Opinion
22-CV-877-JPS
02-23-2023
ANTHONY MITCHEM, Plaintiff, v. BROOKFIELD POLICE DEPARTMENT, JOHN DOES, and CITY OF BROOKFIELD Defendants.
ORDER
J. P. Stadtmueller U.S. District Judge
Plaintiff Anthony Mitchem, an inmate confined at Oshkosh Correctional Institution, filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. ECF No. 1. On November 16, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion to appoint counsel. ECF No. 12. On November 28, 2022, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. ECF No. 14. This Order resolves Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, addresses his motion to appoint counsel, and screens his amended complaint.
1. MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING THE FILING FEE
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because Plaintiff was a prisoner when he filed his complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h). The PLRA allows the Court to give a prisoner plaintiff the ability to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee. Id. § 1915(a)(2). When funds exist, the prisoner must pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). He must then pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id.
On October 11, 2022, the Court ordered Plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $30.58. ECF No. 11. Plaintiff paid that fee on November 8, 2022. The Court will grant Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee. ECF No. 2. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this Order.
2. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT
2.1 Federal Screening Standard
Under the PLRA, the Court must screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the prisoner raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that applies to dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). A complaint must include “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). The complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to “state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
To state a claim for relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of this right was acting under the color of state law. D.S. v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 798 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009)). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers. Cesal, 851 F.3d at 720 (citing Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 776 (7th Cir. 2015)).
2.2 Plaintiff's Allegations
Plaintiff's amended complaint alleges that John Doe police officers used excessive force against him. ECF No. 14. Specially, Plaintiff alleges that in September 2019 he was at Pick ‘N Save in Brookfield. Id. at 1. He came out of the store and was looking for his car when Officer John Doe 1 “pulled up” on him and told Plaintiff to put his hands in the air. Id. Plaintiff asked the officer what he said, and the officer responded for Plaintiff to put his [expletive] hands up. Id. The officer drew his firearm, pointed it at Plaintiff, and told him to get against the hood of his car. Id.
The officer then proceeded to slam Plaintiff's head into the hood of the car. Id. Plaintiff asked what he did, and the officer responded that Plaintiff knew what he did. Id. The officer told Plaintiff to place his hands behind his back and Plaintiff complied. Id. The officers started bending the Plaintiff's wrists. Id. Plaintiff stated if the officer didn't have that gun that he would beat him for bending his wrists. Id. at 1-2. The officer then picked Plaintiff up and slammed him headfirst into the ground. Id. at 2. Next, John Does 2-6 began punching and kicking Plaintiff. Id.
The officers took Plaintiff to Waukesha County Jail, but the nurse told them they had to take him to the hospital for medical clearance. Id. Plaintiff's injuries included a broken toe, swollen face, and a black eye. Id.
2.3 Analysis
First, Plaintiff may proceed on a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against the John Doe officers. “[A]ll claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force . . . should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its ‘reasonableness' standard.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). “The reasonableness inquiry is an objective one, examining ‘whether the officer's actions are objectively reasonable in light of the totality of the facts and circumstances confronting him or her, without regard for consideration of the officer's subjective intent or motivations.” Payne v. Stacy, Case No. 18-CV-850, 2020 WL 886185, at *3 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2020), appeal dismissed, Case No. 20-1509, 2020 WL 5793102 (7th Cir. June 12, 2020) (citations omitted). The actions taken by an officer “must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citations omitted).
Second, the Court will dismiss the Brookfield Police Department and the City of Brookfield as defendants. A police department is generally not a proper defendant. See Best v. City of Portland, 554 F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2009); Chan v. Wodnicki, 123 F.3d 1005, 1007 (7th Cir. 1997). Although a city can be a proper defendant in a Section 1983 case, Plaintiff has not plead facts to support a claim against the City of Brookfield here. Section 1983 grants a private right of action against a “person” who acts under color of state law to deprive another of rights under federal law, including the Constitution. A key part of § 1983's doctrinal structure is the difference between individual and governmental liability. In Monell v. Department of Social Services of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978), the United States Supreme Court found that a plaintiff may proceed against a municipal government so long as a constitutional violation was caused by: (1) an express government policy; (2) a widespread and persistent practice that amounted to a custom approaching the force of law; or (3) an official with final policymaking authority. 436 U.S. at 690-91; Glisson v. Ind. Dep't of Correction, 849 F.3d 372, 379 (7th Cir. 2017) (en banc).
