Opinion
HHDCV166064355
01-31-2017
Emad Mina v. Connecticut Children's Medical Center et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
Nina F. Elgo, J.
The defendants, Connecticut Children's Medical Center (CCMC) and Connecticut Children's Specialty Group, Inc., have filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by the plaintiff, Emad Mina, on the ground that this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction in this action for declaratory relief. The plaintiff claims that the defendants use a form admissions contract with " open" pricing terms which thus requires that CCMC charge the plaintiff for the " reasonable value" of services rendered rather than the " Chargemaster" rates applicable for uninsured " self-pay" patients. The plaintiff seeks declaratory relief pursuant to General Statutes § 52-29.
General Statutes § 52-29(a) provides: " The Superior Court in any action or proceeding may declare rights and other legal relations on request for such a declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be claimed. The declaration shall have the force of a final judgment."
The plaintiff, as the parent of a minor who received emergency care services at CCMC, signed the form admissions contract as a guarantor and alleges that she was improperly charged the " Chargemaster" rates as opposed to the " reasonable value" of the services rendered. In seeking to dismiss the complaint, the defendants characterize these claims as non-justiciable because they are moot, there is no actual controversy, and the plaintiff lacks standing. The plaintiff argues that the defendants are not raising issues that implicate subject matter jurisdiction but, at best, are issues that should be raised in a motion to strike.
DISCUSSION
Subject Matter Jurisdiction and Justiciability
" [J]usticiability comprises several related doctrines, namely, standing, ripeness, mootness and the political question doctrine, that implicate a court's subject matter jurisdiction and its competency to adjudicate a particular matter . . . A case that is nonjusticiable must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Janulawicz v. Commissioner of Correction, 310 Conn. 265, 270, 77 A.3d 113 (2013).
Actual Controversy and Standing
In the context of declaratory judgment actions, our Appellate Court has indicated that all a plaintiff must do to establish the existence of an actual controversy is to allege sufficient facts showing a substantial dispute between the parties. " Practice Book § 390[(b)] [now § 17-55(2)] governs the issuance of declaratory judgments and provides [that] . . . [t]he court will not render declaratory judgments upon the complaint of any person . . . unless 'there is an actual bona fide and substantial question or issue in dispute or substantial uncertainty of legal relations which requires settlement between the parties . . .' The provisions of Practice Book § 390(b) thus require that an action for declaratory judgment be employed only where there is a justiciable controversy . . . The § 390(b) requirement of an actual controversy is one of subject matter jurisdiction . . .
" Section 390(b) requires a sufficient practical need for the determination of the question in dispute . . . The complaint must state facts sufficient to set forth a cause of action entitling the plaintiff to a declaratory judgment . . . To state a cause of action for such relief, facts showing the existence of a substantial controversy or uncertainty of legal relations that requires settlement between the parties must be alleged. Ordinarily, there should be an assertion in the pleadings by one party of a legal relation or status or right in which he has a definite interest, together with an assertion of the denial of it by the other party, thus setting forth a substantial dispute." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) ASL Associates v. Zoning Commission, 18 Conn.App. 542, 545-46, 559 A.2d 236 (1989); accord ABB Automation, Inc. v. Zaharna, 77 Conn.App. 260, 264-67, 823 A.2d 340 (2003).
The purpose of a declaratory judgment action, as authorized by General Statutes § 52-29 and Practice Book § 390, " is to secure an adjudication of rights where there is a substantial question in dispute or a substantial uncertainty of legal relations between the parties." (Emphasis added.) Connecticut Asso. of Health Care Facilities, Inc. v. Worrell, 199 Conn. 609, 613, 508 A.2d 743 (1986). Thus, " [d]eclaratory relief is a mere procedural device by which various types of substantive claims may be vindicated." Luckenbach Steamship Co. v. United States, 312 F.2d 545, 548 (2d Cir. 1963).
