Opinion
CL-2022-0587
09-30-2022
M.L.R. v. M.C.M.
S. Dale Price, Sylacauga, for appellant. Simone Horn, Talladega, for appellee.
S. Dale Price, Sylacauga, for appellant. Simone Horn, Talladega, for appellee.
FRIDY, Judge.
M.L.R. appeals from a judgment of the Talladega Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") purporting to terminate his paren- tal rights to T.M.R. ("the child"). Because the record on appeal does not affirmatively indicate that M.L.R. is the legal father of the child and, therefore, does not affirmatively indicate that the juvenile court had subject-matter jurisdiction to terminate M.L.R.’s parental rights to the child, we dismiss the appeal with instructions.
In September 2020, M.C.M. ("the custodian") filed a complaint in the juvenile court alleging that she had been awarded custody of the child, that A.C.T. ("the mother") is the "natural and legal mother" of the child, that M.L.R. is the "natural and legal father" of the child, that M.L.R. was incarcerated, that the custodian had commenced a proceeding in the Probate Court of Talladega County ("the probate court") seeking to adopt the child, that the mother had executed a written consent to the custodian’s adopting the child, and that there were grounds for terminating the parental rights of the mother and M.L.R. As relief, the complaint sought a judgment terminating the parental rights of the mother and M.L.R. to the child. The juvenile court appointed separate counsel to represent the mother and M.L.R.
The juvenile court tried the action on August 27, 2021. M.L.R.’s counsel appeared in person, and M.L.R. appeared by telephone from a federal prison where he was serving a prison sentence imposed after he had been convicted of the crime of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. He said that, in 2016, the Talladega Circuit Court ("the circuit court") had convicted him of three felonies: theft of property in the first degree, receiving stolen property in the first degree, and felony obstruction of justice. He testified that the circuit court had then sentenced him to a term of incarceration in an Alabama prison. He was released on parole from the Alabama prison in August 2017. He was still on parole when the child was born in December 2018 and when he was arrested on April 5, 2019, on the charge of possessing a firearm after having been convicted of a felony. He testified that he was scheduled to transition from federal prison to a halfway house on December 22, 2021, and that his sentence was scheduled to end on April 26, 2022.
M.L.R. testified that he had placed the child in the care of the custodian three days after the child’s birth in December 2018 because, he said, the mother was not capable of caring for the child and because, he said, he was still on parole for his 2016 felony convictions. During his testimony, none of the parties or their counsel asked M.L.R. whether he was the biological father of the child, whether he was married to the mother when the child was born, whether the mother was married to some other man when the child was born, or whether he had been adjudicated the legal father of the child. Moreover, no party introduced any documentary evidence addressing those issues.
M.L.R. testified that, before his incarceration in April 2019, approximately three months after the child’s birth, he had provided the custodian with some diapers and clothes for the child and $60 to $80 in cash for the support of the child. He testified that he had not provided any clothes or financial support for the child since his incarceration in April 2019. He testified that he had visited the child in person several times during the three-month period before his incarceration and that, after his incarceration in April 2019, he had stayed in contact with the child by telephone until the custodian stopped accepting the charges for his telephone calls from prison.
M.L.R. testified that he had no complaints about the way the custodian was caring for the child but that he did not want his parental rights terminated be- cause, he said, he thought a child should have a father in his life.
The custodian testified in person at the trial. She confirmed that the father had placed the child in her care three days after the child’s birth and that she had cared for the child ever since. She testified that, sometime after M.L.R. had placed the child in her care in December 2018, the juvenile court had awarded her custody of the child. She said that she loved the child and that she wanted to adopt him to give him a permanent and stable home.
On September 28, 2021, the juvenile court entered a judgment that terminated the parental rights of the mother and purported to terminate the parental rights of M.L.R. to the child. That judgment did not, however, include a disposition regarding the permanent legal custody of the child, as required by § 12-15-320(b), Ala. Code 1975. M.L.R. filed what purported to be a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion challenging the September 28, 2021, judgment, which the trial court denied. M.L.R. then appealed to this court. On February 17, 2022, this court dismissed the appeal as being from a nonfinal judgment because the trial court’s September 28, 2021, judgment had not included a disposition regarding the permanent legal custody of the child. See S.H. v. Macon Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 195 So. 3d 311 (Ala. Civ. App. 2015). This court issued its certificate of judgment regarding the dismissal of that appeal on March 8, 2022.
On April 20, 2022, the juvenile court entered an amended judgment terminating the mother’s parental rights to the child, purporting to terminate the parental rights of M.L.R. to the child, and vesting the custodian with permanent legal custody of the child. That same day, M.L.R. filed a notice of appeal to this court.
