Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:03-CV-0902-Y
December 11, 2003
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND NOTICE AND ORDER
This cause of action was referred to the United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), as implemented by an order of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The Findings, Conclusions and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge are as follows:
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This is a purported petition for writ of habeas corpus by a federal prisoner pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
B. PARTIES
Petitioner Sakiliba Mathilde Mines, Reg. No. 36854-037, is a federal prisoner who was incarcerated in the Federal Medical Center, Carswell, in Fort Worth, Texas, at the time this petition was filed.
The Respondent is Lucy Mallisham, Warden of the Federal Medical Center, Carswell, in Fort Worth, Texas.
C. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mines was convicted in the United States District Court for the District of Maryland of three counts of failure to file a tax return in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7203. (Declaration of Alicia Vasquez at ¶¶ 4.) She was sentenced on March 4, 2002, to an aggregate 21-month term of imprisonment and has a current projected release date of December 31, 2003. (Id.) Apparently, Mines was transferred to FMC-Carswell Psychiatric Unit on January 14, 2003. (Federal Pet. at 5; Declaration of Te Cora Ballom, D.O. at ¶ 2.) Mines filed the instant habeas corpus petition in the United States District Court, Fort Worth Division, on August 18, 2003, in which she complains of various conditions of her incarceration and in which she seeks injunctive relief, a temporary restraining order, damages, and a transfer to a less "restrictive environment" or immediate release from confinement to seek treatment for her medical condition. (Federal Pet. at 7; Pet'r Reply at 23.) Since the date she filed her petition, Mines was transferred to the Danbury Federal Correctional Institution in Danbury, Connecticut, and then to Montgomery County Pre-Release in Rockville, Maryland. On December 5, 2003, Mines notified the court of a change of address to 9006 Garland Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland 20901. The respondent has filed a response with supporting affidavits, to which Mines has replied.
The Declaration of Te Cora Ballom, D.O. was placed under seal by order dated November 5, 2003.
D. ISSUES
Mines's grounds for habeas relief are construed as follows:
1. Through deliberate indifference, she has been denied medical evaluation and treatment by a specialist for mercury toxicity in a timely manner;
2. Her transfer and reclassification to FMC Carswell, a higher security level prison, was retaliatory;
3. She has been the victim of sexual misconduct and cruel and unusual punishment; and
4. Various prison officials have conspired to violate her rights in "abuse of authority under color of law." (Federal Pet. at 4-6.)
E. DISCUSSION
In its response, the government contends Mines's claims are not appropriately raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus in this court. (Resp't Resp. at 8-9.) It appears the government's assertion is correct.
"Deliberate indifference" by prison officials to serious illness or injury states a cause of action under § 1983, and not § 2241. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105 (1976); Harris v. Hegmann, 198 F.3d 153, 159 (5th Cir. 1999); Steward v. Murphy, 174 F.3d 530, 533-34 (5th Cir. 1999); McCord v. Maggio, 910 F.2d 1248, 1251 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Sisneros, 599 F.2d 946, 947 (10th Cir. 1979). But see Mason v. Ciccone, 517 F.2d 73 (8th Cir. 1975). Mines's challenge to the nature and quality of her medical care does not question the fact, duration, or degree of her confinement, but rather its conditions. See generally Carson v. Johnson, 112 F.3d 818, 820-21 (5th Cir. 1997); Cook v. Texas Dept. of Criminal Justice, Transitional Planning Dept., 37 F.3d 166, 168 (5th Cir. 1994); Spina v. Aaron, 821 F.2d 1126, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987). Moreover, habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle to seek relief for medical claims, because even if a petitioner can demonstrate that his or her allegations of mistreatment are true and amount to a constitutional violation, the petitioner would still not be entitled to release from prison. See Cook v. Hanberry, 596 F.2d 658, 660 (5th Cir. 1979). Thus, Mines's first complaint is not a proper subject for a habeas corpus petition.
