Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-591 Section: "R" (1).
June 6, 2005
ORDER AND REASONS
Rapiscan Security Products moves the Court for summary judgment on plaintiff Carrie Milton's claim that it supplied a defective product under the Louisiana Products Liability Act. Milton has not responded to the motion. For the following reasons, the Court GRANTS the motion.
I. BACKGROUND
During the spring of 2003, Carrie Milton worked as a Transportation Security Screener at Louis Armstrong Airport in Kenner, Louisiana. She alleges that the screening device she used, provided by Rapiscan Security Products, shocked her on March 1, 2003. As a result, she alleges that she sustained permanent and total injury to her left hand. On March 2, 2004, Milton sued Rapiscan under the Louisiana Products Liability Act. Rapiscan now moves the Court for summary judgment.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Legal Standard
Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues as to any material facts, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2551 (1986). The court must be satisfied that no reasonable trier of fact could find for the nonmoving party or, in other words, "that the evidence favoring the nonmoving party is insufficient to enable a reasonable jury to return a verdict in her favor." Lavespere v. Niagara Mach. Tool Works, Inc., 910 F.2d 167, 178 (5th Cir. 1990); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986). The moving party bears the burden of establishing that there are no genuine issues of material fact. Krim v. BancTexas Group, Inc., 989 F.2d 1435, 1445 (5th Cir. 1993). A factual dispute precludes a grant of summary judgment if the evidence would permit a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Hunt v. Rapides Healthcare System, LLC, 2001 WL 1650961 (5th Cir. 2001) (citations omitted).
If the dispositive issue is one for which the nonmoving party will bear the burden of proof at trial, the moving party may satisfy its burden by merely pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S. Ct. at 2552; Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178. The burden then shifts to the nonmoving party, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts showing that a genuine issue exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553.
B. Analysis
(1) Law
The Louisiana Products Liability Act (LPLA) "establishes the exclusive theories of liability for manufacturers for damage caused by their products." LA.REV.STAT. § 9:2800.52, et seq. The LPLA provides that "[t]he manufacturer of a product shall be liable to a claimant for damage proximately caused by a characteristic of the product that renders the product unreasonably dangerous when such damage arose from a reasonably anticipated use of the product by claimant or another person or entity." Id. § 9:2800.54(A). A product can be "unreasonably dangerous" in (1) construction or composition; (2) design; (3) lack of an adequate warning, or (4) lack of conformity to express warranties. Id. § 9:2800.54(B). The plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the product was unreasonably dangerous. Id. § 9:2800.54(D). The fact-finder may not infer the existence of a vice or defect in a product merely because an accident occurred. Jaeger v. Automotive Casualty Ins. Co., 682 So.2d 292, 298 (La.App.Ct. 1996). See also Ashley v. General Motors Corp., 666 So.2d 1320, 1322 (La.App.Ct. 1996) (same). Further, the characteristic of the product that made it unreasonably dangerous must exist at the time the product left the manufacturer's control. LA.REV.STAT. § 9:2800.54(c).
The LPLA provides that "[a] product is unreasonably dangerous in construction or composition if, at the time the product left its manufacturer's control, the product deviated in a material way from the manufacturer's specifications or performance standards for the product or from otherwise identical products manufactured by the same manufacturer." LA.REV.STAT. § 9:2800.55. In order to make this showing, a plaintiff "must demonstrate not only what a manufacturer's specifications or performance standards are for a particular product, but how the product in question materially deviated from those standards so as to render it 'unreasonably dangerous.'" Welch v. Technotrim, Inc., 778 So.2d 728, 733 (La.App.Ct. 2001). See also Morris v. United Services Automobile Ass'n, 756 So.2d 549, 558
(La.App.Ct. 2000) (same).
The LPLA also provides that a product is unreasonably dangerous in design if, at the time if left the manufacturer's control:
(1) There existed an alternative design for the product that was capable of preventing claimant's damage; and (2) The likelihood that the product's design would cause the claimant's damage and the gravity of that damage outweighed the burden on the manufacturer of adopting such alternative design and the adverse effect, if any, of such alternative design on the utility of the product. An adequate warning about a product shall be considered in evaluating the likelihood of damage when the manufacturer has used reasonable care to provide the adequate warning to users and handlers of the product.
LA.REV.STAT. § 9:2800.56. In order to demonstrate that a product is unreasonably dangerous in design, the plaintiff must (1) identify a specific alternative design that existed and was capable of preventing her injury; and (2) perform the requisite risk-utility analysis. See Krummel v. Bombardier Corp., 206 F.3d 548, 551 (5th Cir. 2000); Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 183. An alternative design must be reasonably specific and not based on mere speculation. See Seither v. Winnebago Industries, Inc., 853 So.2d 37, 41 (La.App.Ct. 2003).
(2) Analysis
Milton's complaint simply asserts that Rapiscan's product was inherently dangerous, "defection," [ sic], and foreseeably would harm persons who made customary use of it. As noted supra, Milton bears the burden of proof on her LPLA claims at trial. Therefore, Rapiscan satisfies its burden on summary judgment by pointing out that the evidence in the record contains insufficient proof concerning an essential element of Milton's claim. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S. Ct. at 2552; Lavespere, 910 F.2d at 178.
Here, Rapiscan points out that there is no evidence in the record to support Milton's LPLA claims. Rapiscan also points out that Milton has not designated any expert witnesses on liability issues. Therefore, the burden is on Milton, who must, by submitting or referring to evidence, set out specific facts to show the Court that a genuine issue exists. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324, 106 S.Ct. at 2553. Milton, however, has not submitted any evidence or set out any facts to show the Court that a genuine issue of fact exists. Accordingly, Rapiscan is entitled to summary judgment.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS the defendant's motion for summary judgment.