Milton v. Rapiscan Security Products

Full title: CARRIE MILTON v. RAPISCAN SECURITY PRODUCTS, ET AL

Court: United States District Court, E.D. Louisiana

Date published: Dec 22, 2004

Civil Action No: 04-591, Section: "R" (1) (E.D. La. Dec. 22, 2004)

Opinion

Civil Action No: 04-591, Section: "R" (1).

December 22, 2004

ORDER AND REASONS

SARAH VANCE, District Judge

The Transportation Security Administration moves the Court to dismiss it from the action under Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The plaintiff, Carrie Milton, has no opposition to the dismissal of TSA from the action. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The United States, through the TSA, employed Carrie Milton as a Transportation Security Screener at Louis Armstrong Airport in Kenner, Louisiana. She alleges that the screening device provided by Rapiscan Security Products shocked her on March 1, 2003. Further, she alleges that she sustained a permanent and total injury to her left hand, and, as a result, she has been unable to work since the accident. On March 2, 2004, Carrie Milton sued Rapiscan and her employer, TSA, in tort. TSA now moves the Court to dismiss it from the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standard

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) governs challenges to a district court's subject matter jurisdiction. The Court must grant a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction when it lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate the case. See Home Builders Ass'n of Miss., Inc., v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998) ( quoting Nowak v. Ironworkers Local 6 Pension Fund, 81 F.3d 1182, 1187 (2d Cir. 1996)). A district court may dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on (1) the complaint alone; (2) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record; or (3) the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the Court's resolution of disputed facts. See Williamson v. Tucker, 645 F.2d 404, 413 (5th Cir. 1981); see also Robinson v. TCI/US West Communications Inc., 117 F.3d 900, 904 (5th Cir. 1997) (citations omitted). The party who invokes federal court jurisdiction bears the burden of showing that jurisdiction is proper. Dow Agrosciences, LLC v. Bates, 332 F.3d 323, 326 (5^th Cir. 2003).

B. Analysis

The Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2671, et seq., provides a limited waiver of sovereign immunity of the government for negligent or wrongful acts of government employees. See Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. Unites States Postal Svs., 675 F.2d 756, 757-58 (5^th Cir. 1982). Government employees injured in the course and scope of their employment, however, cannot sue under the FTCA and recover in tort. Instead, they are entitled to compensation only under the Federal Employees Compensation Act. See 5 U.S.C. § 8116(c). As FECA provides, the government's liability under the Act to pay compensation to government employees injured in the course and scope of their employment "is exclusive and instead of all other liability of the United States." Id. See also White v. U.S., 143 F.3d 232, 234 (5^th Cir. 1998) (describing FECA's remedy as exclusive of any other remedy, including suit under the FTCA, for injuries within its coverage). Therefore, FECA bars any individual who has received benefits under its provisions from suing the United States for that injury under the FTCA. Grijalva v. U.S., 781 F.2d 472, 474 (5^th Cir. 1986). FECA also bars all judicial review of the determination of claims for compensation under it. 5 U.S.C. § 8128(b).

Milton suffered an injury while working in the course and scope of her employment as a government employee. As TSA's Attachment 7 shows, and Milton does not dispute, the Department of Labor Worker's Compensation Programs accepted Milton's claim for compensation under FECA. Thus, Milton is not entitled to sue for her injury under the FTCA because FECA provides the exclusive remedy for government employees who are injured on-the-job. Moreover, to the extent that her complaint is attempt to appeal a determination of the benefits she received under FECA, the Court is without power to hear it because FECA precludes all judicial review of such determinations. Cf. Almaguer v. White, 2002 WL 31396123, at *6 (W.D. Tx.Sept. 13, 2002) (granting the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) because the plaintiff's injuries were covered by FECA).

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS TSA's motion to dismiss.