Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. DP002067
McAdams, J.
In this writ proceeding, the father of a dependent child seeks review of the juvenile court’s order terminating reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing. Finding no merit in his challenge, we deny the father’s petition for an extraordinary writ.
BACKGROUND
The child whose interests are at issue in this proceeding is C.M., a boy born in March 2008. Petitioner M.M. is his presumed father.
Detention
In March 2009, the child was placed in protective custody when the mother was arrested. A petition was filed on the child’s behalf by the Santa Cruz County Human Services Department (Department). The petition was brought pursuant to section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. (Further unspecified statutory references are to that code.) The petition alleged that the child was at risk from the father’s “criminal history tied to drug use” and from the mother’s drug use and substance abuse history. The petition asserted the parents’ failure to protect the child. (§ 300, subd. (b).) Following an initial hearing, the child was detained.
Jurisdiction; Disposition
In April 2009, the juvenile court held a jurisdictional hearing. The father and the mother both submitted on the petition. The court sustained the petition as amended on its face. The court advised the parents of the six-month limit on family reunification services.
In May 2009, following a hearing, a dispositional order was filed. The court ordered the child’s removal from the mother’s custody and placement with the maternal grandmother and her husband, where the child had lived since birth. The order contained a prominent advisement of the six-month limit on family reunification services.
Six Month Review Hearing
The six-month review hearing was initially set for October 6, 2009. The Department’s recommendation was to terminate family reunification services for both parents and to set a permanency planning hearing under section 366.26. At the parties’ request, the court set the matter for a settlement conference on October 27. The father did not appear, and his attorney requested a contested hearing on the Department’s recommendation to terminate services. The mother submitted on the recommendation. The court scheduled the contested hearing for November 19.
At the contested review hearing on November 19, 2009, after hearing testimony by the father and argument from counsel, the court terminated reunification services for the father and set a permanency planning hearing.
Petition for Extraordinary Writ
The father gave notice of his intent to file a writ petition. Acting as his own attorney, the father now petitions this court for extraordinary writ relief. He seeks an “extension for reunification for treatment” upon his anticipated release from jail on February 27, 2010, stating “I want my son.” He also seeks a temporary stay, in order to “acces[s] treatment” after his release.
The Department opposes the writ petition on both procedural and substantive grounds.
DISCUSSION
To provide the proper framework for assessing the father’s challenge to the order, we begin by setting forth the general legal principles that guide our review.
I. Legal Principles
A. Reunification
“When a child is removed from a parent’s custody, the juvenile court ordinarily must order child welfare services for the minor and the parent for the purpose of facilitating reunification of the family.” (Tonya M. v. Superior Court (2007) 42 Cal.4th 836, 843.) “For a child under three years of age at the time of removal,... reunification services are presumptively limited to six months.” (Ibid.)
“The reunification phase of dependency proceedings is a critical aspect of the entire dependency system. If the parent fails to reunify with the minor, then the juvenile court must conduct a selection and implementation hearing, which may result in the permanent severance of the parent-child relationship.” (Ingrid E. v. Superior Court (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 751, 755.) Thus, “terminating reunification services and setting the matter for a permanency planning hearing has potentially serious consequences for a parent.” (Sara M. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 998, 1009.)
However, as this court long ago observed: “Reunification services are voluntary, and cannot be forced on an unwilling or indifferent parent.” (In re Jonathan R. (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 1214, 1220; see also, e.g., Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 970; Angela S. v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 758, 763; Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 599.) “The goal of family reunification is not served when a parent has shown no interest in reunifying. Because reunification services are a benefit, not a constitutional entitlement, the juvenile court has discretion to terminate those services at any time, depending on the circumstances presented.” (In re Jesse W. (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 49, 60.)
B. Appellate Review
A petition for extraordinary writ may be brought in the Court of Appeal to challenge a juvenile court’s decision to terminate reunification services and to set a permanency planning hearing pursuant to section 366.26. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.450, 8.452, 5.600; see generally, Glen C. v. Superior Court (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 570, 577-578 [discussing former rule 39.1B].) The writ procedure, as outlined in the statute and implemented in the rules, enables a party to obtain expeditious review of the juvenile court’s decision. (Steve J. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 798, 811.)
Whether appellate review is sought in a writ proceeding or in an appeal, we apply the general rule that the trial court’s judgment or order is presumed correct and error must be affirmatively shown. (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) We review an order following a review hearing for substantial evidence. (James B. v. Superior Court (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1014, 1020; cf. Dwayne P. v. Superior Court (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 247, 260.) The appellant or petitioner “has the burden of showing there is no evidence of a sufficiently substantial nature to support the finding or order.” (In re Diamond H. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1127, 1135, disapproved on another point in Renee J. v. Superior Court (2001) 26 Cal.4th 735, 748, fn. 6.)
II. Analysis
A. Adequacy of the Writ Petition
A party seeking extraordinary writ relief is obliged to submit a petition that “substantively addresses the specific issues to be challenged and is supported by an adequate record.” (Glen C. v. Superior Court, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 582.) “The petition must be accompanied by a memorandum.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.452(a)(3).) The memorandum “must provide a summary of the significant facts,” and it must “support each point by argument and citation of authority.” (Id., rule 8.452(b)(1), (3).)
