The Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination can be claimed in any proceeding; it operates so that "the State cannot, 'expressly or by implication,' impose 'a penalty for the exercise of the privilege.'" Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 79, ¶ 13, 41 P.3d 614, 617 (App. 2001) (quoting In re Amanda W., 705 N.E.2d 724, 727 (App. 1997)); see also U.S. Const. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment did not exempt Father from participating in reunification services. Requiring Father to participate in reunification services did not necessarily mean he would be required to incriminate himself.
But to further sully the picture here, the prosecutor failed to instruct the grand jury that it was Maretick's right to be free from self-incrimination, that Maretick had no obligation to present evidence, and that the jurors could draw no negative inference from his failure to do so. See State v. Corrales, 138 Ariz. 583, 588 n. 3, 676 P.2d 615, 620 n. 3 (1983) (reiterating the commonly understood proposition that a jury may not draw negative inferences from a criminal witness's exercise of his Fifth Amendment right); see also Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 79, ¶ 13, 41 P.3d 614, 617 (App. 2001) (stating that an individual's Fifth Amendment privilege "can be claimed in any proceeding," whether civil or criminal). While the prosecutor was not strictly required to give the instruction, there is little doubt that the combination of the witness's misleading testimony, the prosecutor's intervention during grand jury questioning, and the failure to instruct the jurors in the applicable constitutional law raises the concern that the grand jury may have based its indictment upon improper evidence and law. Although instructions to grand juries are usually given before any cases are presented, no rule prohibits giving a later instruction should justice and the needs of the case require that it be given.
Further, the fact that the parent may have to make difficult choices does not provide an automatic defense for inaction-even when the choice is between pursuing the parental relationship or following the advice of counsel to avoid risking criminal liability. Cf. Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 77-80, ¶¶ 1, 7, 10, 15-17 (App. 2001) (affirming severance where parents charged with murder of one child followed criminal counsel's advice to refuse to participate in reunification services for remaining children)
Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec, 202 Ariz. 76, 79, ¶ 14 (App. 2001).
¶15 Parents' rights to raise their children as they see fit is fundamental, but not absolute. Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec, 202 Ariz. 76, 79, ¶ 14 (App. 2001) (citation omitted). To terminate parental rights, the court must find (1) by clear and convincing evidence one of the statutory grounds under A.R.S. § 8-533 and (2) by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interest of the child.
¶12 Parents' rights to raise their children as they see fit is fundamental, but not absolute. Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec, 202 Ariz. 76, 79, ¶ 14 (App. 2001) (citation omitted). To terminate parental rights, the court must find (1) by clear and convincing evidence one of the statutory grounds under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) and (2) by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child.
Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec, 202 Ariz. 76, 79, ¶ 14 (App. 2001).
¶18 Parents' rights to raise their children as they see fit is fundamental, but not absolute. Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec, 202 Ariz. 76, 79, ¶ 14 (App. 2001). To terminate parental rights, the court must find (1) by clear and convincing evidence one of the statutory grounds under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) and (2) by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the child.
¶ 12 Severance cases by their very nature are dependent on the unique factual circumstances of each case, but all of them implicate a parent’s constitutional right to parent her children. See Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. , 202 Ariz. 76, 79, ¶ 14, 41 P.3d 614, 617 (App. 2001). This fundamental right does not disappear because a parent has not been a model parent or has temporarily lost custody of the children.
Although parents have a fundamental right to raise their children as they see fit, that right is not without limitation. Minh T. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 202 Ariz. 76, 79, ¶ 14, 41 P.3d 614, 617 (App. 2001). As relevant here, a juvenile court may terminate a parent's rights if it finds by clear and convincing evidence "[t]hat the parent is deprived of civil liberties due to the conviction of a felony . . . if the sentence of that parent is of such length that the child will be deprived of a normal home for a period of years."