Opinion
CR-21-0468
09-02-2022
M.L.W. v. State of Alabama
Appeal from Madison Juvenile Court (JU-21-728.01)
KELLUM, JUDGE
The appellant, M.L.W., appeals the Madison Juvenile Court's ruling transferring his case from juvenile court to the circuit court for trial as an adult.
In October 2021, then 15-year-old M.L.W. was arrested and charged with murder. The petition alleged that M.L.W. killed T.H. by shooting him in the face, see § 13A-6-2(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975. The State moved to certify M.L.W. as an adult and to transfer his case to the circuit court for trial as an adult. After a hearing, the juvenile court granted the motion to transfer. (C. 72-75.) M.L.W. filed a motion to alter, amend, or vacate the juvenile court's decision and argued that the probable cause to transfer his case was based solely on hearsay and that the evidence showed that he had acted in self-defense. (R. 79.) The juvenile court denied the postjudgment motion. (C. 87.) M.L.W. filed a notice of appeal directly to this Court because there was an adequate record for this Court to review. See Rule 28(A), Ala. R. Juv. P.
"The purpose of Rule 28 is to assure that all juveniles receive an appeal of right before the appellate courts of this state. Smith v. State, 518 So.2d 174 (Ala.Crim.App.1987). The Comment to Rule 28 states that the direct appeal 'should be viewed as the preferred route of all juvenile court appeals.'" D.L.S. v. State, 659 So.2d 1012, 1013 (Ala.Crim.App.1995).
I.
M.L.W. first argues that his case was erroneously transferred to the circuit court because, he says, the sole basis for the juvenile court's finding of probable cause rested on the hearsay testimony of Investigator Julian Johnson of the Huntsville Police Department. The State concedes that the juvenile court's findings were based solely on hearsay and that, therefore, this case should be remanded to the Madison Juvenile Court for that court to conduct a new transfer hearing.
The record shows that when Investigator Johnson began his testimony and discussed the witnesses' statements concerning M.L.W.'s involvement in the shooting, M.L.W. objected and obtained a standing objection to the admission of hearsay testimony. (R. 10-11.) In his motion to alter, amend, or vacate, M.L.W. also argued that the juvenile court's finding of probable cause was based solely on hearsay. (C. 79-80.)
In granting the State's motion to transfer, the juvenile court stated, in pertinent part:
"The first and primary witness called to testify by the State was Investigator Julian Johnson of the Huntsville Police Department, who was the on-call investigator when the homicide call came in on the early morning hours of October 10, 2021. He responded to the scene and talked to several witnesses and family members of both the shooting victim and [M.L.W.]. He learned both parties were in a hotel room with several minors, and they were partying with alcohol and marijuana without any adult supervision (Johnson found the presence of both alcohol and marijuana still in the room, open and notorious.) Throughout the evening, [M.L.W.] and T.H. had argued and waved their weapons. No other weapons were
seen throughout the night. At the time of the shooting, two females were also in the room (including [M.L.W.'s] sister) and the investigator learned that while both parties had handguns, only [M.L.W.'s] was loaded (as another minor had taken the victim's gun earlier and unloaded it in the room in front of the others due to reckless behavior of the victim). Just prior to the shooting, the victim shouted that 'no n-ga is gonna f-k with me' when both were standing within 12 feet of each other. Then the single shot was fired that hit T.H. in the face right by his left eye and the projectile exited the skull and lodged in a wall after shattering a mirror. Witnesses said that [M.L.W.] left the room with both guns and, to date, they have not been recovered. T.H. died at the hospital after being removed from life support. The official cause of death was a gunshot wound to the head, causing massive trauma and loss of blood. [M.L.W.] was located a little over a week later and arrested."(C. 73.)
The record shows that Investigator Johnson's testimony was based on statements that he obtained from five witnesses who were at the scene of the shooting. His testimony was based, in large part, on a statement that he obtained from A.H. Investigator Johnson said that A.H. told him that her mother had booked a room at a hotel for her to celebrate her birthday with her friends. (R. 14.) A.H. also told Investigator Johnson that they had been drinking and that both T.H. and M.L.W. had been waiving their guns. A.H. said that T.H. was drunk so she took the bullets out of his gun. Sometime later M.L.W. and T.H. got into an argument and M.L.W. shot T.H. in the face. At one point during Investigator Johnson's testimony, the prosecutor asked Investigator Johnson what another witness had told him about what had occurred that night. The other witness to testify for the State at the transfer hearing was an intake and probation officer who said that when M.L.W. was arrested he tested positive for marijuana.
We agree with M.L.W. and the State that the juvenile court's probable-cause determination was based solely on hearsay testimony.
"[A] transfer hearing is a '"critically important" proceeding' in juvenile criminal procedure. Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966). A transfer hearing 'must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair treatment.' Kent, 383 U.S. at 562, 86 S.Ct. at 1057.