Here, Plaintiff does not allege any facts to state a Monell claim against the City of Brookfield. He makes no mention of the failure to train or any unconstitutional policy, customs, or practice. As such, the Court will dismiss Defendants Brookfield Police Department and the City of Brookfield from this action.
Finally, because Plaintiff does not know the names of any of the John Doe defendants, the Court will add the Brookfield Chief of Police- Chief of Police James P. Adlam-as a defendant for the limited purpose of helping Plaintiff identify the names of the defendants. See Donald v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dept., 95 F.3d 548, 556 (7th Cir. 1996). The Court will order the U.S. Marshals to serve Chief Adlam with Plaintiff's amended complaint and a copy of this Order. Chief Adlam does not have to respond to the amended complaint. After Chief Adlam's attorney files an appearance in this case, Plaintiff may serve discovery upon Chief Adlam (by mailing it to his attorney at the address in his notice of appearance) to get information that will help him identify the names of the John Doe defendants.
For example, Plaintiff may serve interrogatories (written questions) under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33 or document requests under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34. Because Plaintiff does not state a claim against Chief Adlam, Plaintiff's discovery requests must be limited to information or documents that will help Plaintiff learn the real names of the John Doe defendants he is suing. Plaintiff may not ask Chief Adlam about any other topic, and Chief Adlam is under no obligation to respond to requests about any other topic.
After Plaintiff learns the names of the individuals that he alleges violated his constitutional rights, he must file a motion identifying their real names. The Court will dismiss Chief Adlam as a defendant once Plaintiff identifies the John Doe defendants' names. After those defendants have an opportunity to respond to Plaintiff's amended complaint, the Court will issue a scheduling order for the remainder of the case.
Plaintiff must identify the names of the John Doe defendants within sixty days of Chief Adlam's attorney appearing. If Plaintiff does not, or does not explain to the Court why he is unable to do so, the Court may dismiss his case based on his failure to follow the Court's order.
3. APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
The Court now turns to Plaintiff's pending motion to appoint counsel. ECF No. 12. For the reasons explained below, the Court will deny Plaintiff's motion.
As a civil litigant, Plaintiff has “neither a constitutional nor statutory right to a court-appointed attorney.” James v. Eli, 889 F.3d 320, 326 (7th Cir. 2018). However, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1), a “court may request an attorney to represent any person unable to afford counsel.” A court should seek counsel to represent a plaintiff if: (1) he has made reasonable attempts to secure counsel; and (2) “‘the difficulty of the case-factually and legally-exceeds the particular plaintiff's capacity as a layperson to coherently present it.'” Navejar v. Iyiola, 718 F.3d 692, 696 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647, 655 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc)). Whether to appoint counsel in a particular case is left to a court's discretion. James, 889 F.3d at 326; McCaa v. Hamilton, 893 F.3d 1027, 1031 (7th Cir. 2018).
While framed in terms of a plaintiff's capacity to litigate, this discretion must also be informed by the realities of recruiting counsel in this District. When a court recruits a lawyer to represent a pro se party, the lawyer takes the case pro bono. Unlike a lawyer appointed to represent a criminal defendant during his prosecution, who is paid by the government for his work, an attorney who takes a prisoner's civil case pro bono has no promise of compensation.
It is difficult to convince local lawyers to take such cases. Unlike other districts in this Circuit, see, e.g., L.R. 83.35 (N.D. Ill.), the Eastern District of Wisconsin does not employ an involuntary appointment system for lawyers admitted to practice in the District. Instead, the District relies on the willingness of lawyers to sign up for the Pro Bono Attorney Panel and, once there, accept appointments as needed. See Pro Bono Program, available at: http://www.wied.uscourts.gov/pro-bono-program.
The District is grateful to the lawyers who participate in the Pro Bono Program, but there are never enough volunteers, and those who do volunteer rarely take more than one or two cases a year. This is understandable, as many are already busy attending to fee-paying clients. Although the Pro Bono Program does provide for payment of certain litigation expenses, it does not directly compensate a lawyer for his or her time. Participants may seek attorney's fees when permitted by statute, such as in successful § 1983 cases, but they will otherwise go unpaid. The small pool of attorneys available to this District for pro bono appointments stands in stark contrast to that of the Court of Appeals, which regularly recruits counsel from across the nation to represent pro se plaintiffs on appeal. See, e.g., James, 889 F.3d at 323 (appointing counsel from Washington, D.C. to represent the pro se appellant); McCaa, 893 F.3d at 1029 (same).
