Mitchell v. Rice

11 Citing cases

  1. Armantrout v. Carlson

    166 Wn. 2d 931 (Wash. 2009)   Cited 8 times
    Noting that because WRC 4.20.020 did not define "dependent" it was appropriate to turn to the dictionary for meaning

    ¶10 The need for "substantial dependency" expressed in Bortle has been further defined as "a term having relation to the circumstances of the plaintiff." Mitchell v. Rice, 183 Wash. 402, 407, 48 P.2d 949 (1935) (claimant father was in a difficult financial situation and unable to sustainably support self); Estes v. Schulte, 146 Wash. 688, 689, 264 P. 990 (1928) (claimant sister's only income was from funds contributed by decedent). The dependency must be based on the situation existing at the time of decedent's death and not on promises of future contributions.

  2. Armantrout v. Carlson

    141 Wn. App. 716 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007)   Cited 5 times

    To the contrary, our supreme court has previously allowed the question to go to the jury if substantial evidence supports a finding of dependence.See Mitchell v. Rice, 183 Wash. 402, 48 P.2d 949 (1935) (issue of dependency properly reserved for the jury when there was substantial evidence that the father depended on monetary payments from the deceased). ¶12 Cascade challenges generally the three jury instructions relating to the Armantrouts' wrongful death claim, arguing that there is insufficient evidence as a matter of law to support that the Armantrouts were dependent on Kristen for support.

  3. Myers v. Pacific Greyhound Lines

    134 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1943)   Cited 4 times
    Involving the New Mexico statute

    In Massachusetts, Georgia, and Washington, each having a death statute similar but not identical with that in New Mexico, it is well settled that partial or substantial dependence is enough. Hodnett v. Boston Albany R. Co., 156 Mass. 86, 30 N.E. 224; Mulhall v. Fallon, 176 Mass. 266, 57 N.E. 386, 54 L.R.A. 934, 79 Am.St.Rep. 309; Welch v. New York, N.H. H.R. Co., 176 Mass. 393, 57 N.E. 668; Boyle v. Columbian Fireproofing Co., 182 Mass. 93, 64 N.E. 726; Mehan v. Lowell Electric Light Corp., 192 Mass. 53, 78 N.E. 385; Bartley v. Boston N. St. Ry. Co., 198 Mass. 163, 83 N.E. 1093; Clay v. Central Railroad Banking Co., 84 Ga. 345, 10 S.E. 967; Daniels v. Savannah, F. W. Ry. Co., 86 Ga. 236, 12 S.E. 365; Atlanta C. Air-Line Ry. Co. v. Gravitt, 93 Ga. 369, 20 S.E. 550, 26 L.R.A. 553, 44 Am.St.Rep. 145; Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Henson, 121 Ga. 462, 49 S.E. 278; Reid v. Moyd, 186 Ga. 578, 198 S.E. 703; Mitchell v. Rice, 183 Wn. 402, 48 P.2d 949; Cook v. Rafferty, 200 Wn. 234, 93 P.2d 376; Joski v. Short, 1 Wn.2d 454, 96 P.2d 483. Under a like statute in Florida, it is held that one basing his right to recover upon the fact that he was a dependent of the deceased must show that, either from disability of age or nonage, or physical or mental incapacity, coupled with a lack of property means, he was in fact dependent on the deceased for support. Duval v. Hunt, 34 Fla. 85, 15 So. 876; Benoit v. Miami Beach Electric Co., 85 Fla. 396, 96 So. 158. The fourth subdivision of section 12(j), chapter 83, Laws of New Mexico 1917, being the original Workmen's Compensation Act of the state, provides that a parent shall be deemed to be a dependent only if actually dependent, wholly or partially, on the deceased.

  4. Estate of Wasilchen v. Gohrman

    870 F. Supp. 2d 1115 (W.D. Wash. 2012)   Cited 7 times

    Since the Bortle opinion, the Court has further defined “substantial dependency” as “a term having relation to the circumstances of the plaintiff.” Armantrout, 214 P.3d at 917 (quoting Mitchell v. Rice, 183 Wash. 402, 48 P.2d 949, 951 (1935)). Moreover, “[t]he dependency must be based on the situation existing at the time of [the] decedent's death and not on promises of future contributions.”