As to her second claim, Mines contends that her transfer and reclassification to the Psychiatric Unit at FMC Carswell when she had no history of mental illness was retaliatory in response to her "expressing [her] opinion and requesting medical care" and to her exercising her "First Right Amendment to complain to Congress about serious constitutional violations." (Federal Pet. at 5, 7; Pet'r Reply at 22.) She also complains of the "manner in which she was transferred." According to Mines, she was "thrown to the ground, shackled and chained against her will" and "transferred as an emergency to Carswell." (Id. at 5; Pet'r Reply at 17.) It is well settled that under 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b), the Bureau of Prisons may direct confinement in any available facility and may transfer a prisoner from one facility to another at any time. See Holland v. Ciccone, 386 F.2d 825, 827 (8th Cir. 1967). Federal prisoners generally enjoy no constitutional right to placement in a particular penal institution or to a particular custodial classification, and administrative determinations regarding these issues are not subject to review in a habeas corpus proceeding. See Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 322 (1989); Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245 (1983); Wilson v. Budney, 976 F.2d 957, 958 (5th Cir. 1992); Brown-Bey v. United States, 720 F.2d 467, 470 (7th Cir. 1983). Nor is Mines's complaint involving the alleged "manner" in which she was transferred cognizable in federal habeas review. (Pet'r Reply at 17-18.) Contrary to her assertion, a particular episode of alleged excessive force or some other wrong by prisoner officials does not go "to the manner in which [her] sentence is being executed," but, instead, constitutes a "condition of confinement." The proper vehicle for such a claim is a § 1983 action. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983; Siglar v. Hightower, 112 F.3d 191, 193 (5th Cir. 1997).
Mines's third claim involves alleged sexual misconduct by a corrections officer in the Federal Prison Camp in Alderson, West Virginia, where Mines was confined before her transfer to FMC Carswell. (Federal Pet. at 5; Pet'r Reply at 19.) The government alleges, and Mines appears to concede, that to the extent the claim is appropriate for habeas review, the court lacks jurisdiction over the claim. However, because this type of claim raises an arguable § 1983 claim only, and is not appropriate for habeas review, it is not necessary to address the jurisdictional question. See McFadden v. Lucas, 713 F.2d 143, 146 (5th Cir. 1983).
Finally, under her fourth claim, Mines alleges a "conspiracy against [her] rights" and lists various prison officers and officials and two prison doctors as "defendants." (Federal Pet. at 5-6.) Again, this type of claim is properly raised in a § 1983 action, not a habeas petition under § 2241. See Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1995).
To establish a conspiracy claim under § 1983, a prisoner must demonstrate (1) an agreement between persons acting under color of law to commit an illegal act, and (2) an actual deprivation of the prisoner's constitutional rights in furtherance of the conspiracy. Hale v. Townley, 45 F.3d 914, 920 (5th Cir. 1995).
RECOMMENDATION
Because writ of habeas corpus is not the appropriate vehicle for the relief sought by Mines, it is recommended that respondent's petition for writ of habeas corpus be DENIED.NOTICE OF RIGHT TO OBJECT TO PROPOSED FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION AND CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO OBJECT
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), each party to this action has the right to serve and file specific written objections in the United States District Court to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation within ten (10) days after the party has been served with a copy of this document. The court is extending the deadline within which to file specific written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation until January 2, 2004. The United States District Judge need only make a de novo determination of those portions of the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation to which specific objection is timely made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(B)(1). Failure to file by the date stated above a specific written objection to a proposed factual finding or legal conclusion will bar a party, except upon grounds of plain error or manifest injustice, from attacking on appeal any such proposed factual finding or legal conclusion accepted by the United States District Judge. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en bane op. on reh'g); Carter v. Collins, 918 F.2d 1198, 1203 (5th Cir. 1990).
IV. ORDER
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636, it is ORDERED that each party is granted until January 2, 2004, to serve and file written objections to the United States Magistrate Judge's proposed findings, conclusions, and recommendation. It is further ORDERED that if objections are filed and the opposing party chooses to file a response, a response shall be filed within seven (7) days of the filing date of the objections.
It is further ORDERED that the above-styled and numbered action, previously referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation, be and hereby is returned to the docket of the United States District Judge.