Opinion
B326428
04-25-2024
SHARAREH MOAZED, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. PEYMAN JAVAHERBIN, Defendant and Respondent.
John J. Gulino for Plaintiff and Appellant. Matthew E. Hess for Defendant and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. 21SMCV01336, Mark A. Young, Judge. Affirmed.
John J. Gulino for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Matthew E. Hess for Defendant and Respondent.
CHANEY, J.
In the complaint filed by appellant Shahareh Moazed, she alleged that respondent Peyman Javaherbin had breached pooling and support agreements whereby he had agreed to support her financially for the rest of her life, and to treat all property and income acquired during the relationship as joint property, in exchange for her agreement to care for Javaherbin's needs and provide him with companionship. The complaint admitted that Javaherbin's promises had been made after he had promised he would marry her and that, throughout their relationship, Javaherbin reiterated his promise of marriage. In the proceedings below, the trial court granted Javaherbin's motion for judgment on the pleadings and denied leave to amend, finding that Moazed's complaint was barred by Civil Code sections 43.4 and 43.5, also known as the "anti-heart-balm-statutes."
Undesignated statutory references are to the Civil Code. (§ 43.4 ["A fraudulent promise to marry or to cohabit after marriage does not give rise to a cause of action for damages"]; § 43.5, subd. (d) ["No cause of action arises for . . . [¶] . . . [¶] . . . Breach of promise of marriage"].)
On appeal, Moazed contends the court erred in granting the motion because her complaint was based on Javaherbin's breach of the pooling and support agreements, not the breach of his promise to marry her. She also argues the court erred in denying leave to amend because she could have added allegations to make clearer that the parties' pooling and support agreements were unrelated to the promises of marriage. We conclude that Moazed's causes of action are barred by the anti-heart-balm statutes and that her proposed amendment would not help her state a cause of action. We therefore affirm.
The parties also disagree whether Moazed's complaint is barred by the statute of limitations or the statute of frauds. Because we conclude the court did not err in granting Javaherbin's motion for judgment on the pleadings, we need not address these issues.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We limit our summary to the facts and procedural history relevant to the issues raised on appeal.
A. Moazed Files a Complaint
In August 2021, Moazed filed a complaint against Javaherbin. She alleged that, on her first date with Javaherbin in September 2011, he disclosed he was seeking a "homemaker wife." Within days thereafter, Javaherbin proposed that Moazed move in with him, stating "that he was desperately in need of companionship and that he believed that they were meant to be together." After Moazed refused, citing both cultural and religious reasons, as well as "that her family would be upset if they learned that she and Peyman were living together without being married," Javaherbin suggested they enter into a "religious marriage" that would be a "solemn agreement," but would not be "recorded." Javaherbin "further confirmed that once the Plaintiff and Peyman got to know each other and after existing issues regarding his divorce and child custody were concluded, Plaintiff and Peyman would be formally married." Moazed agreed. In January 2012, the couple participated in a religious ceremony to "celebrate and confirm their 'marriage'" and, after returning from a honeymoon, Javaherbin began identifying and introducing Moazed as his wife.
"Within a short time following the religious ceremony," Javaherbin told Moazed that "he wanted to care for her and take care of all of her financial needs. He included her name on his credit cards and had credit cards issued in her name and put her on title to his automobile[,] explaining that these things were theirs to share. Peyman told Plaintiff that he was having her identified as the beneficiary on his insurance policies. Plaintiff assumed the role of Peyman's wife. They discussed and agreed that in the near future they would 'record' their marriage[,] which Plaintiff understood meant that the two would obtain a California marriage license and then be lawfully married." Moazed also agreed to work only part-time so that she could spend more time with Javaherbin to "care for his needs and provide him with the company and companionship that he requested of Plaintiff." Javaherbin "confirmed several times that Plaintiff did not need to work and, indeed, Peyman would prefer that she not work. Peyman attempted to convince Plaintiff not to work confirming time and again that he would support and care for her and take care of all of her financial needs."
