Opinion
2006-627 K C.
Decided on June 7, 2007.
Appeal from a judgment of the Civil Court of the City of New York, Kings County (Loren Baily-Schiffman, J.), entered May 25, 2005. The judgment, after a nonjury trial, dismissed the action.
udgment reversed without costs and matter remanded to the court below for a new trial.
Present: PESCE, P.J., WESTON PATTERSON AND GOLIA, JJ.
In this small claims action to recover the sum of $1,500, the court below precluded plaintiff from presenting her proof, consisting of a promissory note defendant allegedly signed, establishing that she loaned defendant said amount. The court misstated the law when it would not make a determination regarding the genuineness of the signature appearing on said promissory note by comparing that signature with defendant's signature appearing on other documents presented by plaintiff at trial ( see CPLR 4536; Legale v Moura, 14 Misc 3d 10 [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists 2006]). On this point of law, the court's determination was so clearly erroneous that plaintiff was precluded from establishing her claim against defendant and denied substantial justice ( see CCA 1804, 1807; Borg v Linnenkohl, 4 Misc 3d 132 [A], 2004 NY Slip Op 50715[U] [App Term, 2d 11th Jud Dists]). Accordingly, a new trial is required.
Pesce, P.J., and Golia, JJ., concur.
Weston Patterson, J., dissents and votes to affirm the judgment in the following memorandum:
Although the court below did not determine the genuineness of the signature appearing on the promissory note, the court's decision involved nothing more than an issue of credibility that was properly resolved in defendant's favor. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent and would vote to affirm.
It is well-settled that issues of credibility are appropriately resolved by the trier of fact, who is in the best position to evaluate the testimony and observe the witnesses' demeanor ( see McGuirk v Mugs Pub., 250 AD2d 824). A fact finder's credibility determination should not be disturbed on appeal, "unless it is obvious that it could not have been reached under any fair interpretation of the evidence" ( Nevers v High Q Auto, Inc., 15 Misc 3d 134 [A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50729[U] [App Term 2d 11th Jud Dists], citing Claridge Gardens v Menotti, 160 AD2d 544). "The deference accorded to a trial court's credibility determinations applies with even greater force to judgments rendered in the Small Claims Part of the court given the limited standard of review" ( Nevers v High Q Auto, Inc., 15 Misc 3d 134 [A], 2007 NY Slip Op 50729[U], supra).
Applying these principles here, I conclude that there is ample support in the record for the trial court's determination. Defendant admitted to having received $1,500 from plaintiff, but denied that it was his signature on the note and maintained that the $1,500 payment was for services he had rendered to plaintiff. The court below, having had the opportunity to assess the witnesses' demeanor, obviously credited defendant's testimony over that of plaintiff and dismissed the action. Although the court indicated that it was not a "handwriting expert," it noted that it was unable, not unwilling, to determine the authenticity of the signature on the promissory note. In my view, there is no basis for disturbing the trial court's discretionary determination. In these circumstances, it cannot be said that plaintiff was denied "substantial justice" according to the rules and principles of substantive law (CCA 1807).