Summary
In Minino v Perales (168 AD2d 289, affd 79 NY2d 883), the First Department declared invalid a statute which denied sponsored legal aliens benefits under the Home Relief Program based upon a "deeming" provision that provided that for three years after the alien's entry into this country, the income of the sponsor is deemed available to the alien, whether or not the income is in fact available.
Summary of this case from Aliessa v. WhalenOpinion
December 11, 1990
Appeal from the Supreme Court, New York County (Leland DeGrasse, J.).
This action consolidates claims based upon the unlawful denial of Home Relief benefits by application of the provisions of Social Services Law § 131-k (3) "deeming" the income of a sponsor available to a sponsored alien for a period of three years after such alien's entry into the United States, for purposes of determining the eligibility of such alien for Home Relief benefits, whether or not such income is actually available. We reject the State's argument that the Federal "deeming" policy set forth in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981 and applicable to Federally funded public assistance programs, upon which Social Services Law § 131-k (3) is modeled, was intended by Congress to have the dual purpose of discouraging unqualified immigration into the United States and reducing the cost of public assistance, and thus that Federal preemption in the field of immigration mandates application of Social Services Law § 131-k (3) to the State-funded Home Relief program.
It has been held that not every State enactment which deals with aliens constitutes a regulation of immigration and is thus preempted by Federal law. (See, De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351.) Indeed, the Supreme Court has noted that the several States possess broad authority under their police powers to regulate the safety and welfare of all persons within the State, including aliens. (De Canas v. Bica, supra, at 356-357.)
Article XVII, § 1 of the New York State Constitution imposes a duty on the State to aid the needy and the Legislature may not avoid that constitutional mandate by denying aid to such persons solely on the basis of criteria having nothing to do with need, such as the "deeming" provision of Social Services Law § 131-k (3). (See, Tucker v. Toia, 43 N.Y.2d 1, 9.)
We find that it was error for Supreme Court to have denied the city defendant's motion to dismiss the action as against it. The sole responsibility of the city is to administer the State's public assistance program in New York City in accordance with State regulations, and thus the city defendant is not a necessary or proper party to the action. (See, e.g., Joanne S. v. Carey, 115 A.D.2d 4.)
Concur — Murphy, P.J., Sullivan, Carro, Milonas and Rubin, JJ.