"During the course of their relationship," the parties "entered into an oral agreement by the terms of which they agreed to treat as joint property the earnings and income, and all property acquired therewith, which resulted from all personal service, skill, effort, and work that each of them, thereafter, individually or jointly, performed, expended, or contributed during their relationship and while they lived with each other." Similarly, "[o]ver the passage of time[,] Plaintiff and Peyman discussed his promise that their religious 'wedding' would be made a formal and legally recognized marriage in the State of California."
However, in 2013, after Javaherbin still had not provided Moazed with a specific timeline for when they would be legally married, Moazed "decided that she would accept a full time employment position in furtherance of a career." She explained to Javaherbin, who had objected to this, that she would be happy to be a housewife when they were formally married. In September 2013, Javaherbin acquired a house in Encino, which he stated was for the two of them, although title to the property was in Javaherbin's name only.
Moazed suffered a job-related injury in 2015 and thereafter, Javaherbin "once again pleaded with Plaintiff not to return to her career, expressing his grief over the fact that his 'wife' had been injured, and again confirmed that there was no reason for the Plaintiff to work[,] promising that he would care for all of her needs, including her financial needs. Peyman expressed that he needed Plaintiff to be his 'wife' on a full time basis and be there for him whenever he needed her comfort, love and companionship. Peyman told Plaintiff that he would take care of all of her needs as his 'wife.'" Moazed "agreed to abandon her career dreams to be a full time wife to Peyman and Peyman agreed that he would take care of her needs, including her financial needs in return."
Over time, Moazed "sensed that Peyman wanted the Plaintiff to continue to live with him as his 'wife' but not follow through with his promise that they would be lawfully married." She decided to move out "until he fulfilled his promise that the two of them would be properly and legally married in California." In March 2018, she found somewhere to live and informed Javaherbin she was moving out "since he apparently had decided that they would not be formally married. Peyman then renewed his promises that they would be formally and lawfully married and convinced the Plaintiff to withdraw her interest in a separate apartment."
When no marriage materialized, Moazed again informed Javaherbin in February 2019 that she was moving out; Javaherbin again convinced her "to forego the application for this rental property and promised that he would make arrangements for their marriage." In late 2019, Javaherbin had his lawyer prepare a "pre-marital agreement," but still "delayed and dragged his feet regarding arranging the marriage ...." Moazed finally "determined that Peyman's promise that they would be married was false and that his continued promises and agreements that they would marry were made simply to convince Plaintiff to remain with him and to provide care, comfort and companionship to Peyman without the commitment of a lawful marriage." Moazed moved out in April 2020.
After Moazed moved out, Javaherbin "continued to provide Plaintiff with a credit card in her name on Peyman's account for her exclusive use as she deemed necessary." However, he canceled this card in July 2021. Javaherbin additionally "made payment of funds to the Plaintiff the last of which was made on February 19, 2021, in the sum of $8000." Javaherbin "also provided Plaintiff with a 'blank check' on his account at CitiBank explaining that Plaintiff could fill in on this check any amount that she chose and that Peyman was giving Plaintiff this blank check in good faith to confirm his agreement [that] he would always provide her with financial support."
Based on these allegations, Moazed alleged five causes of action: (1) Breach of Pooling Agreement and Accounting; (2) Breach of Contract for Support; (3) Fraud; (4) Promissory Estoppel; and (5) Imposition of Constructive Trust on the Encino house. Javaherbin answered the complaint in September 2021.
B. Javaherbin Moves for Judgment on the Pleadings
In November 2022, Javaherbin moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that Moazed's complaint were barred by sections 43.4 and 43.5 because they prohibited "[a]ny and all claims arising out of a breach of promise to marry." Recognizing that none of the causes of action pled in the complaint was explicitly for a breach of a promise to marry, Javaherbin elaborated that "a promise to marry was central to the parties' relationship from the very beginning and was inextricably intertwined with their subsequent cohabitation." (Emphasis in original.)
Javaherbin also argued the complaint was barred by the statute of limitations because Moazed suspected "as early as 2013" that Javaherbin was not going to marry her and "sensed" the same thing in March 2018. Javaherbin additionally contended that the alleged contracts were uncertain, and that any cause of action asserting an interest in the Encino Property was barred by the statute of frauds. Finally, he argued that the fraud cause of action lacked the requisite specificity and that "constructive trust" was a remedy, not a cause of action. The trial court did not address these arguments in its ruling.
Moazed opposed the motion. In response to Javaherbin's argument that her complaint was barred by the anti-heart-balm statutes, she countered that our Supreme Court held in Marvin v. Marvin (1976) 18 Cal.3d 660 (Marvin) "that pooling and support agreements not part of a promise of marriage are not barred from enforcement by § 43.5." Moazed argued that her claims "are clearly not regarding the failure of the two to be married." Moazed did not request leave to amend should the court grant the motion. Javaherbin replied to the opposition.
In December 2022, the court granted Javaherbin's motion, finding that "the Complaint's allegations fall within the plain meaning of the anti-heart-balm statutes," and agreeing with Javaherbin's argument that "a fair reading of the Complaint demonstrates that this is an action for breach of promise to marry, since a promise to marry was central to the parties' relationship from the very beginning and was inextricably intertwined with their subsequent cohabitation." The court noted that "[c]ritically, [the parties] discussed a future marriage but agreed that this would be put off while Defendant resolved personal matters ...." The court distinguished Marvin, noting that there our Supreme Court held that the anti-heart-balm statutes "did not apply to 'pooling and support agreements not part of or accompanied by promise of marriage.'" (Emphasis in original.) The trial court added that in Moazed's cited authority, "the parties did not couple a promise to cohabitate, share expenses, support, etc., with a promise of marriage." The court denied leave to amend, stating "Plaintiff has the burden to show a basis for amendment." Moazed timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Moazed contends the court erred because "[t]he fact that the parties discussed and agreed that they would ultimately marry and later determined not to do so has no effect on the Appellant's right to seek to enforce the pooling agreement and the agreement for support." Moazed additionally argues the court erred in denying leave to amend when the complaint "could be simply amended to make it more clear that the parties' agreements regarding sharing of property acquired during their cohabitation and the Respondent's agreement to provide financial support to the Appellant are unrelated to their discussion and goal to marry." We address each contention in turn.
A. The Court Did Not Err in Granting Javaherbin's Motion
" 'We independently review the trial court's ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings to determine whether the complaint states a cause of action. [Citation.] In doing so, we accept as true the plaintiff's factual allegations and construe them liberally.'" (Dondlinger v. Los Angeles County Regional Park &Open Space Dist. (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 994, 998.)
Moazed contends the court erred in finding the complaint barred by the anti-heart-balm statutes because her "claims are clearly not regarding the failure of the two to be married." Moazed interprets the statutes too narrowly. Although section 43.5, subdivision (d), provides flatly that "[n]o cause of action arises for . . . [b]reach of promise of marriage," cases have found the section applies more broadly. We find instructive both Marvin and Boyd v. Boyd (1964) 228 Cal.App.2d 374 (Boyd).
In Boyd, two days after the parties were married, "defendant left [the plaintiff] and has since refused to live with her and to support her." (Boyd, supra, 228 Cal.App.2d at p. 376.) The plaintiff sued, contending in part that the defendant had "breached an express oral promise to live with and support plaintiff." (Ibid.) In considering whether this cause of action was barred by section 43.5, the appellate court explained that "[t]he marriage institution comprehends an array of interrelated commitments and expectations," including financial support, and that "[i]n outlawing breach of promise actions, section 43.5, subdivision (d), aims at lawsuits in which one party or the other seeks financial compensation for loss of this group of expectations and commitments." (Id. at p. 378.) Thus, the court rejected the plaintiff's argument that "the defendant made and broke an express oral promise, and this breach -- not the breach of a promise of marriage -- is the gravamen of the action." (Id. at pp. 378-379.)
The appellate court elaborated that "[b]reach of promise actions generally aim at financial vindication of the entire group of marital expectations and commitments. [Citations.] That one plaintiff seeks compensation for outraged affection or loss of companionship, while another expresses loss of expected support, is not a pivotal factor....[T]he statute no more allows the former variety of damage than the latter. Thus a plaintiff may not, by selecting frustrated economic expectations as the sole item of damage, escape the bar of the statute." (Boyd, supra, 228 Cal.App.2d at p. 379, fn. omitted; cf. Askew v. Askew (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 942, 957 [husband's fraud action based on wife's misrepresentation prior to marriage that she found him physically attractive barred by section 43.4 because wife's "false statements that she loved and sexually desired [him] . . . clearly come within the legal category of a fraudulent promise to 'cohabit' after marriage"].) In other words, Boyd held that section 43.5 bars not only an action seeking recovery for the breach of an actual promise of marriage, but also actions seeking recovery for breaches of the "array of interrelated commitments and expectations" associated with the promise to marry-such as the promise for financial support. (Boyd, at p. 378.)
Our Supreme Court indirectly confirmed this in Marvin. There, the plaintiff and defendant" 'entered into an oral agreement' that while 'the parties lived together they would combine their efforts and earnings and would share equally any and all property accumulated as a result of their efforts whether individual or combined.'" (Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 666.) They also agreed that" 'plaintiff would further render her services as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook to . . . defendant'" and would" 'give up her lucrative career as an entertainer [and] singer' in order to 'devote her full time to defendant . . . as a companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook;' in return defendant agreed to 'provide for all of plaintiff's financial support and needs for the rest of her life.'" (Ibid.) There was no mention of any promise to marry. The high court determined that the plaintiff had stated a cause of action for breach of express contract, rejecting an argument that the cause of action was barred by section 43.5, subdivision (d). (Id. at p. 674.) Acknowledging Boyd and the premise that "a promise of marriage impliedly includes a promise to support and to pool property acquired after marriage," the high court argued that it would be a "strained contention" to conclude from this premise that "pooling and support agreements not part of or accompanied by promise of marriage are barred by" section 43.5. (Marvin, at p. 674, emphasis added.)
Our Supreme Court could simply have stated that, because the plaintiff in Marvin was not suing over a breach of an actual promise to marry, section 43.5 did not apply. But it did not so state. Instead, by acknowledging Boyd and stating that the section did not bar causes of action to enforce pooling and support agreements "not part of or accompanied by promise of marriage," the court impliedly confirmed that pooling and support agreements that were "part of or accompanied by promise of marriage" would be barred by section 43.5. (Marvin, supra, 18 Cal.3d at p. 674.)
Moazed and Javaherbin never married but we agree with the trial court that the only fair way to read the complaint is to acknowledge that the promises Javaherbin allegedly made regarding pooling and support were all part and parcel of his promise that they would eventually be married. Before any promises were made regarding pooling or support, Javaherbin "confirmed" that the two would be "formally married." Moazed's forays into employment or living separately all occurred when she began to disbelieve Javaherbin's promises of marriage and, conversely, ceased when he reassured her that the marriage would occur. Like the plaintiff in Boyd, Moazed claims that her complaint "sought to enforce that [pooling and support] agreement and not to recover damages for the refusal of the Respondent to marry." We agree with the court in Boyd that Moazed "may not, by selecting frustrated economic expectations as the sole item of damage, escape the bar of the statute." (Boyd, supra, 228 Cal.App.2d at p. 379.)
Moazed cites Marvin as well Watkins v. Watkins (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 651 (Watkins) in support of her argument that her causes of action are not barred by the anti-heart-balm statutes. We are unpersuaded.
As discussed above and as Moazed admits in her opening brief, Marvin held that section 43.5 was no bar to pooling and support agreements "which are not part of a promise of marriage." Similarly, Watkins held that "where unmarried parties who are living together enter into an implied agreement acknowledged by Marvin . . ., and the parties later marry, the Marvin agreement is enforceable after marriage." (Watkins, supra, 143 Cal.App.3d at p. 652.) But Watkins contained no allegations that any pooling or support agreements were made in connection with a promise to marry. (Id. at pp. 652, 655.) Thus, Marvin and Watkins stand for the proposition that pooling and support agreements unconnected with a promise to marry are enforceable. But Javaherbin's promises of pooling and support were part of and intimately connected to a promise to marry. Thus, neither Marvin nor Watkins has any bearing on the issue before us.