  5. Beggs v. Department of Social & Health Services

    171 Wn. 2d 69 (Wash. 2011)   Cited 35 times
    Finding an implied cause of action against persons required to report child abuse in RCW 26.44.030

    This makes little sense in the context of a young child whose public benefit payments support the family and adds nothing to the analysis of dependency. Properly understood, the language in Bortle simply confirms that the degree of dependency must be real and substantial and will not arise from occasional gifts or gratuities. See Bortle, 60 Wash, at 554 (finding the deceased son's occasional gifts to his parents did not establish their dependency); see also Mitchell v. Rice, 183 Wash. 402, 405, 48 P.2d 949 (1935) (holding casual gifts insufficient to show dependency). Though Bortle determined the dependency of a parent on a deceased child, the same standard of substantial dependency applies when the second tier beneficiary is a sibling of the decedent.

  6. Hawley v. Mellem

    66 Wn. 2d 765 (Wash. 1965)   Cited 6 times

    (Italics mine.) This court has, in fact, inferentially if not directly rejected the strictly legalistic concept of the Aragon line of authority in Maddock v. McNiven, 139 Wn. 412, 247 P. 467, and Mitchell v. Rice, 183 Wn. 402, 48 P.2d 949. Speaking of the inconsistency apparent in two verdicts returned in consolidated cases, in the Maddock case, supra, this court said (p. 415): But there is another ground upon which the order directing a new trial in each case may be sustained, and that is the manifest inconsistency of the two verdicts.

  7. Joski v. Short

    96 P.2d 483 (Wash. 1939)   Cited 4 times

    To sustain a recovery upon the ground of dependency, it was necessary for the respondent to establish that she was, at the time of her son's death, substantially dependent upon him for support, and also that this dependency was recognized by the son by his contributing to her support, not merely by way of casual gifts from son to mother, but in recognition of the mother's dependency. Mitchell v. Rice, 183 Wn. 402, 48 P.2d 949. In the case of Cook v. Rafferty, 200 Wn. 234, 93 P.2d 376, upon this question it was said:

  8. Cook v. Rafferty

    93 P.2d 376 (Wash. 1939)   Cited 18 times
    In Cook, the adult daughter lived with her mother and her invalid father; she also contributed to the expenses of the household.

    Under the facts, we think it is reasonable to suppose that, had Miss Cook lived, she would have continued to contribute to the support of the family and continued to care for her parents, and to conclude that Mr. and Mrs. Cook suffered a pecuniary loss by reason of her death. It is established in this state that parents of an adult son need not be wholly dependent upon him for support in order to recover damages for his wrongful death. Partial dependency is sufficient. Mitchell v. Rice, 183 Wn. 402, 48 P.2d 949. The rule as to an adult daughter must be the same. Rem. Rev. Stat., §§ 183, 183-1, and 194 [P.C. §§ 8259, 8260, 8275], being remedial in their nature, are liberally construed.

  9. Sheldon v. Imhoff

    87 P.2d 103 (Wash. 1939)   Cited 5 times

    [1] As we understand it, appellants' contention is that the verdicts are, in form and substance, for the plaintiffs upon the issues of negligence and contributory negligence; that since, under the undisputed evidence, they sustained substantial injuries, the finding of the jury that they suffered no [none] damages is inconsistent with the substance of the verdicts. Appellants cite a number of cases where new trials have been ordered because of inconsistency in verdicts on different causes of action ( Mitchell v. Rice, 183 Wn. 402, 48 P.2d 949) or where nominal or inadequate damages have been awarded in face of proof of substantial injuries ( Daigle v. Rudebeck, 154 Wn. 536, 282 P. 827; Hillman v. Seattle, 163 Wn. 401, 299 P. 514). But we think these authorities are inapposite in the light of the italicized portion of the above quoted instruction.

  10. Silow v. Mau

    57 P.2d 1059 (Wash. 1936)   Cited 2 times

    " The case cited was followed in the cases of Lamping v. Ripley, 178 Wn. 206, 34 P.2d 459; Hatcher v. Globe Union Mfg. Co., 178 Wn. 411, 35 P.2d 32; Robinson v. Ebert, 180 Wn. 387, 39 P.2d 992; Davis v. Riegel, 182 Wn. 1, 44 P.2d 771; and Mitchell v. Rice, 183 Wn. 402, 48 P.2d 949. In the case of Swanson v. Sewall, 183 Wn. 462, 48 P.2d 939, this court affirmed an order denying a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and granting a new trial on the ground that the verdict was inadequate, saying, in connection with the latter phase of the case: