(citations omitted)); Providence Washington Ins. Co. v. Stanley, 403 F.2d 844, 850 n. 6 (5th Cir. 1968) ("Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right."); and City of Montgomery v. Weldon, 280 Ala. 463, 467, 195 So.2d 110, 113 (1967) (" `Waiver is voluntary surrender or relinquishment of some known right, benefit or advantage; estoppel is the inhibition to assert it.'" (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (4th ed. 1951))). Although RDA correctly argues that intent is necessary to effect a waiver, it fails to consider this Court's decision in Mobile Airport Authority v. HealthSTRATEGIES, Inc., 886 So.2d 773 (Ala. 2004), in which we quoted Ford v. Jackson Square, Ltd., 548 So.2d 1007, 1013 (Ala. 1989), for the proposition that "`[an] intention to waive a right may be found where one's course of conduct indicates such an intention or is inconsistent with any other intention,'" 886 So.2d at 782 (citing City of Montgomery v. Weldon and Braswell Wood Co. v. Fussell, 474 So.2d 67 (Ala. 1985)). Here, the trial court found that Jason Stinson's oral statements, written communications, and actions taken on behalf of RDA led the Golf Club reasonably to believe that all of its requirements under the agreement, including its duty to provide environmental reports and reliance letters to RDA, had either been modified or waived, at least insofar as they applied to the calculation of the initial inspection period and the extended inspection period leading up to closing.

We reject USAA's argument that these waiver or estoppel rules do not apply when the insurance contract had already terminated when the accident occurred. See Mobile Airport Auth. v. Health Strategies, Inc., 886 So.2d 773, 783-84 (Ala. 2004) (rejecting a similar argument and holding that waiver may apply in circumstances where "no policy existed" or had been terminated). Simon maintains that waiver or estoppel applies here because USAA accepted Simon's payment for the premium on Jeffrey's lapsed policy, with knowledge of his death, and then retained the premium for approximately 45 days.

So, "coverage under an insurance policy cannot be created or enlarged by waiver or estoppel and, if there is no ambiguity, it is the duty of the court to enforce the policy as written." Id. at 51 ; see alsoMobile Airport Auth. v. HealthSTRATEGIES, Inc. , 886 So. 2d 773, 782 (Ala. 2004) (citing, though distinguishing, Home Indem. Co. , 381 So. 2d at 50–51 ). In short, Alabama law does not allow estoppel to create coverage—and, thus, indemnification—under an insurance policy.

Standard of Review "We review a summary judgment de novo. Mobile Airport Auth. v. HealthSTRATEGIES, Inc., 886 So.2d 773, 779 (Ala. 2004). We accord the lower court's legal conclusions no presumption of correctness.

II. Standard of Review We review a summary judgment de novo. Mobile Airport Auth. v. HealthStrategies, Inc., 886 So.2d 773, 779 (Ala. 2004). In reviewing a summary judgment, this Court reviews the record in a light most favorable to the nonmovant.

II. We review a summary judgment de novo. Mobile Airport Auth. v. HealthSTRATEGIES, Inc., 886 So.2d 773, 779 (Ala. 2004). We accord the lower court's legal conclusions no presumption of correctness.

Id. Although there was also substantial evidence indicating that Clark had not been aware of her oncoming sleep, the conflicting substantial evidence precludes the entry of a summary judgment. See, e.g., Mobile Airport Auth. v. HealthSTRATEGIES, Inc., 886 So.2d 773, 786 (Ala.2004) (Johnstone, J., concurring in the result) (stating that “conflicting substantial evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact ... which precludes summary judgment”). Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court's summary judgment on the wantonness claim and would remand the case for a jury trial on that issue.

Id. Although there was also substantial evidence indicating that Clark had not been aware of her oncoming sleep, the conflicting substantial evidence precludes the entry of a summary judgment. See, e.g., Mobile Airport Auth. v. HealthSTRATEGIES, Inc., 886 So. 2d 773, 786 (Ala. 2004) (Johnstone, J., concurring in the result) (stating that "conflicting substantial evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact ... which precludes summary judgment"). Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court's summary judgment on the wantonness claim and would remand the case for a jury trial on that issue.