In her reply brief, Moazed contends "the facts as alleged in the Plaintiff's complaint cannot possibly be interpreted as a claim for breach of promise to marry" because it "clearly alleges that the parties ended their relationship in April of 2020" but Javaherbin "continued to provide the Appellant with support, as agreed, until July of 2021 ...." The complaint alleges that Javaherbin gave Moazed this blank check "to confirm his agreement to he would always provide her with financial support." But the agreement he was allegedly confirming was one made as part of his promise to marry Moazed. There is no allegation that the parties made a new agreement after Javaherbin reneged on his promise of marriage.
B. The Court Did Not Err in Denying Leave to Amend
" 'Denial of leave to amend after granting a motion for judgment on the pleadings is reviewed for abuse of discretion.'" (Travelers Property Casualty Co. of America v. Engel Insulation, Inc. (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 830, 834.) In evaluating whether the complaint can be amended to state a cause of action, we may consider a theory raised for the first time on appeal. (Cf. 20th Century Ins. Co. v. Quackenbush (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 135, 139, fn. 3 ["When a demurrer is sustained without leave to amend the petitioner may advance on appeal a new legal theory why the allegations of the petition state a cause of action"].)
Although Moazed cites nothing in the record to indicate she asked for leave to amend her complaint should the court sustain Javaherbin's motion, she nevertheless contends the court erred in denying leave to amend because "her Complaint could be simply amended to make it more clear that the parties' agreements regarding sharing of property acquired during their cohabitation and the Respondent's agreement to provide financial support to the Appellant are unrelated to their discussion and goal to marry." As an example, Moazed states that an allegation that "the Appellant concluded that the Respondent no longer loved her as he had consistently professed and, therefore, she determined that she would not continue to cohabitate with the Respondent would add additional context that the trial Court could not find in the Complaint." Such an allegation would make no difference to our analysis.
Moazed has already alleged that, before she cohabitated with Javaherbin, he had confirmed they would be formally married after certain issues regarding his divorce were addressed. It was "[w]ithin a short time" of their religious marriage that Javaherbin expressed his desire to take care of Moazed's financial needs and the parties "discussed and agreed that in the near future they would 'record' their marriage[,] which Plaintiff understood meant that the two would obtain a California marriage license and then be lawfully married." Similarly, Moazed alleged that "[o]ver the passage of time[,] Plaintiff and Peyman discussed his promise that their religious 'wedding' would be made a formal and legally recognized marriage in the State of California." And he discouraged her stabs at independence by promising to take care of her, and confirming the marriage would occur. In other words, the genesis of Javaherbin's promises of pooling and support and his confirmations of the same were inextricably tied to his promises that he would marry Moazed. An allegation that Moazed moved out of their shared home because she believed Javaherbin no longer loved her would not change the context of his promises, and therefore would not cure the fatal defects found by the trial court.
At oral argument, Moazed's counsel suggested paragraph 29 of the complaint-that "[i]n or about January 2012, Plaintiff and Defendant Peyman further agreed orally that in the event that their relationship should terminate, Peyman would provide for Plaintiff's support and would compensate her for the fact that she had abandoned her chosen career to devote her full time, energies and attention to providing Peyman with companionship, care, comfort and support for approximately eight years while the two lived together as husband and wife"-sufficiently stated a cause of action, or could be amended to do so. Setting aside that this allegation is contradictory-Moazed alleges that the parties met in September 2011 and that four months later, in January 2012, Javaherbin promised to compensate her for supporting him for eight years-this promise was still intertwined with Javaherbin's promises to marry Moazed.
" 'A pleader may not attempt to breathe life into a complaint by omitting relevant facts which made his previous complaint defective.'" (Vallejo Development Co. v. Beck Development Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 929, 946.) Moreover, "a court is 'not bound to accept as true allegations contrary to factual allegations in former pleading in the same case.'" (Ibid.) Because Moazed cannot demonstrate how she could truthfully amend the complaint to state a cause of action without omitting or contradicting the relevant facts about Javaherbin's promises of marriage, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying her leave to amend.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs on appeal.
We concur: BENDIX, Acting P. J.,WEINGART, J.