M. 175, 217 P.2d 256, 19 A.L.R. 2d 553; Gibbs v. Whelan, 56 N.M. 38, 239 P.2d 727; Edwards v. Peterson, 61 N.M. 104, 295 P.2d 858. This leaves for the determination of this court the question as to whether or not the trial court's conclusions based upon the findings of fact are proper. There are literally thousands of cases involving injuries to children, many of which differ only slightly as to the factual situation.

And it is in keeping with the "legal and policy underpinnings of New Mexico courts' approach to the collateral source rule." Pipkins, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 1261 (citing Mobley v. Garcia, 54 N.M. 175, 217 P.2d 256, 257 (1950), which stated that "[t]he right of redress for wrong is fundamental. Charity cannot be made a substitute for such right, nor can benevolence be made a set-off against the acts of a tortfeasor.").

Moreover, so long as it is credible and truthful, a plaintiff's own testimony may suffice in proving her claim of lost earning capacity. Finnie, 620 So.2d at 901; see also Mobley v. Garcia, 217 P.2d 256 (N.M. 1950) (affirming award of loss-of-earning-capacity damages on the basis of plaintiff's own trial testimony). In the instant case, the Court concludes that the best indicator or predictor of Plaintiff's lost earning capacity is the amount of work she did, and the income she received, as a fitness trainer during the first half of 2002.

Although New Mexico courts have not addressed the collateral source rule's application to the gratuitous provision of medical services, the legal and policy underpinnings of New Mexico courts' approach to the collateral source rule strongly suggest that New Mexico would apply the collateral source rule to the gratuitous provision of medical services. In Mobley v. Garcia, 217 P.2d 256, 257 (N.M. 1950), the New Mexico Supreme Court stated: "The right of redress for wrong is fundamental. Charity cannot be made a substitute for such right, nor can benevolence be made a set-off against the acts of a tortfeasor.

Charity cannot be made a substitute for such right, nor can benevolence be made a set-off against the acts of a tort-feasor." Mobley v. Garcia, 54 N.M. 175, 177, 217 P.2d 256, 257 (1950); see also Martinez v. Knowlton, 88 N.M. 42, 44, 536 P.2d 1098, 1100 (Ct. App. 1975) ("[A] tort-feasor should not get the benefit of the contract between the [victim and a third party]."). Additionally, knowing that they have some likelihood of being reimbursed may make third parties more likely to help victims during the time before they are able to collect from the defendant.

Charity cannot be made a substitute for such right, nor can benevolence be made a set-off against the acts of a tort-feasor.” Mobley v. Garcia, 54 N.M. 175, 177, 217 P.2d 256, 257 (1950); see also Martinez v. Knowlton, 88 N.M. 42, 44, 536 P.2d 1098, 1100 (Ct.App.1975) (“[A] tort-feasor should not get the benefit of the contract between the [victim and a third party].”). Additionally, knowing that they have some likelihood of being reimbursed may make third parties more likely to help victims during the time before they are able to collect from the defendant.

Public assistance and social security constitute benefits from a collateral source, and they are not subject to offset from an award of damages. See Trujillo v. Chavez, 76 N.M. 703, 708, 417 P.2d 893, 897 (1966); Mobley v. Garcia, 54 N.M. 175, 177-78, 217 P.2d 256, 257 (1950); see also Maxfield v. Sinclair Int'l, 766 F.2d 788, 793-95 (3d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1057, 106 S.Ct. 796, 88 L.Ed.2d 773 (1986); Littlejohn v. Null Mfg. Co., 31 Empl.Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 33,587 (W.D.N.C. 1983), aff'd, 732 F.2d 150 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 900, 105 S.Ct. 276, 83 L.Ed.2d 212 (1984). Public sources that provide subsistence income do not constitute a windfall such that they should be offset against a damage award, especially when considered in light of the discriminatory activities of FDC that forced Smith and his family onto the public dole.

ground that the verdictwas not responsive to the evidence: 234 S.C. 583 (589-591), 109 S.E.2d 572. As to error for the Court to charge thejury on punitive damages when the evidence showed nowillful or reckless breach of contract nor willful or recklesstortious acts on the part of the Appellant: Sec. 10-1210, 1962 Code of Laws for South Carolina. As to the Court's beingin error in refusing to charge the jury concerning the lapseof time from the work performed to the incident sued on, asrequested by Appellant's attorney: 2 R.C.L. 76 (Sec. 53-Appeal and Error); 231 S.C. 243 (248-249), 98 S.E.2d 255. Messrs. C. Ben Bowen and George F. Townes, of Abrams,Bowen and Townes, Greenville, for Respondent, cite: As tothe Court's properly denying the Appellant's motion for anew trial: 22 Am. Jur.2d 286, Damages, Sec. 206; 7 A.L.R. 3d 522, Sec. 3 (b); 165 S.C. 15, 162 S.E. 574, 575, 81 A.L.R. 313; 226 S.C. 249, 84 S.E.2d 719; 231 S.C. 28, 97 S.E.2d 73; 250 S.C. 149, 156 S.E.2d 759; 19 A.L.R.2d 558; 54 N.M. 175, 217 P.2d 256, 19 A.L.R.2d 553; 188 F. Supp. 384; 254 Wis. 233, 35 N.W.2d 920; 405 Pa. 355, 175 A.2d 530; 296 N.W. 541; 25 C.J.S., Damages, Sec. 99 (pp. 1011-1020); 165 S.C. 15, 162 S.E. 574; 226 S.C. 249, 84 S.E.2d 719; 250 S.C. 149, 156 S.E.2d 759; 231 S.C. 28, 97 S.E.2d 73. As to the Court'sproperly charging the jury on punitive damages: 250 S.C. 143, 156 S.E.2d 638; 229 S.C. 230, 92 S.E.2d 647; 199 S.C. 132, 18 S.E.2d 675; West's South Carolina Digest, Appeal and Error, Key Numbers 169-179 (3 S.C. D. 331-339 and Suppl. pp. 42-45). January 12, 1972.

Martin v. Sheffield, 112 Utah 478, 189 P.2d 127; and see 52 A.L.R.2d 1451. Compare Mobley v. Garcia, 54 N.M. 175, 217 P.2d 256, 19 A.L.R.2d 553, and Baros v. Kazmierczwk, 68 N.M. 421, 362 P.2d 798. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial.

Accordingly, if it appears from the evidence that a person has a continuing disability resulting from the injury which has resulted in and will continue to result in loss of earnings, and there is proof of his age, occupation, rate of pay when working, and previous condition of health, there is sufficient to go to the jury even without proof of his earnings of any given period. Turrietta v. Wyche, 54 N.M. 5, 212 P.2d 1041, 15 A.L.R.2d 407; Mobley v. Garcia, 54 N.M. 175, 217 P.2d 256, 19 A.L.R.2d 553; Jackson v. Southwestern Public Service Co., 66 N.M. 458, 349 P.2d 1029. The question of whether or not it was error to permit the jury to include in any award an amount for future medical expenses when there has been no estimate whatsoever in the evidence as to what this amounts to presents a more difficult problem.