Additionally, it must be remembered that, when a court determines that counsel recruitment is appropriate, it can take months to locate a willing lawyer. This delay works to the detriment of all parties and contravenes Congress's instruction in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 that district courts must endeavor to secure the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Thus, looming large over each request for counsel are a court's ever-more-limited time and resources.
With these considerations in mind, the Court returns to the question presented: whether counsel can and should be recruited to represent Plaintiff at this stage in this case. First, a court asks whether the litigant has made “reasonable” efforts to obtain his own representation. Pruitt, 503 F.3d at 655; Jackson v. County of McLean, 953 F.2d 1070, 1073 (7th Cir. 1992). It is a question not often litigated; many district court judges either overlook arguably unreasonable efforts at obtaining counsel, or they impose eminently practical requirements such as the submission of evidence demonstrating that the prisoner has tried and failed to secure representation from several lawyers. See, e.g., Kyle v. Feather, No. 09-cv-90-bbc, 2009 WL 2474627, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Aug. 11, 2009).
The first element of Pruitt is fairly easy to satisfy, but it is not toothless, and it is not a mere technical condition of submitting a certain number of rejection letters. If it was, then a Wisconsin prisoner litigating a § 1983 action could submit rejection letters from ten randomly selected criminal defense lawyers from Nevada and call his work complete. This cannot be. The purpose of the reasonable-efforts requirement is to ensure that if a court and private lawyers must expend scarce resources to provide counsel for a prisoner, he has at least made a good-faith effort to avoid those costs by getting a lawyer himself. To fulfill this duty, a pro se prisoner should reach out to lawyers whose areas of practice suggest that they might consider taking his case. If he learns that some of the lawyers he has contacted do not, he should reach out to others before he concludes that no one will help him.
Plaintiff has submitted no evidence that he contacted attorneys to represent him in the matter. ECF No. 12. Although Plaintiff states he contacted multiple attorneys, without proof, the Court has no ability to tell if this is true or not or whether he contacted attorneys whose practice areas suggest that they might consider taking the case. Plaintiff's demonstrated efforts to retain counsel are minimal at best. Even assuming, however, that Plaintiff's efforts were sufficient to meet the first Pruitt factor, Plaintiff cannot meet the second prong as discussed below.
Plaintiff's request must also succeed on the second Pruitt question: whether the difficulty of the case exceeds his capacity to coherently present it. This assessment must be made in light of the particular capabilities and circumstances presented by each pro se litigant. James, 889 F.3d at 326-27. The Court of Appeals explains:
The second step is itself grounded in a two-fold inquiry into both the difficulty of the plaintiff's claims and the plaintiff's competence to litigate those claims himself. The inquiries are necessarily intertwined; the difficulty of the case is considered against the plaintiff's litigation capabilities, and those capabilities are examined in light of the challenges specific to the case at hand. Ultimately, the question is not whether a lawyer would present the case more effectively than the pro se plaintiff; if that were the test, district judges would be required to request counsel for every indigent litigant. Rather,
the question is whether the difficulty of the case-factually and legally-exceeds the particular plaintiff's capacity as a layperson to coherently present it to the judge or jury himself. Notably, this inquiry extends beyond the trial stage of the proceedings. The relevant concern is whether the plaintiff appears competent to litigate his own claims, given their degree of difficulty. This includes all of the tasks that normally attend litigation: evidence gathering, preparing and responding to motions and other court filings, and trial.Id. (citations and quotations omitted). While a court need not address every concern raised in a motion for appointment of counsel, it must address “those that bear directly” on the individual's capacity to litigate his case. McCaa, 893 F.3d at 1032.
The balancing contemplated in the second Pruitt step must be done against the backdrop that district courts cannot be expected to appoint counsel in circumstances which are common to all or many prisoners. See Bracey v. Grondin, 712 F.3d 1012, 1017-18 (7th Cir. 2013); Pruitt, 503 F.3d 647, 656 (observing that the Seventh Circuit has “resisted laying down categorical rules regarding recruitment of counsel in particular types of cases”); Harper v. Bolton, 57 F.Supp.3d 889, 893 (N.D. Ill. 2014). Doing so would place untenable burdens on court resources. It would also turn the discretion of § 1915(e)(2) on its head, making appointment of counsel the rule rather than the exception.