" Implicit in these principles is the notion that a declaratory judgment action must rest on some cause of action that would be cognizable in a nondeclaratory suit. See Hodgdon v. Campbell, 411 A.2d 667, 669 (Me. 1980) (declaratory judgment statutes do " not create a new cause of action; [their] purpose is 'to provide a more adequate and flexible remedy in cases where jurisdiction already exists"). To hold otherwise would convert our declaratory judgment statute and rules into a convenient route for procuring an advisory opinion on moot or abstract questions . . . and would mean that the declaratory judgment statute and rules created substantive rights that did not otherwise exist." (Citation omitted.) Wilson v. Kelley, 224 Conn. 110, 116, 617 A.2d 433 (1992).
" [Section] 52-29, which, as we have recognized, provides a valuable tool by which litigants may resolve uncertainty of legal obligations." Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., 263 Conn. 616, 625, 822 A.2d 196 (2003). " The [declaratory judgment] procedure has the distinct advantage of affording to the court in granting any relief consequential to its determination of rights the opportunity of tailoring that relief to the particular circumstances." Horton v. Meskill, 172 Conn. 615, 627, 376 A.2d 359 (1977). A declaratory judgment action is not, however, " a procedural panacea for use on all occasions, " but, rather, is limited to solving justiciable controversies. Liebeskind v. Waterbury, 142 Conn. 155, 158-59, 112 A.2d 208 (1955). Invoking § 52-29 does not create jurisdiction where it would not otherwise exist. Wilson v. Kelley, supra, 224 Conn. 116 (" Implicit in [§ 52-29 and Practice Book § 17-55] is the notion that a declaratory judgment must rest on some cause of action that would be cognizable in a nondeclaratory suit . . . To hold otherwise would convert our declaratory judgment statute and rules into a convenient route for procuring an advisory opinion on moot or abstract questions . . . and would mean that the declaratory judgment statute and rules created substantive rights that did not otherwise exist." [Citations omitted.]); accord Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., supra, 625. " Consequently, in analyzing whether a declaratory judgment action is barred by a particular statutory period of limitations, a court must examine the underlying claim or right on which the declaratory action is based." Wilson v. Kelley, supra, 116.
In this case, the plaintiff has clearly alleged facts which manifest a dispute as to the terms and implications of the contract to which she, as guarantor, and the defendants are parties. As such, she not only has standing as a party to the contract but has demonstrated the existence of a " substantial controversy or uncertainty of legal relations" due to the ambiguity of the terms which the defendants have duly denied. Specifically, the defendants deny that Chargemaster rates were imposed and deny that the pricing terms are open or uncertain. Whatever the underlying merits of the defendants' claims, however, the denials serve to underscore the fact that there is nevertheless an actual controversy before the court. " In deciding whether the plaintiff's complaint presents a justiciable claim, [a court] make[s] no determination regarding its merits. Rather, [a court] consider[s] only whether the matter in controversy [is] capable of being adjudicated by judicial power according to the aforestated well established principles." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Milford Power Co., LLC v. Alstom Power, Inc., supra, 263 Conn. 626.
The defendant nevertheless argues that this " court must decide the jurisdictional issue even if the inquiry overlaps with the merits of the case." The authority upon which the defendant relies, however, simply does not support that proposition. Moreover, in ABB Automation, Inc. v. Zaharna, supra, 77 Conn.App. 260, the Appellate Court reversed the trial court's determination that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction where the trial court found that allegations based " on information and belief" could not establish the existence of an actual controversy. In that case, the plaintiff corporation alleged in its complaint that it had entered into an employment contract with the defendant and that, " on information and belief, " the defendant disputed the validity and enforceability of some provisions of the employment agreement. The plaintiff thus sought a judicial determination to settle the " actual bona fide and substantial questions and issues in dispute between the parties and substantive uncertainty of legal relations between them." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 262.
Relying on the principle that " [t]he court must accept as true the facts alleged in the complaint" the court determined that " [t]he form of the allegations [there at issue were] not per se insufficient to demonstrate the existence of a substantial controversy. The substance of the allegations is an assertion that the agreement of employment is valid and enforceable, and that the defendant disputes that proposition." Id., 267. Noting that, " [a]s a fact pleading state, [our courts] do not exalt form over substance, particularly when [the court] indulge[s] every presumption in favor of subject matter jurisdiction, " the court rejected the assertion that " the allegations [were] conclusory in nature because of the form employed by the plaintiff in its complaint." Id. The Appellate Court therefore concluded that, " [b]ecause the court did not lack subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the complaint, it improperly granted the defendant's motion to dismiss." Id.
