Opinion
A23A1061
03-03-2023
RASHAWN MITCHELL v. THE STATE.
The Court of Appeals hereby passes the following order:
Rashawn Mitchell was charged with several sexual offenses, and he filed a special demurrer to the indictment. The trial court overruled the demurrer and subsequently denied Mitchell's request for a certificate of immediate review. Mitchell then filed this direct appeal, asserting that he is appealing the trial court's order under the collateral order doctrine. We lack jurisdiction.
Our precedent is clear that an order denying a special demurrer is an interlocutory order. See Ivey v. State, 210 Ga.App. 782, 783 (437 S.E.2d 810) (1993) (appeal of order overruling special demurrer required compliance with interlocutory appeal procedure). Accordingly, in order to appeal, Mitchell was required to follow the interlocutory appeal procedure in OCGA § 5-6-34 (b), which includes obtaining a certificate of immediate review. Here, the trial court declined to issue the certificate, and we will not interfere with the trial court's discretion in this regard. See Scruggs v. Georgia Dept. of Human Resources, 261 Ga. 587, 588 (1) (408 S.E.2d 103) (1991).
Mitchell is not entitled to a direct appeal under the collateral order doctrine. "The collateral order doctrine permits appeals from a small category of decisions that are (i) conclusive, (ii) that resolve important questions separate from the merits, and (iii) that are effectively unreviewable on appeal from the final judgment in the underlying action." Expedia, Inc. v. City of Columbus, 305 Ga.App. 450, 452 (1) (699 S.E.2d 600) (2010) (punctuation omitted). This narrow doctrine applies only to those cases in which denial of immediate appeal would render appellate review impossible. See Murphy v. Murphy, 322 Ga.App. 829, 831 (747 S.E.2d 21) (2013). That is not the case here and thus, the collateral order doctrine does not apply. See Ivey, 210 Ga.App. at 783 (order overruling a special demurrer is reviewable under the interlocutory appeal procedures or after conviction).
Accordingly, Mitchell's failure to comply with the interlocutory appeal procedures of OCGA § 5-6-34 (b) deprives this Court of jurisdiction to consider this appeal, which is hereby DISMISSED.