Several pronouncements from the Court of Appeals appear to be in tension with this principle. First, the Seventh Circuit notes that “complexity increases and competence decreases as a case proceeds to the advanced phases of litigation.” James, 889 F.3d at 327. It deems the “[a]dvanced phases” to include those from discovery onward. Id.; McCaa, 893 F.3d at 1032. But nearly every prisoner case proceeds to discovery, as the district court applies exceedingly lenient review during initial screening.
Second, the Seventh Circuit instructs that district courts should evaluate a prisoner's competency irrespective of the involvement of a “jailhouse lawyer.” McCaa, 893 F.3d at 1033; Walker v. Price, No. 17-1345, 2018 WL 3967298, at *5 (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 2018). How courts should do this is not clear. A court rarely knows whether a filing was prepared by the plaintiff or someone helping him. And if a court does know that the plaintiff is receiving help, how can it assess his ability to litigate without knowing which portions of the filings are his work, and which come from the jailhouse lawyer? In Walker, the court determined that the inmate's work product decreased in quality after his jailhouse lawyer was transferred to another prison. 2018 WL 3967298, at *6. Yet a savvy prisoner, looking to secure counsel for himself, could do this on purpose, crafting his filings to downplay his own litigation capabilities. A court would have no way to assess whether the inmate is sandbagging it.
Finally, the Court of Appeals indicates that claims involving the state of mind of the defendant, such as those involving deliberate indifference, are particularly complex. James, 889 F.3d at 327-28; McCaa, 893 F.3d at 1032. Yet a government official's culpable mental state is the foundation for most constitutional claims. Indeed, it is often the defining characteristic that sets § 1983 claims apart from their state-law tort analogues. Deliberate indifference is essential to nearly all claims of cruel and unusual punishment, excessive force, mistreatment of medical needs, and First Amendment and due process violations. See Kingsley v. Henderson, 135 S.Ct. 2466, 2473 (2015); County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 849 (1998); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Hambright v. Kemper, 705 Fed.Appx. 461, 462 (7th Cir. 2017); Milton v. Slota, 697 Fed.Appx. 462, 464 (7th Cir. 2017) (“[N]egligently inflicted harm does not amount to a constitutional violation.”) (emphasis in original). Taken together, these claims comprise the vast majority of prisoner litigation in this District. If state-of-mind issues are generally beyond the ability of most pro se litigants to prove, then a court likely would need to appoint counsel in nearly every prisoner case. This is plainly impossible.
The guiding rule has always been that appointment of counsel is the exception rather than the rule in pro se prisoner litigation. Yet a confluence of all-too-common circumstances-discovery, jailhouse lawyers, and claims concerning state of mind-militate in favor of the appointment of counsel. As the list of reasons to appoint counsel grows, the reasons not to do so shrink. This District's resources have not kept pace.
Against this backdrop, the Court finds that Plaintiff has not presented sufficient evidence and argument showing that he cannot litigate or try this matter competently on his own. In his motion, Plaintiff indicates that he does not understand the rules of civil procedure or the hurdles that will arise during this action. ECF No. 12.
It is true, as Plaintiff intuits, that a lawyer would be helpful in navigating the legal system; trained attorneys are better positioned to successfully raise defenses. But Plaintiff's lack of legal training brings him in line with practically every other prisoner or former prisoner litigating in this Court. Further, the Court will assist Plaintiff in this regard (as it does with all prisoner litigants) by providing copies of the most pertinent federal and local procedural rules along with its scheduling order. Thus, ignorance of the law or court procedure is generally not a qualifying reason for appointment of counsel. Plaintiff has not demonstrated that his case is exceptional to require counsel. As such, the Court will therefore deny Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel.
4. CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff may proceed on the following claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b):
Claim One: Fourth Amendment excessive force claim against the John Doe defendants.
The Court has enclosed with this Order guides prepared by court staff to address common questions that arise in cases filed by prisoners. These guides are entitled, “Answers to Prisoner Litigants' Common Questions” and “Answers to Pro Se Litigants' Common Questions.” They contain information that Plaintiff may find useful in prosecuting his case.
Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed without prepaying the filing fee, ECF No. 2, be and the same is hereby GRANTED;
IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion to appoint counsel, ECF No. 12, be and the same is hereby DENIED;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants Brookfield Police Department and the City of Brookfield be and the same are hereby DISMISSED from this action;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Brookfield Chief of Police James P. Adlam be added as a defendant for the limited purpose of helping Plaintiff identify the names of the John Doe defendants;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the U.S. Marshals Service shall serve a copy of the amended complaint and this order upon Chief Adlam pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. Plaintiff is advised that Congress requires the U.S. Marshals Service to charge for making or attempting such service. 28 U.S.C. § 1921(a). Although Congress requires the Court to order service by the U.S. Marshals Service, it has not made any provision for these fees to be waived either by the Court or by the U.S. Marshals Service. The current fee for waiver-of-service packages is $8.00 per item mailed. The full fee schedule is provided at 28 C.F.R. §§ 0.114(a)(2), (a)(3). The U.S. Marshals Service will give Plaintiff information on how to remit payment. The Court is not involved in collection of the fee;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Chief Adlam does not have to respond to Plaintiff's amended complaint; however, he must respond to any discovery requests as described in this Order;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must identify the names of the John Doe defendants within sixty days of Chief Adlam's attorney appearing; if he fails to identify the defendants within sixty days, the Court may dismiss his case based on his failure to follow the Court's order;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED if Defendants contemplate a motion to dismiss, the parties must meet and confer before the motion is filed. Defendants should take care to explain the reasons why they intend to move to dismiss, and Plaintiff should strongly consider filing an amended complaint. The Court expects this exercise in efficiency will obviate the need to file most motions to dismiss. Indeed, when the Court grants a motion to dismiss, it typically grants leave to amend unless it is “certain from the face of the complaint that any amendment would be futile or otherwise unwarranted.” Harris v. Meisner, No. 20-2650, 2021 WL 5563942, at *2 (7th Cir. Nov. 29, 2021) (quoting Runnion ex rel. Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. & Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 524 (7th Cir. 2015)). Therefore, it is in both parties' interest to discuss the matter prior to motion submissions. Briefs in support of, or opposition to, motions to dismiss should cite no more than ten (10) cases per claim. No string citations will be accepted. If Defendants file a motion to dismiss, Plaintiff is hereby warned that he must file a response, in accordance with Civil Local Rule 7 (E.D. Wis.), or he may be deemed to have waived any argument against dismissal and face dismissal of this matter with prejudice.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the agency having custody of Plaintiff shall collect from his institution trust account the $315.00 balance of the filing fee by collecting monthly payments from Plaintiff's prison trust account in an amount equal to 20% of the preceding month's income credited to Plaintiff's trust account and forwarding payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10 in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). The payments shall be clearly identified by the case name and number assigned to this case. If Plaintiff is transferred to another county, state, or federal institution, the transferring institution shall forward a copy of this Order along with his remaining balance to the receiving institution;
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a copy of this Order be sent to the officer in charge of the agency where Plaintiff is confined; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk's Office mail Plaintiff a copy of the guides entitled “Answers to Prisoner Litigants' Common Questions” and “Answers to Pro Se Litigants' Common Questions,” along with this Order.
Plaintiffs who are inmates at Prisoner E-Filing Program institutions shall submit all correspondence and case filings to institution staff, who will scan and e-mail documents to the Court. Prisoner E-Filing is mandatory for all inmates at Columbia Correctional Institution, Dodge Correctional Institution, Green Bay Correctional Institution, Oshkosh Correctional Institution, Waupun Correctional Institution, and Wisconsin Secure Program Facility.
Plaintiffs who are inmates at all other prison facilities, or who have been released from custody, will be required to submit all correspondence and legal material to:
Office of the Clerk United States District Court Eastern District of Wisconsin 362 United States Courthouse 517 E. Wisconsin Avenue Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202
DO NOT MAIL ANYTHING DIRECTLY TO THE COURT'S CHAMBERS . If mail is received directly to the Court's chambers, IT WILL BE RETURNED TO SENDER AND WILL NOT BE FILED IN THE CASE .
Plaintiff is further advised that failure to timely file any brief, motion, response, or reply may result in the dismissal of this action for failure to prosecute. In addition, the parties must notify the Clerk of Court of any change of address. IF PLAINTIFF FAILS TO PROVIDE AN UPDATED ADDRESS TO THE COURT AND MAIL IS RETURNED TO THE COURT AS UNDELIVERABLE, THE COURT WILL DISMISS THIS ACTION WITHOUT PREJUDICE .