As the Department points out, the father’s petition falls far short of these procedural requirements. It lacks the requisite memorandum arguing and supporting specific claims of error. (Glen C. v. Superior Court, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 577.) More fundamentally, the petition itself fails to identify any claimed error. Where the petition is defective, it is “appropriate to deny it summarily.” (Anthony D. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 149, 157.)
Despite its grave deficiencies, we will entertain the father’s petition on the merits. “The interest at stake in [such] petitions is of extreme importance, as the termination of reunification services in most instances ensures the subsequent termination of parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing.” (Glen C. v. Superior Court, supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 580.) Moreover, the statute encourages reviewing courts to consider such petitions on their merits. (§ 366.26, subd. (l)(4)(B); Steve J. v. Superior Court, supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 807.)
B. Validity of the Challenged Order
Having reviewed the entire record filed in this court, we find no basis for relief.
In assessing the juvenile court’s decision to terminate reunification services, a number of considerations come into play. One is the parents’ compliance with the case plan and their progress in addressing the problems that resulted in the child’s removal from their custody. (Jennifer A. v. Superior Court (2004) 117 Cal.App.4th 1322, 1341-1342.) Another is the child’s well-being. (In re Joseph B. (1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 890, 901.) Here, neither of those considerations supports the father’s request for an extension of reunification services.
1. The Father’s Participation and Progress
“Compliance with the reunification plan, though not determinative, is a pertinent consideration at a section 366.22 hearing.” (Jennifer A. v. Superior Court, supra, 117 Cal.App.4th at p. 1341.) In addition, “the court must also consider progress the parent has made towards eliminating the conditions leading to the children’s placement out of home.” (In re Dustin R. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1131, 1141-1142.) “The failure of the parent or legal guardian to participate regularly and make substantive progress in court-ordered treatment programs shall be prima facie evidence that return would be detrimental.” (§ 366.22, subd. (a).)
In this case, the juvenile court found “by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable services have been offered and offered many times to both parents.” Those services included referrals for counseling, parenting education, drug and alcohol assessments, and drug testing. The court found that the parents had not availed themselves of the services offered by the Department, noting “the lack or participation, regular participation, and/or substantive progress by the parents in the case plan.” The court’s formal order describes the father’s progress as “minimal.” As the judge put it at the hearing, “quite frankly, based on the lack of substantive progress, there’s absolutely no basis for the Court extending services for an additional six months.”
The court’s findings are amply supported by the record.
Here, the Department’s report for the six-month review hearing contains a detailed description of the father’s meager compliance with each of his case plan objectives. Overall, the Department “assessed that the progress in the case for the entire 6 month period was not substantial enough, nor was there a likelihood of return and the recommendation is to terminate services as a result.”
In closing argument at the November 19th hearing, the father’s own attorney acknowledged that his client had “a very checkered history with regard to this case” and that the father’s “participation was very spotty for the first several months.” But with the father in jail, his attorney asserted, “he’s in a position to where he can and is participating in at last the sort of services that were recommended to him in the first place.”
The father’s compliance efforts were too little, too late. In the juvenile court’s words, “it’s not until he’s sitting in custody on a six-month jail sentence that he says, now I’m willing to work my program. [¶] [The child] deserves better than that.” Nor was the father’s progress sufficient. Nothing in the juvenile court record or in the father’s writ papers reflects that he addressed the key problem of his substance abuse. (See Dawnel D. v. Superior Court (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 393, 398, disapproved on another point in Tonya M. v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 848.) To the contrary, at the November 19th hearing, the father admitted that he had used drugs as recently as October 30, just before his return to jail. As the Department summarized it, the father needed “to devote attention to maintaining sobriety.” He continued “to struggle with substance abuse, life skills and being able to appropriately care for” the child. And there continued “to be many of the same barriers and challenges that existed when the dependency began.”
2. The Child’s Interests
Another key consideration with respect to termination of reunification services is the child’s well-being. Even strict compliance with the reunification plan does not entitle a parent “to custody of the minor regardless of the substantial risk of detriment that reunification would have on the minor’s emotional well-being.” (In re Joseph B., supra, 42 Cal.App.4th at p. 901.) That is because “the focus of dependency law is on the well-being of the minor.” (Ibid.) “The best interests of the child are paramount.” (In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 673.)
As stated in the Department’s report for the six-month hearing, the father acknowledged that it was in the child’s “best interest to remain with his maternal grandparents.” Moreover, that report further observes, the child “needs to attain permanence and can’t continue to wait in the hopes that his parents are going to be able to be successful[.]” As longstanding case law recognizes, “time is of the essence in offering permanent planning for dependent children.” (In re Debra M. (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1032, 1038.) By the time of the hearing, the child had been detained for more than eight months, two months beyond the presumptive six-month reunification period for a child his age. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(1)(B); Tonya M. v. Superior Court, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 843.) “The reality is that childhood is brief; it does not wait while a parent rehabilitates himself or herself. The nurturing required must be given by someone, at the time the child needs it, not when the parent is ready to give it.” (In re Debra M. at p. 1038; Arlena M. v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 566, 572.)
Considering the evidence of the father’s progress and the child’s interest, we find no basis for overturning the challenged order.
DISPOSITION
The petition for extraordinary writ is denied on the merits. The request for a stay is denied.
WE CONCUR: Bamattre-Manoukian, Acting P.J., Mihara, J.