Ironically, the defendants here argue that this court should consider in its motion to dismiss the fact that " the overwhelming majority of courts have ruled that similar pricing language is not 'uncertain.'" Such a determination, however, is on its face a determination of the merits of the controversy itself, and not whether a substantial controversy exists. Moreover, this court's review of those cases reveal that while there is no consensus on the implications of similar pricing language, the justiciability of the issue was not in question and indeed, none were dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Burton v. William Beaumont Hosp., 347 F.Supp.2d 486, 491 (E.D.Mich. 2004) (various claims were substantively reviewed, including under failure to state claim standard); Banner Health v. Medical Savings Ins. Co., 216 Ariz. 146, 163 P.3d 1096 (Ariz.Ct.App. 2007) (decided on summary judgment); Limberg v. Sanford Medical Center Fargo, 2016 ND 140, 881 N.W.2d 658, 660 (N.D. 2016) (although court dismissed the action based on failure to state claim, court specifically found that it had jurisdiction under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 2).
Mootness
" Mootness raises the issue of a court's subject matter jurisdiction and is therefore appropriately considered even when not raised by one of the parties. Mootness is a question of justiciability that must be determined as a threshold matter because it implicates [the] court's subject matter jurisdiction . . .
" The fundamental principles underpinning the mootness doctrine are well settled. [Our Supreme Court] begin[s] with the four part test for justiciability established in State v. Nardini, 187 Conn. 109, 445 A.2d 304 (1982) . . . Because courts are established to resolve actual controversies, before a claimed controversy is entitled to a resolution on the merits it must be justiciable. Justiciability requires (1) that there be an actual controversy between or among the parties to the dispute . . . (2) that the interests of the parties be adverse . . . (3) that the matter in controversy be capable of being adjudicated by judicial power . . . and (4) that the determination of the controversy will result in practical relief to the complainant . . .
" The mootness doctrine is rooted in the first factor of the Nardini test . . . It is founded on the same policy interests as the doctrine of standing, namely, to assure the vigorous presentation of arguments concerning the matter at issue . . . [The Supreme Court has] . . . reiterated that the standing doctrine is designed to ensure that courts and parties are not vexed by suits brought to vindicate non-justiciable interests and that judicial decisions which may affect the rights of others are forged in hot controversy, with each view fairly and vigorously represented . . . Indeed, [the court] note[s] that courts are called upon to determine existing controversies, and thus may not be used as a vehicle to obtain advisory judicial opinions on points of law." (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lyon v. Jones, 291 Conn. 384, 392-93, 968 A.2d 416 (2009).
" [A]n actual controversy must exist not only at the time the appeal is taken, but also throughout the pendency of the appeal . . . When, during the pendency of an appeal, events have occurred that preclude an appellate court from granting any practical relief through its disposition of the merits, a case has become moot . . . [I]t is not the province of appellate courts to decide moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual relief or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow . . . In determining mootness, the dispositive question is whether a successful appeal would benefit the plaintiff or defendant in any way." (Citations omitted; emphasis omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Lyon v. Jones, 291 Conn. 384, 392-94, 968 A.2d 416 (2009).
In asserting that the claims are moot, the defendants argue that the plaintiff was not required to pay " Chargemaster" rates. The defendants argue that as someone who was believed to have private commercial insurance, specifically, Aetna insurance, the plaintiff was charged at the same rate applicable to other, privately insured emergency care patients. The defendants argue that this renders the plaintiff's claims moot.
In light of this stance and the affidavits filed in support, this court orders as to the issue of mootness supplemental briefing and a hearing to address the following issue:
1. Whether there is an issue of fact in dispute on this jurisdictional question and whether it must be resolved before this court may rule on the issue of mootness?