Opinion
No. 06-05-00116-CR
Submitted: December 28, 2005.
Decided: January 13, 2006. DO NOT PUBLISH.
On Appeal from the 71st Judicial District Court, Harrison County, Texas, Trial Court No. 04-0244X.
Before MORRISS, C.J., ROSS and CARTER, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
After a careful review of the entire appellate record, Walter Wayne Mills' counsel on appeal submitted a brief to this Court in which counsel concluded there are no arguable issues that would require reversal of the trial court's judgment. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). As also required by Anders, counsel filed a motion to withdraw from the appeal, sent Mills a copy of the brief and the appellate record, and informed Mills of his right to file a responsive brief pro se. Mills submitted a response November 28, 2005. After conducting our own independent review of the record before us, we concur with counsel's assessment, and for the reasons set forth briefly below, we affirm the trial court's judgment. Mills pled guilty to the offense of aggravated robbery. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.03 (Vernon 2003). Mills elected to have the jury assess punishment. The record in this case shows the trial court's admonishments to Mills concerning his guilty plea complied substantially with Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13 (Vernon Supp. 2005). The record also reflects that Mills' waiver of rights and plea of "guilty" were made willingly, knowingly, and voluntarily. Thus, Mills' plea is factually and legally sufficient to support the trial court's entry of a finding of guilt. See Ex parte Williams, 703 S.W.2d 674, 678 (Tex.Crim.App. 1986) (in felony cases where defendant pleads guilty before jury, "there is no question of the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal . . . or on collateral attack"). Our review of voir dire, as well as the parties' opening and closing arguments, also reveals nothing to suggest that reversible error occurred during those portions of the proceedings below. Likewise, our review of the jury charge reveals no anomalies requiring reversal. The record suggests — although it is not exactly clear — that Mills' trial counsel had requested the trial court to list some of the conditions of community supervision that could be imposed by the trial court, should the jury recommend a probated sentence. The record also might be read to suggest counsel wanted the trial court to issue some instruction regarding alcohol and drug abuse that counsel thought should be considered by the jury as a factor mitigating punishment. Neither request, however, was submitted in writing, nor was either requested charge specifically dictated into the record, as required by law. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14 (Vernon Supp. 2005). Accordingly, any issues regarding Mills' generalized charge requests were not preserved for review by this Court. Moreover, we note that a trial court is not required to submit a list of potential conditions of community supervision in its charge. Cagle v. State, 23 S.W.3d 590, 594-95 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2000, pet. ref'd) (citing Yarbrough v. State, 742 S.W.2d 62, 64 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1987), pet. dism'd, improvidently granted, 779 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989)). And it is possible that any directive to the jury for it to specifically consider alcohol and drug abuse to be a mitigating factor might be seen as an improper comment on the weight of the evidence. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.14. The jury in this case assessed Mills' punishment at fifteen years' imprisonment. This is within the range provided for by Texas law. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.32 (a) (Vernon 2003). Finally, we note that, during the State's direct examination of the victim, the State was able to assist the victim by volunteering the name of the daytime talk show hosted by Barbara Walters, "The View." While the State's comment might have drawn an objection from opposing counsel regarding allowing counsel to testify, our review of the record leads us to the conclusion that the State's comment had no impact on the jury's verdict; further, we do not believe Mills' trial counsel offered ineffective assistance for failing to object to this slight degree of assistance by the State. For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court's judgment.
Aggravated robbery is a first-degree felony. Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 29.03(b).
The trial court's written warnings did not include the statutory paragraph regarding sex-offender registration. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 26.13(a)(5). Sex-offender registration is a direct consequence of a guilty plea; but registration is nonpunitive, and the trial court's failure to admonish the accused regarding sex-offender registration does not render a guilty plea void. Mitschke v. State, 129 S.W.3d 130, 135-36 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004). Such a view is even more applicable when Mills' offense, aggravated robbery, and the facts of this case would not subject him to the sex-offender registration requirements. See generally Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 62.408 (Vernon Supp. 2005).