"A transfer hearing is not designed to determine the guilt or innocence of the juvenile accused of the crime, but is, instead, a probable cause hearing to determine whether the juvenile should be transferred out of the juvenile court for criminal prosecution as an adult. Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d 1006 (Ala.), on remand, Whisenant v. State, 466 So.2d 1013 (Ala. Cr. App. 1985). Probable cause, in the context of a transfer hearing, is defined as that which would warrant a man of reasonable prudence and caution in believing that the offense has been committed and that the juvenile in question is the offender. Bragg v. State, 416 So.2d 715 (Ala. 1982)."Ex parte W.T.K., 586 So.2d 850, 851-52 (Ala. 1991).
"The strict rules of evidence do not apply in a juvenile transfer hearing." Smith v. State, 475 So.2d 633, 635 (Ala.Crim.App.1985). "The Alabama Supreme Court in Gulledge v. State, 419 So.2d 219 (Ala. 1982), determined that a trial judge may properly allow hearsay testimony in a transfer hearing." Tucker v. State, 426 So.2d 513, 515 (Ala.Crim.App.1982). However, "[hearsay evidence] cannot constitute the sole basis for a finding of probable cause. M.B.M. v. State, 848 So.2d 283 (Ala.Crim.App.2002)." Q.J.S. v. State, 12 So.3d 164, 165 (Ala.Crim.App.2008). This Court has reversed rulings in juvenile-transfer hearings where the finding of probable cause to support a transfer was based exclusively on hearsay evidence. See Q.J.S. v. State, 12 So.3d 164 (Ala.Crim.App.2008); M.B.M. v. State, 848 So.2d 283 (Ala.Crim.App.2002); D.D.A. v. State, 650 So.2d 571 (Ala.Crim.App.1994); and C.E.B. v. State, 661 So.2d 786 (Ala.Crim.App.1994).
"Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Rule 801(c), Ala. R. Evid.
In C.E.B., the ruling in the juvenile-transfer hearing was reversed because the investigator "was permitted, over objection of defense counsel, to testify to statements made by others implicating the appellant in the charged offense" and that testimony was the only testimony presented by the State to support the transfer. 661 So.2d at 787.
Moreover,
"the doctrine of res judicata was inapplicable, as stated earlier. A transfer hearing is not a criminal case. Cruse v. State, [489 So.2d 694 (Ala.Crim.App.1986)]. Furthermore, the doctrine of res judicata applies after a court of competent jurisdiction has entered a final judgment on the merits of a cause of action. Duke v. State, 48 Ala.App. 188, 263 So.2d 165 (1971). An order denying transfer is not a final judgment."J.L. v. State, 826 So.2d 205, 210 (Ala.Crim.App.2001).
"Jeopardy does not attach in a transfer hearing where there was no adjudicatory finding that the juvenile was delinquent or had actually violated a criminal law. Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 538, 95 S.Ct. 1779, 1790, 44 L.Ed.2d 346 (1975); Boyd v. State, 341 So.2d 680, 683 (Ala. 1976); Smith v. State, 368 So.2d 298, 301 (Ala. Cr. App. 1978), cert. quashed, Ex parte Smith, 368 So.2d 305 (Ala.1979)."Cruse v. State, 489 So.2d 694, 696 (Ala.Crim.App.1986).
Accordingly, this case is due to be remanded to the Madison Juvenile Court for a new transfer hearing. "The appellant is entitled to a new transfer hearing conducted in conformity with the principles set out herein." O.M. v. State, 595 So.2d 514, 526 (Ala.Crim.App.1991)
II.
M.L.W. also argues that the juvenile court erred in admitting his statement to police without first establishing that the statement was given in compliance with Miranda and Rule 11, Ala. R. Juv. P. Because this issue may arise in a subsequent transfer hearing, we remind the juvenile court that before a juvenile's statement is admissible at a transfer hearing, the State "must show that the juvenile made the statement after being advised of his rights under [§ 12-15-202(b), Ala. Code 1975]." Ex parte Smith, 611 So.2d 1023, 1024 (Ala. 1992), and § 12-15-202, Ala. Code 1975.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
Rule 11, Ala. R. Juv. P., was rescinded on January 9, 2009, when the legislature adopted § 12-15-202, Ala. Code 1975, which specifically addresses the rights of a child. The provisions that M.L.W. cites in his brief are now contained in § 12-15-202, Ala. Code 1975.
"At the transfer hearing, [the appellant's] statement was offered as 'evidence against himself,' within the very proscriptive language of the State Constitution. To relax the strict rules of evidence for purposes of the transfer hearing, when [their] application is restricted to matters ordinarily governed by the rules of evidence, is one thing; but to carry [their] application to the extent of allowing the admission of an otherwise inadmissible statement of the accused is constitutionally impermissible. The right against self-incrimination protected by the State Constitution with respect to the trial on the merits is the same right that is likewise protected with respect to the transfer hearing."Ex parte Whisenant, 466 So.2d 1006, 1008 (Ala. 1985). See § 12-15-66(b), Ala. Code 1975 ("An extrajudicial statement which would be constitutionally inadmissible in a criminal proceeding shall not be received in evidence over objection.").
For the reasons set out in Part I of this opinion, the juvenile court's ruling transferring M.L.W.'s case to adult court is hereby reversed, and this case is remanded to the Madison Juvenile Court for that court to conduct a new transfer hearing.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Windom, P.J., and McCool, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.