[1] M.L.R. contends that the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to terminate his parental rights to the child because, he says, the record does not contain any evidence indicating that he is the legal father of the child. In J.R.C. v. Mobile County Department of Human Resources, 342 So. 3d 580 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021), this court held that the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act ("the AJJA"), § 12-15-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975, authorizes a juvenile court to terminate the parental rights of a child’s legal mother and legal father if clear and convincing evidence establishes that there are grounds for the termination. We further held that the AJJA does not authorize a juvenile court to terminate the parental rights of a man who is merely an alleged father or putative father of the child.
[2] The record in the present case indicates that all the parties and the juvenile court assumed that M.L.R. is the legal father of the child, but no party introduced any evidence indicating that he is the legal father of the child. The record contains no evidence indicating that M.L.R. was ever married to the mother, that he had taken the child into his home and held him out as his child, that he had legitimated the child, or that a court had adjudicated M.L.R. the legal father of the child. Because a juvenile court is a court of limited jurisdiction, an appellate court cannot presume that a juvenile court has jurisdiction over an action; rather, every fact essential to its jurisdiction must affirmatively appear of record. See H.A.A. v, B.J.J., 368 So. 3d 876,—(Ala. Civ. App. 2022).
The dissent suggests that the juvenile court could have adjudicated M.L.R. the legal father of the child in the earlier proceeding in which it had vested the custodian with custody of the child. That is possible; however, as the dissent acknowledges, the record does not contain the judgment entered in the earlier proceeding. Therefore, the record does not affirmatively establish that the juvenile court had adjudicated M.L.R. to be the legal father of the child in the earlier proceeding and, therefore, does not affirmatively establish one of the facts essential to the juvenile court's jurisdiction to terminate M.L.R.’s parental rights to the child, i.e., that M.L.R. is the legal father of the child.
[3] Because the record does not affirmatively establish that M.L.R. is the legal father of the child, the juvenile court did not have jurisdiction to terminate M.L.R.’s parental rights to the child, and, therefore, its judgment is void insofar as it purported to terminate M.L.R.’s parental rights. See H.A.A., supra, and J.R.C., supra. A void judgment will not support an appeal. Id. Therefore, we dismiss the appeal with instructions to the juvenile court to vacate the portion of its judgment purporting to terminate M.L.R.’s parental rights and to conduct any further proceedings it deems necessary to adjudicate the custodian’s complaint in light of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional limits.
The dissent asserts that we have "erroneously presumed error on the part of the juvenile court." 373 So. 3d at 825. However, we are not reversing the juvenile court's judgment based on error. Indeed, we do not even reach the issue whether the juvenile court committed error. Rather, we are dismissing M.L.R.’s appeal without reaching the merits of that appeal based on our conclusion that the juvenile court's judgment is void insofar as it purported to terminate M.L.R,’s parental rights to the child because the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction to terminate those parental rights.
APPEAL DISMISSED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Moore and Hanson, JJ., concur.
Edwards, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.
Thompson, P.J., dissents, with opinion.
THOMPSON, Presiding Judge, dissenting.
I dissent for the same reasons set forth in my dissent in H.A.A. v. B.J.J., 368 So. 3d 876, — (Ala. Civ. App. 2022). As I explained in that dissent, I do not believe that the legislature intended file interpretation that this court has given to the Alabama Juvenile Justice Act, § 12-15-101 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. Also in this case, as in H.A.A. v. B.J.J., supra, the father’s status as the legal father of the child is not in dispute.
In addition, in H.A.A. v. B.J.J., supra, and in J.R.C. v. Mobile County Department of Human Resources, 342 So. 3d 580, 581 (Ala. Civ. App. 2021), no order or judgment pertaining to the legal status of the fathers in those cases had been entered. In this case, however, the Talladega Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court") entered a judgment awarding custody of the child to M.C.M. ("the custodian") in 2019. That judgment is not set forth in the record, so it is not clear whether M.L.R.’s paternity of T.M.R., the child at issue in this case, was established in the judgment. The questioning of the witnesses, and the custodian’s answer during her testimony, indicate that 2019 judgment was entered by the same juvenile-court judge that presided over the current action. At the conclusion of the ore tenus hearing, the juvenile court made a finding that the "father ha[d] shown an unwillingness or inability to discharge [his] parental rights." In its April 20, 2021, judgment, the juvenile court identified M.L.R. as the child’s "father," and it stated that "the father, [M.L.R.], is unwilling and/or unable to provide for the care, support, or education of [the] child." Those findings tend to support a conclusion that the juvenile court had adjudicated M.L.R.’s paternity in the 2019 judgment. I conclude that, in reaching its decision in this appeal, the main opinion also has erroneously presumed error on the part of the juvenile court. D.M. v. Walker Cnty. Dep’t of Hum. Res., 919 So. 2d 1197, 1210 (Ala. Civ. App. 2005) ("An appellate court may not assume error on the part of the trial court.").
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully dissent.